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1 Introduction
Traditionally, economic theory has imposed strong conditions on how well
economic agents are informed about various aspects of the model in which
they are acting. An ongoing development is to weaken these assumptions.
This cumulative dissertation aims to contribute to this trend and consists
of four projects: “The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilib-
ria”, “The LIBOR Mechanism and Related Games”, “Model Uncertainty in
Insurance Markets”, and “Equilibria with Inertia in Bewley Economies”.1
All four projects come from the field of theoretical microeconomics and are
presented in the self-contained chapters 2 to 5. Despite the diﬀerent mod-
els and questions motivating the four chapters, there are deep interrelations
along several diﬀerent dimensions between the projects. By examining these
connections in this summary of the dissertation in detail we illustrate the
research approach and the research questions that this dissertation consid-
ers and answers.2 We begin with precise descriptions of the four projects,
with a particular focus on the research questions and our main contribu-
tions. In the second half of this summary we then study the connections
of the projects along several diﬀerent lines, before we give an outlook on
future work and developments.
1We will refer to them as Non-Robustness, LIBOR, Model, and Bewley, respectively.
2I will use “we” throughout the dissertation as a stylistic decision and as chapter 2 is
joint work with Christoph Kuzmics.
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The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk
equilibria
“The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria” is joint work with
Christoph Kuzmics. In this project we consider a classical economic situ-
ation. An agent has private information which is important for a second
agent. The action of the second agent influences the welfare of both agents.
In “Persuasion by cheap talk” Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the
existence of influential cheap talk equilibria despite a large conflict of inter-
est between the two agents. We add uncertainty about the preferences of
the first agent in a natural way to their model and show that the slightest
amount of uncertainty leads to nonexistence of influential communication
in equilibrium.
More precisely, the sender is privately informed about the true state ✓ 2
⇥ ⇢ RN , where N   2, and ⇥ is compact, convex, and nonempty. The
sender can send a costless message m from a finite message set M to the
receiver. The receiver gets the message and takes an action which aﬀects
the welfare of both sender and receiver. The receiver has a full support
prior over ⇥ defined by the distribution function F and will in equilibrium
always play his best estimate of the true state, a = E(✓|m). The sender’s
utility is a function of the action of the receiver, u(a) 2 R. As the message
is costless and thereby does not enter directly the utility function of the
sender, the model is a cheap talk model.
The paper which started this literature is the seminal Crawford and So-
bel (1982). In the latter framework influential communication between one
sender and one receiver is only possible if the bias, the conflict of interest,
between the expert and the uninformed receiver is not too large. Here in-
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fluential means that diﬀerent messages induce diﬀerent actions with strictly
positive probability. If the bias is large, influential communication seemed
possible only if messages are costly or verifiable, thus if messages are not
cheap. However, Chakraborty and Harbaugh alter the model of Crawford
and Sobel in two important points and prove the existence of influential
cheap talk equilibria in a situation of a large bias. First, they take the
dimension of the state space to be multidimensional, N   2. Second, they
assume the sender has state-independent preferences, i.e. the state does
not enter the utility function of the sender. As the preferences are assumed
to be common knowledge ex ante, the state-independence entails that the
preferences of the sender are also common knowledge ex interim. Further-
more, the state-independence is interpreted as a large bias as the receiver’s
preferences in fact depend on the realization of the state. A real world ex-
ample of state-independent preferences is the following situation between
a worker (the expert) and an employer. The true ability of the sender is
private knowledge. However, the sender wants, independently of her ability,
the maximum wage or the best relation of wage and leisure time.
The state-independence of the expert’s preferences at the interim stage re-
quires indiﬀerence of the sender between all actions which are induced in
equilibrium. The main insight of Chakraborty and Harbaugh is that it is
always possible to find an equilibrium with multiple messages and multiple
induced actions. They prove this via the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, a result
from functional analysis which can be used to prove Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem as a corollary.
However, for their result they assume that the preferences of the sender
have to be perfectly known to the receiver. Nevertheless, they are able to
prove robustness in three particular ways. There exists an influential cheap
3
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talk equilibrium if either the dimensionality of the state space is larger than
the cardinality of possible sender types or when the receiver has a prior
over the type set of the sender which is suﬃciently concentrated on one
type. Moreover, they present an equivalence result between epsilon-cheap
talk equilibria for large biases and cheap talk equilibria in the case of dis-
tance preferences. These are interesting robustness checks, but they do not
constitute the natural way to test for robustness. Therefore, we introduce
uncertainty about the preferences in a diﬀerent, more standard way which
resembles the uncertainty in Harsanyi (1973). In the simplest case of N = 2,
linear preferences, and uncertainty in one dimension, the utility function be-
comes U(a, x) = a1 + (⇢+ x)a2. Here ⇢ 2 R, ⇢ 6= 0, and x is the realization
of a continuous random variable X with distribution   on support [ ✏, ✏],
where ✏   0. The realization x of X is private knowledge of the sender.
This setup leads to uncertainty about the slope of the indiﬀerence curves.
The following theorem then holds true.
Theorem 2.2 If there is uncertainty about the preferences in the linear
case, i.e. if ✏ > 0, there does not exist an influential cheap talk equilibrium
for any F .
In the general case we consider not only a set of possible types t 2 T of
the sender but also require Condition (S) to be satisfied. Condition (S)
is satisfied if for any two actions a and a0 , if U(a, x⇤) = U(a0 , x⇤), then
U(a, x) 6= U(a0 , x) for all x 6= x⇤, x 2 T . This condition has been intro-
duced by Chakraborty and Harbaugh in the appendix of their paper and is
basically a generalized single crossing property and for instance satisfied by
linear preferences. The second main result of chapter 2 is theorem 2.4.
Theorem 2.4 If Condition (S) is satisfied and   is nonatomic, there does
not exist an influential cheap talk equilibrium for any F .
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Thus, the two main results in our paper state that all influential cheap talk
equilibria cease to exist as soon as we introduce the slightest amount of
uncertainty about the preferences of the sender. In stark contrast, we show
via an example that uncertainty about the bias in Crawford and Sobel does
not lead to an immediate breakdown of influential communication. Instead
uncertainty about the bias plays a surprisingly small role in their framework.
Additionally, we explain why a condition such as Condition (S) is needed
in the case of general preferences, investigate additive separable preferences
which are an intermediate case between the linear and the general case, and
consider a set of receivers which diﬀer in their prior.
The LIBOR Mechanism and Related Games
The second project “The LIBOR Mechanism and Related Games” has been
motivated by the ongoing LIBOR3 scandal which started to make headlines
throughout the world in summer 2012 and continues to do so. To give the
appropriate background to our modeling approach, we start chapter 3 with
a historical perspective of the LIBOR, a detailed chronology of the LIBOR
scandal, an overview over the administering process and a description of
policy responses to answer the problems with the LIBOR mechanism un-
covered by the scandal.
We then turn to an analysis of the LIBOR mechanism in a theoretical
model. For this end, we consider three strategic games which only diﬀer in
the utility function of the players. The players represent the banks. They
maximize their expected utility, which depends on three components. First,
their financial exposure to an index I which is a statistic of the quotes of
3LIBOR is short for London Interbank Oﬀered Rate
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the banks. Second, a penalty term for deviating with their quote from their
private costs. Third, a term which catches the reputation concerns of the
banks quote relative to the index and the quotes of the other banks. All
banks quote at the same point in time and without knowing the quotes of
the other banks. The three games we investigate are the Trimmed Average
Game, the Median Game, and the Average Game which all have their name
from the statistic used in the utility functions of the banks. Besides from
that, the games are completely identical.
The games are defined as follows. Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of players.
All players are informed about the realization of the state variable ✓ 2 ⇥ =
Rn+. This variable represents the private costs of the players. The strategy
of a player i is a function si : ⇥i ! R+. The quotes are denoted by x and
defined by the strategy. The utility function is a function of the quotes and
the own private value:
ui(xi, x i, ✓i) = ⌫iI(xi, x i)   (xi   ✓i)2 +  i(I(xi, x i)   xi). Here, I(x)
denotes a statistic depending on all quotes, ⌫i 2 R the financial exposure of
bank i to the index, and the players weigh their reputational concerns with
 i 2 R. In the Median and Trimmed Average Game we set  i = 0 for all i.
We start with the analysis of the Average Game and solve for Nash equi-
libria which are unique and explain why the Groves mechanism can solve
the misrepresentation problem in this game. Also, we explain the condi-
tions under which increasing the number of players is helpful and how this
depends on reputation concerns.
After having established the benchmark results in the Average Game, we
consider the Median Game. The median is the middle quote if the number
of players is odd and the arithmetic mean of the middle two quotes if the
number of players is even. In equilibrium, players will quote truthfully or
6
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will quote such that their quote directly impacts the median. Moreover, we
are able to show a qualitative diﬀerence between the equilibria in the even
and uneven case. If the number of players is uneven and at least three,
in every Nash equilibrium at least one player quotes truthfully, i.e. quotes
her private costs. This is not the case in the even case as we show via an
example.
In reality, the LIBOR is currently calculated as a trimmed average, i.e.
the submitted quotes from the banks are ordered from high to low, the
top and bottom 25 percent quantile are deleted, and the remaining quotes
are arithmetically averaged. To be able to distinguish between the three
diﬀerent statistics average, median, and trimmed average it is necessary to
consider at least five players as for one and two players all notions coincide
and for three and four players one has to define the trimmed average either
as median or average (except one allows for a diﬀerent weighting of diﬀerent
quotes). The equilibrium analysis in the Trimmed Average Game leads
to the following results. Similarly to the Median Game with even player
number there exist equilibria in which all players misrepresent. Moreover,
we formulate a suﬃcient criterion for misrepresentation: If a player quotes
such that the quote is not in the top or bottom 25 percent quantile and is
not one of the two pivotal quotes which just count for the trimmed average,
then the player misrepresents if she has positive exposure |⌫i| > 0 to the
index. We show that the bank will quote the pivotal quote if the bank faces
suﬃciently high exposure to the index. Finally, we are able to prove for the
five player game the existence of an equilibrium in which at least one player
misrepresents in a maximal way by analyzing all possible equilibrium quote
constellations.
In the following paragraph of chapter 3 we compare the three diﬀerent
7
Section 1.0 Introduction
games and in particular prove theorem 3.16 that states that in all games
there exists an equilibrium in which at least one player misrepresents in a
maximal way.
Theorem 3.16 In the Median Game, the Trimmed Average Game and the
Average Game there exists for all ✓ and all ⌫ an equilibrium in which at
least one player misrepresents in a maximal way.
Decisive for the surprisingly easy proof is the notion of maximal equilib-
rium misrepresentation. We note that this maximal misrepresentation in
equilibrium is lowest in the Average Game, followed by the Trimmed Aver-
age Game, and highest in the Median Game. This is due to the diﬀerent
marginal influence of individual quotes in the three games.
The appendix provides an equilibrium characterization in the three player
Median Game which is interesting from a theoretical point of view. We show
that three diﬀerent kind of equilibria may arise, depending on the parameter
constellations of private costs and financial exposure to the index. In the
appendix there are also examples of payoﬀ functions and actual trimming
rules from reality.
The analysis of the three diﬀerent games is interesting from a purely theoret-
ical point of view and to understand how the banks were able to manipulate
the index. However, the natural question which arises is: What does this
imply normatively? What is the right thing to do? Our descriptive study
has some important points to make here. Among these are the following
recommendations: Increase panel bank sizes whenever possible, make in-
dividual quotes temporarily anonymous, base quotes on real transactions
whenever possible, decrease the number of currencies and maturities, and
be cautious to change from a trimmed average rule to a median or aver-
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age rule. Several of these suggestions have also been put forward by the
Wheatley Review and some are already implemented. However, none of
these suggestions really solves the basic underlying incentive problem. Eco-
nomically speaking one needs an incentive compatible mechanism. In the
Average Game the Groves mechanism is able to exactly counterbalance mis-
representation incentives. For this, the mechanism designer has to know the
utility functions of the players perfectly well. Unfortunately, in reality this
will never be the case. Not only are the private costs of borrowing, the
financial exposure to the index, and the penalty function banks may use to
connect their quotes to their true costs all private knowledge of the banks,
they are also subject to constant change as, for example, banks buy and sell
options priced on the LIBOR. We do not see a way of solving the incentive
problem besides developing an alternative index to the LIBOR where insti-
tutions whose welfare is directly aﬀected by the index are not allowed to
influence the index. Thus, there is a need for a qualitatively new interest
rate benchmark.
Model Uncertainty in Insurance Markets
“Model Uncertainty in Insurance Markets” revisits the paper “Equilibrium
in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect
information” by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We introduce model un-
certainty in their framework. First, we examine the benchmark case of a
homogenous group of individuals and model uncertainty about the accident
probability. Second, we investigate model uncertainty about the fraction
of high and low ability types in the heterogeneous population case and in
particular provide a new solution to the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium
puzzle.
9
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The “Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets” paper has become one
of the most influential papers in the theory of economics. In particular, it
has been fundamental in the insurance and information literature. The au-
thors consider a simple model of insurers and individuals with two possible
states of the world, “accident” and “no accident”. If there happens to be
an accident, individuals face accident costs. However, the individuals can
buy insurance on a competitive insurance market, i.e. an insurance market
without any entry costs for the insurers and where expected profits for the
insurers are zero. In the first part of the paper the population of individuals
is homogenous. The individuals have the same likelihood of accident and the
individuals as well as the insurers know this personal accident probability.
Furthermore, insurers are risk neutral and individuals risk averse. The in-
surers oﬀer contracts which lie on their fair odds line. The contracts on this
line give the insurers expected utility zero. The unique equilibrium contract
is the full insurance contract which makes the risk averse individuals exactly
indiﬀerent between accident and no accident. This contract maximizes ex-
pected utility for the individuals while all other contracts, which would be
weakly preferred by the individuals make negative expected profits.
The deep insight of Rothschild and Stiglitz is that changing the assumptions
on the information distribution slightly can change the results qualitatively.
In the second part of their paper, they consider a heterogenous group of
individuals, where a known fraction has high ability / low risk while the
others have low ability / high risk. Individuals know their personal acci-
dent probability. If the insurers knew not only the fraction of high and low
risk types but could distinguish high and low types individually, the result
from the benchmark case would carry over, with two submarkets. In each
submarket a unique equilibrium would exist, the full insurance contract.
However, insurers do not know if an individual has high or low risk. In this
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situation Rothschild and Stiglitz show the following three main findings.
Taking information asymmetries into account is important, an equilibrium
may not exist, and if an equilibrium exists, it may not be pareto-optimal.
The basic force behind these results is that the presence of the low ability
individuals constitutes an externality for the high ability types. If insurers
oﬀered cheaper contracts for the high ability individuals, low ability indi-
viduals would buy them and insurers cannot identify this free riding as they
do not know who has high risk and who has low risk.
We revisit their model and introduce model uncertainty into it. We begin by
introducing model uncertainty about the accident probability on the side of
the insurers in the benchmark case. The insurers know they face a homoge-
nous group of individuals which have an accident with a certain probability
in the next period. However, they do not know the precise probability, but
only that the probability is an element of a nondegenerate connected inter-
val. Individuals know the accident probability. Suppose the insurers are risk
neutral but ambiguity averse concerning the probability interval. This is a
sensible assumption as the uncertainty about the precise probability does
not vanish with a large number of individuals and independent accident
occurrence. Insurers calculate with the highest accident probability for the
individuals, hence the insurance contracts get more expensive. Individuals
buy less insurance, and for suﬃciently high model uncertainty, i.e. a suﬃ-
ciently high diﬀerence between true accident probability and the accident
probability upon which the insurers base their calculations, no insurance
becomes an equilibrium.
We then inverse the setup and introduce model uncertainty on the side of
the individuals. Insurers know the precise probability of accident while the
individuals only know that this probability is an element of a nondegener-
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ate connected interval. When individuals are ambiguity averse, they will
always buy full insurance. However, in many situations it is sensible to
assume ambiguity loving behavior in the sense of overconfidence. Consider
driving abilities. In a often repeated study, car drivers are asked about their
personal driving abilities relative to driving abilities of the population. More
than 70 percent say they are better than average which is mathematically
just not possible. Own abilities are overestimated. Going back to the model
and thinking of car insurance where insuring companies have very good data
on the accident probabilities, overconfidence on the side of the individuals
may lead to underinsurance or no insurance at all, depending on the risk
aversion and the probability interval.
We also investigate the set of equilibria when individuals have incomplete
preferences with inertia. A set of equilibria around the full insurance con-
tract emerges. If this set includes the initial, no insurance allocation, the
inertia condition makes the no insurance contract the unique equilibrium.
For combinations of a suﬃciently large diﬀerence between true and maximal
accident probability and suﬃciently large risk aversion, the latter situation
will occur.
The arguably most important and interesting contribution of the “Model”
paper is that model uncertainty about the fraction of high and low ability
agents may solve the equilibrium puzzle. Consider the heterogenous popu-
lation model of Rothschild and Stiglitz. They assume the fraction   of high
and low types is perfectly known. It is not only mathematically interesting
to allow an interval of possible fractions but also economically more real-
istic to assume that insurers do not perfectly know the correct fraction  
but rather an interval ⇤ = [ , ] of possible fractions. Faced with this inter-
val, we assume insurers act in an ambiguity averse way which entails that
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they reckon with the highest possible fraction of high risk individuals. Two
possible types of equilibria may appear in general in the heterogenous pop-
ulation case. The original argument by Rothschild and Stiglitz that there
cannot be a pooling equilibrium does not depend on the fractions of high
and low types. Consider the separating equilibrium case. If the fraction is
perfectly known, then if there are suﬃciently few low ability types, there
does not exist a separating equilibrium as there exist contracts preferred by
both types. However for these equilibrium breaking contracts to exist the
number of high risk individuals has to be small as they constitute a nega-
tive externality on the low risk ones and make the contract more expensive.
In this situation assume the fraction is not precisely known. Insurers thus
calculate with the highest fraction of high risk types. For suﬃciently large
ambiguity in the sense of a suﬃciently large fraction of high risk types, there
always exists an equilibrium.
Theorem 4.6 Suppose there is ambiguity about the fraction   of the high
risk individuals. Insurers only know   2 ⇤ = [ , ]. If insurers are am-
biguity averse, then there always exists an equilibrium if   is suﬃciently
large.
We close chapter 4 by giving numerical examples and the figures which
illustrate the intuition behind the results.
Equilibria with Inertia in Bewley Economies
In “Equilibria with Inertia in Bewley Economies”, we perform a detailed
analysis of the static version of the discrete time case study presented by
Dana and Riedel (2013). We investigate the equilibrium set for diﬀerent
13
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amounts of ambiguity in the economy and diﬀerent ambiguity attitudes.
In particular, we are interested in the full insurance and no insurance of
uncertainty allocation, how the interplay of risk and Knightian uncertainty
aﬀects the set of equilibria, the inertia equilibrium refinement, and robust-
ness considerations.
Dana and Riedel consider two agents which are each endowed with two in-
dependent random variables R and U . The endowment !1 = R + U of the
first agent is minus the endowment of the second agent. The variable R
represents the risk in the economy and its distribution is known to be stan-
dard normal. The variable U represents Knightian uncertainty in the sense
of Knight (1921). This variable has standard variance but the expectation
↵ is an element of an interval [ ,], so that    0 becomes a measure for
the amount of ambiguity in the economy. Technically, we define the cor-
responding set of priors via the densities with respect to a reference prior.
Both agents have CARA utilities of degree one. We assume agents have
incomplete Bewley preferences as introduced by Bewley (2002). Hence, an
agent prefers allocation one over allocation two if the agent prefers one over
two in all scenarios, i.e. under all elements of the prior set. We call an
economy where agents have Bewley preferences B-economy. The decision
rule makes the preferences incomplete as soon as there exist two allocations
where one is not unanimously better under all priors than the other. In
particular, equilibrium allocations tend to be indeterminate when agents
have incomplete preferences. To ensure that at least endowment is compa-
rable with an equilibrium, Bewley (2002) suggests the inertia condition. An
equilibrium satisfies this property if all agents strictly prefer the equilibrium
allocation to the endowment allocation.
In our equilibrium analysis we first consider the equilibrium set without
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inertia. The following results holds.
Theorem 5.2 The B-economy has an equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with equilibrium
consumption c1⇤ =  c2⇤ = ↵U and equilibrium price p⇤ = exp( 12↵2) for
↵ 2 [ ,]. In particular, the set of equilibria in the B-economy is indeter-
minate for  > 0.
Thus, the equilibrium set gets thicker the more ambiguity there is in the
economy. Without ambiguity, agents know the distribution of the second
random variable which is standard normal. Full insurance is the unique
equilibrium. As soon as there is ambiguity about the expectation of the
second random variable, the equilibrium set becomes indeterminate and for
suﬃciently large ambiguity, no trade of the uncertain variable becomes an
equilibrium. Important to note is that agents always trade as they com-
pletely trade away their exposure to the risk representing random variable
R. Refining the equilibrium concept with the inertia condition leads to a
tension between risk aversion and the status quo bias that stems from the
inertia condition.
Theorem 5.4 The equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with c⇤ = ↵U and p⇤ = exp( 12↵2)
satisfies the inertia property if and only if
↵ 2 [max{ , p2  2+ 2},min{, +p2 + 2+ 2}].
In particular, the set of equilibria with inertia in the B-economy is indeter-
minate for positive and finite ambiguity ( 2 (0,1)).
For low levels of ambiguity the inertia property has no bite. However, with
increasing level of ambiguity the status quo bias becomes more powerful
and the inertia condition cuts through the equilibrium set. We precisely
calculate for which ambiguity level the equilibrium set is thickest, when
full insurance ceases to be an equilibrium, from which points on the inertia
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cuts through the equilibrium set, and prove uniqueness of equilibrium in
the limiting case of infinite ambiguity. Moreover, we highlight that if agents
have Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) preferences, full insurance is always the
unique equilibrium, independently of the level of ambiguity.
We then turn to a robustness analysis of our findings. We perform robust-
ness checks in the following diﬀerent dimensions: Endowment, degree of
constant absolute risk aversion, prior sets, and combinations thereof. To
take one example, we investigate the equilibrium set if agents are only en-
dowed with uncertainty but not with risk. In this case, the equilibrium
with inertia becomes unique as soon as no trade of uncertainty becomes an
equilibrium allocation.
Interrelations of the four projects
We now investigate the interrelations of the four projects from several dif-
ferent perspectives.
Financial market regulation, financial crisis and the
drying up of markets
The “Bewley” project delivers insights on the financial crisis and the regula-
tion of financial markets. Two prevalent ways of regulation and to measure
financial strength are risk measures and stress testing. Artzner et al. (1999)
introduce the notion of a coherent risk measure which is an attempt to cap-
ture financial risk in a real number. Their starting point is axiomatically.
They provide a set of axioms that such a measure of risk is supposed to
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satisfy. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) preferences can be interpreted as co-
herent risk measures due to the representation result of these risk measures.
Exhibiting a stress test means comparing a status quo to a new allocation
under a number of scenarios where the new one is only preferred to the
current one if it performs better under all scenarios. Thus, there is a cor-
respondence to incomplete preferences plus inertia. Our results point to a
possible objectionable consequence of stress testing. Insurance markets may
dry up provided suﬃciently large ambiguity.
Financial market regulation lies also at the core of the LIBOR project.
This set of interest rate benchmarks has been manipulated for years. It
is of vital interest for the functioning of financial markets that new rules
get established which make such manipulations impossible or at least more
diﬃcult. Our descriptive study has some normative implications on this
front.
The LIBOR scandal also has an inherent relation to the drying up of a
market, the interbank market. After the financial crisis broke lose in 2007,
banks were very cautious concerning the financial strength of other banks.
Therefore, the unsecured interbank borrowing market, which underlies the
theoretical conception of the LIBOR, dried up. The number of credits in
this market fell massively. Nevertheless, banks had to come up with quotes
which were supposed to give an adequate description of the interest rates on
the unsecured market. Despite all the misrepresentation incentives which
exist independently of a dry or liquid interbank market, the drying up made
the task to find an adequate number for the quote more diﬃcult.
Speaking of drying up of insurance markets and financial crisis our project
“Model” provides important insights. Times of financial crisis are in general
also times where uncertainty about contract partners grows. We examine
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the case where insurers face ambiguity about the precise accident probabil-
ities of individuals. In this situation the insurance market shrinks as full or
almost full insurance becomes too expensive for the individuals. Moreover,
being less fully insured, individuals are also more vulnerable to accidents or,
more generally, negative shocks. These accidents may become real threats
to the individuals as their income distribution becomes highly dependent on
the state. This may signal a generally higher level of fragility of companies
and economies in times of high uncertainty.
Information transmission and information extraction
Information transmission and information extraction is a joint topic of the
first three projects. In “Non-Robustness” we investigate a sender receiver
game. Our main contribution is an impossibility result. As soon as there is
some uncertainty about the preferences of the sender, there is no influential
communication in equilibrium. It is not possible for sender and receiver to
communicate such that the receiver learns something about the true state
of the world.
In the “LIBOR” project the receiver which is the financial regulation au-
thority would like to infer from the quotes the true underlying state as well.
The regulator would like to extract as much information as possible from the
quotes. In the Average Game, full revelation is possible due to the Groves
mechanism. In reality, the basic underlying problem is that the true payoﬀ
functions of the senders are not known. This makes the problem hard to
solve and the LIBOR quotes will give the regulator only an imprecise idea
of what the true private costs are.
In the “Model” paper the presence of the high risk individuals poses a neg-
18
Section 1.0 Introduction
ative externality on the low risk individuals and it is not possible for the
insurers to separate the groups before the contracts are bought. Also, the
low risk individuals cannot communicate credibly that they are low risk. If
the insurers believed them, high risk individuals would communicate in the
same way.
Equilibria
In all four projects we investigate the equilibrium sets and under which cir-
cumstances no equilibrium exists. Moreover, we compare the diﬀerent equi-
libria concerning how much information they oﬀer and if they are socially
desirable. In the “Non-Robustness” paper we show that only the babbling
equilibrium exists, provided there is uncertainty about the preferences. In
contrast, we show that influential equilibria continue to exist in Crawford
and Sobel (1982) despite bias uncertainty. The “LIBOR” project examines
three diﬀerent but related games in detail. One commonality is that in all
three games there exist equilibria in which at least one player misrepresents
in a maximal way. Our most important finding in “Model” guarantees the
existence of an equilibrium which does not necessarily exist if insurers are
better informed about the fraction of high risk individuals in the popula-
tion. Thus, less information leads to better predictable market behavior in
the sense of the existence of a unique equilibrium. The more standard rela-
tion in economics is the opposite. In “Bewley” no insurance of uncertainty
equilibria arise provided suﬃciently large ambiguity. The insurance market
dries up, a phenomenon which is economically not desirable as the economy
becomes more vulnerable to negative realizations.
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Insurance
All four projects have a relation to insurance and insurance markets. The
“Model” project investigates the set of equilibrium contracts in competi-
tive insurance markets and the “Bewley” chapter examines when full, par-
tial, and no insurance equilibria exist. From a quite diﬀerent angle, “Non-
Robustness” has an insurance interpretation as well. A situation of state-
independent preferences is that of an insurance agent who is privately in-
formed about the quality of a contract but only interested in selling the
contract. In our model this expert cannot influence the action of the poten-
tial buyer through costless messages as soon as the receiver faces uncertainty
about the preferences of the sender. An important part of risk management
of companies is to insure against changes of interest rates. The manipula-
tion and manipulability of key interest rates that we discuss in “LIBOR” is
therefore an aspect risk managers should be at least aware of.
Robustness
More broadly, a research goal of the thesis is to investigate how robust
findings in game theory and economics in general are, if we allow for certain
modifications and the introduction of uncertainty. In “Non-Robustness”
influential equilibria immediately break down provided uncertainty about
preferences; in “LIBOR” the basic incentives to misrepresent are present in
all related games, the magnitude of misrepresentation however changes; in
“Model” uncertainty may lead to more precise equilibrium predictions, and
in “Bewley” the amount of (Knightian) uncertainty in the economy plays a
decisive role in the determination of the equilibrium set.
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Outlook
Economic theory is a relatively young science and not as matured as physics,
for example. Many real world phenomena have not been understood well in
economic models so far. Nevertheless, economic theory has been successful
in many areas, in particular in microeconomics. To give one example, mod-
ern auction theory has helped Germany to make large revenues from the
UMTS auction in 2000. Game theory has also been, generally speaking, a
success story. While not being able to capture or predict human behavior in
many circumstances, it has become an important intellectual tool to think
about strategic reasoning and incentives. However, economic theory still
has a lot of work to do and a lot of interesting and important questions
remain to be answered. With this dissertation we try to support the at-
tempt of economic theory to go more in the direction of robustness and less
restrictive assumptions on information about preferences and probabilities.
To be more precise, “Non-Robustness” questions the assumption of perfect
information of the receiver about the sender’s preferences and comes to the
negative conclusion that influential communication ceases to be possible
in equilibrium. On the positive side, we show that uncertainty about the
bias in “Strategic information transmission” plays a surprisingly small role
and does not immediately change communication possibilities. “LIBOR”
examines a mechanism from the real world and investigates manipulation
possibilities. From our point of view, the language of game theory is natural
in this situation as banks are utility maximizing, strategically acting entities.
In the “Model” and “Bewley” framework actors do not only face risk but also
ambiguity. Thus, we weaken the assumption of the Bayesian paradigm.4 We
4The Bayesian paradigm holds, in the formulation of Gilboa and Marinacci (2011), that
any source of uncertainty can and should be quantified probabilistically. Gilboa and
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allow the agents to use a set of priors instead of a single probability. In these
chapters we apply ambiguity theory and investigate how equilibrium sets
change in comparison to models in which agents are better informed in the
sense of having a precise probability.
Economic theory and economics in general are, from our perspective, in a
transition phase. A lot of models have turned out to be missing essential
parts of the real world, in particular in macroeconomics. Some questions
may even be unanswerable as the evolution of complex dynamic systems
becomes easily chaotic. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge three
facts. First, economic theory has led already to many deep insights, second,
it is a young and diﬃcult science, and third, it is trying to find answers to the
many challenges still to be explained and is making progress on this path.
We hope to contribute with this dissertation to this ongoing development.
Marinacci state “Since the mid-20th century, economic theory is dominated by the
Bayesian paradigm.”
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2 The (non-)robustness of
influential cheap talk
equilibria
Abstract
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap
talk equilibria in sender-receiver games when the state is multidimensional
and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only
the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small degree of
uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973).
None of the influential equilibria are robust to this kind of uncertainty.
2.1 Introduction
One of the main findings of the cheap talk literature is that influential
communication in one sender one receiver games is only possible if the
conflict of interest is not too large. This has been shown in the equilibrium
characterization by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and expanded by Goltsman
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et al. (2009). For large biases, credible communication seemed only possible
if messages are verifiable or costly (for a survey on this literature, see Sobel
(2013)). To the contrary, Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the
existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in sender-receiver games even if
the conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver is large. Thus,
their result is in contrast to the intuition that for influential communication
preferences cannot be too diﬀerent. Two things are however key for the
result by Chakraborty and Harbaugh which make their framework diﬀerent
from the setting of Crawford and Sobel. First, the preferences of the sender
are state-independent and second, the dimensionality N of the state variable
✓, whose realization is private knowledge of the sender, is strictly greater
than one. The fact that dimensionality of the state can change results
qualitatively is known since at least Battaglini (2002)1, see also Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2007) who show how common interests arise naturally in a
multidimensional setting. The additional assumption of state-independence
can be seen as an extreme form of conflict of interest. If the sender is a
worker with privately known skill level, she may want to receive, regardless
of the true state, the maximal wage and therefore has state-independent
preferences. In particular, the state-independence implies that if more than
one action is induced in equilibrium, the sender has to be indiﬀerent between
these actions. This latter fact gives the impression that influential cheap talk
equilibria are not very robust and easily break down as soon as the slightest
amount of uncertainty about the preferences of the sender is introduced.
Chakraborty and Harbaugh themselves show robustness of the equilibrium
construction in the presence of limited uncertainty of the receiver about the
sender’s type in three particular examples. When the number of possible
types is lower then the dimensionality N of ✓ there still exists an influential
1He shows that full revelation is generically possible in a multiple sender and multidi-
mensional state world, even for arbitrarily large conflict of interest.
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cheap talk equilibrium. Also, if the probability distribution over the set of
possible types is suﬃciently concentrated on one type, the existence result
remains true. Furthermore, Chakraborty and Harbaugh investigate state-
dependent Euclidean preferences and present an equivalence result between
cheap talk equilibria and epsilon-cheap talk equilibria for large biases.2
In this paper we introduce uncertainty in a diﬀerent, more natural way which
resembles the kind of uncertainty in the purification paper by Harsanyi
(1973). With this kind of uncertainty which we call Harsanyi-Uncertainty,
the intuition that the existence result is not very robust is true. In fact,
all influential cheap talk equilibria cease to exist as soon as the slightest
amount of uncertainty exists. We begin with the linear case. In this case
the way we introduce uncertainty leads to uncertainty about the slope of
the indiﬀerence curves. The slightest amount of uncertainty suﬃces to show
the nonexistence of influential cheap talk equilibria. For the general case of
nonlinear preferences, we suppose additionally that what Chakraborty and
Harbaugh call condition (S) is satisfied. This condition basically says that
two diﬀerent actions are not given the same utility by more than one type. In
particular, this condition is always satisfied in the linear case. It is necessary
to impose a condition like this as otherwise there still may exist an influential
cheap talk equilibrium if the indiﬀerence curves intersect in a particular
way. Given condition (S) there do not exist influential cheap talk equilibria
if there exists the slightest amount of uncertainty. To the contrary, there
exists an influential equilibrium in Crawford and Sobel despite uncertainty
about the bias as we show in the appendix. Moreover, the existence theorem
of Chakraborty and Harbaugh is robust to uncertainty about the type of
the receiver.
2These robustness results appear in the online appendix of the Chakraborty and Har-
baugh paper.
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The paper is organized as follows. We begin by restating the model and the
main finding of Chakraborty and Harbaugh. Then we consider the linear
case as a motivating example for the intuition behind our results before
we turn to the general case where we generalize the findings of the linear
case. Here we also explain why a condition like condition (S) is needed
in the general case. In the conclusion we discuss the implications of our
results for applications, like the possibility of credible communication of
biased lobbyists. In the appendix we show why uncertainty about the bias
does not necessarily lead to nonexistence of influential cheap talk equilibria
in Crawford and Sobel, we present the proof of the existence theorem of
Chakraborty and Harbaugh, consider the case when preferences are additive
separable, and show robustness of the existence result when there is a set
of possible receivers.
2.2 The Chakraborty and Harbaugh result
A sender (female) is privately informed about the realization of ✓ 2 ⇥, where
⇥ is a convex and compact subset of RN with nonempty interior and N   2.
The sender can send a costless message m from a finite set of messages M
to a receiver (male). The receiver observes the message and takes an action
which influences the welfare of both sender and receiver. In equilibrium,
the receiver plays his best estimate of the true state, a = E(✓|m). 3 The
prior of the receiver is described by the distribution function F with density
f and has full support on ⇥. The preferences of both sender and receiver
3If the utility function of the receiver has the form v(a, ✓) =  (a   ✓)2, then the best
response of the receiver is to play the (conditional) expectation of ✓. Here we only
consider equilibrium actions of the receiver, in equilibrium he will always play his
best estimate of the true state given his prior and the message of the sender
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are common knowledge at the interim stage. Thus, the utility function of
the sender does not depend on the realization of the state variable ✓, it is
state-independent. Her utility is a function of the action of the receiver,
u(a) 2 R. A communication strategy is a mapping from the state space ⇥
into the set of probability distributions over messages in the message space
M . The equilibrium concept is Bayesian Nash. In this setup we define
the notions of influential and cheap talk equilibrium. A communication
strategy is a cheap talk equilibrium if there is no incentive for the sender to
deviate to misreporting about the true state of the world. An equilibrium is
influential if diﬀerent messages induce diﬀerent actions with strictly positive
probability. The main finding of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) is the
existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in addition to the always in
cheap talk games existing babbling equilibrium.4
Theorem 2.1. (Chakraborty and Harbaugh) For all u and all F there exists
an influential cheap talk equilibrium.
In the proof, they fix an interior point c and split the state space via a hy-
perplane h with orientation s where s is an element of the unit sphere. Due
to the Borsuk-Ulam theorem5 there exists a hyperplane h⇤ with orientation
s⇤ such that if the sender truthfully indicates on which side of the hyper-
plane the true state is, the sender does not have an incentive to deviate to
misreporting as she is exactly indiﬀerent between the induced actions. The
receiver does not have an incentive to deviate, as he learns something about
4If the receiver takes the same action regardless of the message, the sender is always
indiﬀerent between all signals. In particular, it is a best reply for the sender to
always send the same message, hence there exists a no communication equilibrium,
the babbling equilibrium.
5The Borsuk-Ulam theorem states that all continuous odd functions f : SN 1 ! R have
a zero, i.e. there exists s⇤ such that f(s⇤) = 0. Here SN 1 is the unit sphere, the set
of points which have distance one from the reference point.
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the true state and therefore has a more precise updated estimate of the true
state. For details of the proof, we refer to the appendix.
2.3 Robustness for linear preferences
Two points are key to the existence proof: the sender’s indiﬀerence between
the two induced actions and the common knowledge of the sender’s prefer-
ences at the interim stage. Chakraborty and Harbaugh themselves weaken
the common knowledge assumption and show robustness of the equilibrium
construction in the presence of limited uncertainty of the receiver about the
sender’s type in three particular examples. When the number of possible
types is lower then the dimensionality N of ✓ there still exists an influential
cheap talk equilibrium. Also, if the probability distribution over the set of
possible types is suﬃciently concentrated on one type, the existence result
remains true. Furthermore, they present an equivalence result for distance
preferences between epsilon-cheap talk equilibria and cheap talk equilibria
when the bias is large.
The three ways in which Chakraborty and Harbaugh allow for uncertainty
are however, from our perspective, not the natural ones. We introduce un-
certainty in a diﬀerent, more apparent way and call it Harsanyi-Uncertainty.
We start with the simplest case: two dimensions (N = 2), linear preferences,
and uncertainty in one dimension. Without uncertainty about the prefer-
ences of the sender the utility function is u(a) = a1+⇢a2, where ⇢ 2 R, ⇢ 6= 0.
We now introduce limited uncertainty about the sender’s preferences con-
cerning the second component, U(a, x) = a1 + (⇢ + x)a2, where x 2 [ ✏, ✏]
for ✏   0. If ✏ = 0, we are back in the world without uncertainty. The
preferences of the sender cease to be common knowledge as the receiver
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(a) No uncertainty (b) Uncertainty
Figure 2.1: Uncertainty vs. no uncertainty in the linear case
does not know x but only X ⇠  [ ✏, ✏]. Here X is a continuous random
variable distributed according to the continuous distribution function   on
the interval [ ✏, ✏]. An example is the uniform distribution.6 The realiza-
tion x of X is private knowledge of the sender. Therefore, we denote the
utility function from the perspective of the sender as U with arguments a
and x. For ✏ = 0, there is no uncertainty, thus theorem 2.1 guarantees the
existence of an influential cheap talk equilibrium. As soon as ✏ > 0, there
is uncertainty about the preferences which induces qualitatively diﬀerent
results concerning the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria. The
following theorem 2.2 makes this precise.
Theorem 2.2. If there is uncertainty about the preferences in the linear
case, i.e. if ✏ > 0, there does not exist an influential cheap talk equilibrium
for any F .
6Decisive will be the fact that any particular type of a sender will have probability zero
due to the continuity of the distribution function. Thus, we could also consider for
example a normal distribution with positive variance which then has support R.
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Before we give the formal proof, we present the way in which we introduce
uncertainty and the intuition behind the contradiction argument in Figure
2.1. In (a), we depict the case without uncertainty about the sender’s utility
function. For any interior point c there exists a hyperplane h such that if the
sender always sends truthfully in which half of the state space the true state
lies and the receiver understands the strategy and the message of the sender,
the updated estimates of the receiver lie on the same indiﬀerence curve of
the sender. The updated estimates are a1 and a2 and the indiﬀerence curve
is the straight line through a1 and a2. Therefore, an influential equilibrium
exists. This is the main insight of Chakraborty and Harbaugh. However, it
is crucial for this influential equilibrium to exist that the sender is exactly
indiﬀerent between the two updated estimates of the receiver.
Suppose now there is Harsanyi-Uncertainty about the slope of the indiﬀer-
ence curve as in (b). The receiver does not know the precise slope, he only
knows that the indiﬀerence curve of the sender through point c lies some-
where between the dotted and the broken line. The set of possible slopes is
a nonempty interval. If the receiver has a nonatomic distribution over this
set, with probability zero he will guess the correct one. However, for any
two updated estimates of the receiver defined by the hyperplane, there only
exists one indiﬀerence curve on which both updated estimates lie. There-
fore, with probability one, the sender is not indiﬀerent between the two
induced actions, which lets her message state-independently. This in turn
leads to a contradiction to the assumption that there exists an influential
cheap talk equilibrium. We now turn to the formal proof.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists an influential cheap
talk equilibrium. Then there exist m1 6= m2 such that a1 = E[✓|m1] 6=
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E[✓|m2] = a2.7 In equilibrium, a1 and a2 have to be best replies. Wlog,
a12 > a
2
2, else introduce uncertainty in the first dimension of action (if “=”)
or relabel (if “<”). Suppose there exists x˜ 2 [ ✏, ✏] such that U(a1, x˜) = a11+
(⇢+x˜)a12 = a
2
1+(⇢+x˜)a
2
2 = U(a
2, x˜). This implies U(a1, x) > U(a2, x) for all
x > x˜ and U(a1, x) < U(a2, x) for all x < x˜. If the sender is not indiﬀerent
between the two induced actions, it is the unique best response for the sender
to make the message sent not state-dependent: For all ✓, ✓0 2 ⇥, ✓ 6= ✓0 ,
it holds Pr(m1|x, ✓) = Pr(m1|x, ✓0) and Pr(m2|x, ✓) = Pr(m2|x, ✓0) for all
x 6= x˜. As x is unknown to the receiver andX is continuous, Pr(X = x) = 0
for all x 2 [ ✏, ✏], in particular Pr(X = x˜) = 0.8 Therefore, the receiver
correctly infers how much the sender gains in the second dimension with
probability zero. With probability one, the sender is not indiﬀerent between
the two induced actions. Therefore, with probability one the sender will not
make the message contingent on the state. Realizing this, the receiver will
choose an action independently of the message received, actions a1 and a2
are not best responses to the strategy of the sender. Thus, there cannot
exist an influential cheap talk equilibrium and the only existing equilibrium
is the babbling equilibrium.
In the particular case of linear preferences with ✏ uncertainty about the
sender’s preferences concerning the second dimension, the influential cheap
7To be precise: Influential only implies that diﬀerent messages imply diﬀerent actions
with strictly positive probability, not necessarily with probability one. It suﬃces
however to prove the theorem only for the probability one case, as if there exists an
influential equilibrium, in particular there exists an influential equilibrium in which
diﬀerent messages induce diﬀerent actions with probability one.
8Here one could precisely quantify in terms of   the probability that S prefers a1 to a2
due to the ordering of the type space [ ✏, ✏] and the linearity of the preferences. This
is however not important for the contradiction argument and will not be possible in
the later, general proof of the nonexistence of influential cheap talk equilibria.
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talk equilibria are still robust if we weaken the equilibrium notion to ✏-
equilibrium.9 To make this precise, consider   = maxx2[ ✏,✏] |[U(a1, x)  
U(a2, x)]|. Then the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.3. For all F there exists an influential cheap talk  -equilibrium.
2.4 Robustness for general preferences
We now turn to the general case. Wlog, we assume N = 2.10 The sender’s
utility function has two arguments, action a 2 A ⇢ ⇥ and type x 2 T .11 In
the linear case we have T = [ ✏, ✏]. We assume the type x of the sender is
her private knowledge, the receiver only knows X ⇠  (T ), where   is a con-
tinuous distribution function with support T .12 We now formulate condition
(S), as stated in the online appendix of Chakraborty and Harbaugh.13 Con-
dition (S) is satisfied if for any two actions a and a0 , if U(a, x⇤) = U(a0 , x⇤),
then U(a, x) 6= U(a0 , x) for all x 6= x⇤, x 2 T . For example, linear prefer-
ences satisfy this property, as one can see from figure 2.1. More generally
condition (S) holds for preferences whose indiﬀerence curves satisfy a single
crossing property. The following example given in figure 2.2 explains why a
condition like condition (S) is needed. Take an interior point c and a hyper-
9Let ✏   0. An equilibrium is an ✏-equilibrium if it is not possible for a player to gain
more than ✏ by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium strategy.
10This is wlog, as the contradiction argument will not depend on the dimensionality of
✓.
11We choose, in contrast to Chakraborty and Harbaugh, to denote the type by x and
not by t, to be able to distinguish between the random variable X and the realization
x.
12We implicitly assume T has some kind of interval structure to be able to support a
continuous distribution function.
13They introduce condition (S) for their proposition 6 and use it to split the type set
which enables them to apply the implicit function theorem.
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Figure 2.2: Existence of influential cheap talk equilibrium despite Harsanyi-
Uncertainty
plane h which splits the state space in two halves. The indiﬀerence curves
of the diﬀerent sender types are the dotted lines.14 If now the updated
estimates a1 and a2 are exactly such that the indiﬀerence curve through a1
also goes through a2 for all possible sender types x 2 T (violating Condi-
tion (S)), then there still exists an influential cheap talk equilibrium. The
receiver has no incentive to deviate as he is better informed and the sender
has no incentive as the updated estimates lie on the same indiﬀerence curve.
Condition (S) rules the situation of figure 2.2 out and the following theorem
generalizes theorem 2.2 to nonlinear preferences.
Theorem 2.4. If Condition (S) is satisfied and   is nonatomic, there does
not exist an influential cheap talk equilibrium for any F .
Comment 2.5. Two points are important to note. First, it is straightfor-
ward to generalize theorem 2.4 to the case where condition (S) is satisfied
14One may think of a continuum of indiﬀerence curves between the most left and most
right curve
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with probability one: Say Condition (S 0) holds if for any two actions a and
a
0 ,  (x 2 T |U(a, x) 6= U(a0 , x)) = 1. Then theorem 2.4 holds if we replace
condition (S) by the weaker condition (S 0). The proof is the same.
Second, theorem 2.4 and the condition (S 0) version of theorem 2.4 give suf-
ficient conditions for the nonexistence of influential cheap talk equilibria,
given T is nondegenerate. It might be interesting to investigate necessary
conditions for the nonexistence.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction and similar to the proof of the lin-
ear case. Suppose there exists an influential cheap talk equilibrium. Hence,
there exist messagesm1 andm2 which induce diﬀerent actions, a1 = E(✓|m1) 6=
a2 = E(✓|m2).15 Suppose there exists x˜ 2 T such that u(a1, x˜) = u(a2, x˜).
Condition (S) implies that for all x 6= x˜ it holds u(a1, x) 6= u(a2, x). If the
sender is not indiﬀerent between the two induced actions, she will send a
message which is not state-dependent: For all ✓, ✓0 2 ⇥, ✓ 6= ✓0 , it holds
Pr(m1|x, ✓) = Pr(m1|x, ✓0) and Pr(m2|x, ✓) = Pr(m2|x, ✓0) for all x 6= x˜.
As x is unknown to the receiver and X is a continuous random variable,
Pr(X = x) = 0 for all x 2 T , in particular Pr(X = x˜) = 0. Therefore,
the receiver can only correctly infer how much the sender gains and loses
in the two dimensions with probability zero. Thus, with probability one
the sender strictly prefers one induced action over the other induced action
which implies that with probability one the sender will send a message which
is not state-dependent. Realizing this, the receiver will not make his action
contingent on the message as making the action contingent on the message
is no longer a best reply. Hence, there cannot exist an influential cheap talk
equilibrium. The only equilibrium is the babbling equilibrium.
15As argued before in the footnote in the proof of theorem 2.2, it suﬃces to consider the
probability one case.
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Consider an influential cheap talk equilibrium with equilibrium actions
a1 6= a2 in the case without uncertainty about the preferences. Denote
the maximal utility diﬀerence of these actions in the uncertainty case by
  = maxx2T [|U(a1, x)   U(a2, x)|]. Then the following proposition holds
true.
Proposition 2.6. For all U and all F there exists an influential cheap talk
 -equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusion
The contribution by Chakraborty and Harbaugh provides important in-
sights into how the combination of multidimensionality of the state and
state-independent preferences generates influential cheap talk equilibria.
The state-independence implies that the sender has to be indiﬀerent be-
tween all actions which are induced in equilibrium. This indiﬀerence is an
unavoidable consequence of the state-independence, but also a drawback of
the results as all influential equilibria become fragile in the sense of being
not robust. We introduced uncertainty about the preferences of the sender
in what we consider the most natural way, first for linear preferences, then
for general nonlinear preferences. In the linear case, the receiver knows the
slope of the expert’s indiﬀerence curves precisely up to an ✏. In the general
case the sender’s type is an element of a continuous set T . Additionally, we
imposed condition (S), i.e. if one type gives the same utility to two diﬀerent
actions, all other types are not indiﬀerent between these two actions. We
proved the nonexistence of influential cheap talk equilibria both for the lin-
ear and the general case with a contradiction argument. As the sender type
does not condition the message on the actual state with probability one,
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the receiver does not listen to the sender and only the babbling equilibrium
continues to exist. These findings follow the intuition. If the sender’s util-
ity does not depend on the state, the sender will not disclose information
truthfully except the disclosure leads to actions between which the sender
is indiﬀerent. Therefore, the results of Chakraborty and Harbaugh do not
transfer to more realistic scenarios with some uncertainty about the sender’s
preferences. In these situations the sender cannot communicate information
such that it influences the actions of the receiver.
Our results also let the applications, which Chakraborty and Harbaugh
present, appear in a new light. Credible communication is not possible
for an expert with state-independent preferences as soon as there is some
uncertainty about the type. Consider for example think tanks. They might
have a clear political agenda, but try to appear neutral. One might be
able to have a pretty good estimation of the precise preferences. As their
funding is generally unknown, there nevertheless remains some uncertainty
which suﬃces to break down influential communication, as we have shown.
From a diﬀerent perspective, while the receiver does not learn anything
about the true state, he does get some information about the type of the
sender. It might be interesting to consider if and how a receiver can assemble
information about the true state in a repeated game setting with uncertainty
about the sender’s preferences.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Uncertainty about the bias in Crawford and Sobel
We have shown that the influential cheap talk equilibria of Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2010) do not survive the introduction of Harsanyi-Uncertainty
about the type of the sender. In this section we show that this is not a
general problem that all sender-receiver games suﬀer from. To see this we
use a simple example in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel (1982) with a
possibly biased sender in which information transmission can still happen
despite uncertainty about this bias.
The state space is ⇥ = [ 1, 1]. The prior of the receiver is given by a
distribution F (with density f) over ⇥ that is symmetric around zero.16 The
sender is privately informed about the realization of the state ✓ 2 ⇥ and
can send a costless message m 2M = {H,L} to the receiver. The receiver
observes the message of the sender and takes an action a 2 A = ⇥ = [ 1, 1].
The sender has utility function u(a, ✓, b) =  (✓ + b   a)2 and the receiver
utility function v(a, ✓) =  (✓   a)2. Here, b denotes the sender’s bias
relative to the receiver, a the action taken by the receiver, and ✓ the state.
Suppose, first, it was common knowledge that the sender’s bias is equal
to zero. Thus, the game is one of complete common interest. This game
has an influential equilibrium in which senders with state below zero send
message L and senders with state above zero send message H. The receiver
chooses actions which are equal to the conditional expectation of the state
conditioning on the observed message and given the sender’s strategy. For
the case of a uniform prior F , for instance, the receiver chooses action
16The assumption of symmetry is not important for the result. It allows us, however, to
dramatically simplify the equilibrium calculations.
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aH =
1
2 upon receiving message H and aL =  12 upon receiving message L.
We now introduce Harsanyi-Uncertainty about the bias into this example of
a Crawford and Sobel (1982) sender-receiver game.17 The sender knows her
bias precisely, in addition to knowing the state. The receiver does neither
know the true state nor the precise bias b. Instead, the receiver only has a
prior G (with density g) over an interval [ ✏,+✏] of possible biases of the
sender for ✏ positive but small. The prior G is assumed to be symmetric
around 0 and orthogonal to the prior F over the state space.18
We shall now compute an influential equilibrium that is close to the equilib-
rium without bias uncertainty given above. Suppose that the receiver plays
action aH if he observes message H and action aL if he observes message L
with (without loss of generality) aL < aH . Then the behavior of the sender
must be as follows. If the state ✓ is below a cut-oﬀ of q(b), which depends
on the sender’s bias, then she sends message L, otherwise she sends message
H. The cut-oﬀ must be such that the sender with bias b and state equal to
this cut-oﬀ q(b) is indiﬀerent between the two messages. This consideration
leads to q(b) = aH+aL2   b. The symmetry in the two distributions implies
that aL =  aH . This in turn implies that the cutoﬀ is q(b) =  b and inde-
pendent of the two actions.19 It then remains to calculate the equilibrium
action aH . It is given by the conditional expectation, from the sender’s
point of view, of the state q(b) given that message H is sent, i.e. given that
17Papers with uncertainty about the bias in the cheap-talk literature include Morgan
and Stocken (2003) and Li and Madarász (2008). We are not aware of a paper that
introduces uncertainty about the bias in a way similar to ours.
18In other words the receiver’s joint prior about state and bias is the product of the two
marginal priors. Bias and state are, in the receiver’s view, independently drawn.
19Without symmetry in the distributions this would not be true, and calculations would
be more cumbersome.
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✓ > q(b). For ✏ small enough, this can be expressed as the double-integral
2
Z ✏
b= ✏
Z 1
✓= b
✓f(✓)g(b)d✓db,
where the 2 is the reciprocal of the probability that ✓ > q(b) (derived
from the symmetry in the two distributions). For the special case of two
uniform distributions for F and G we obtain aH = 12   ✏
2
6 and aL =  aH .
Thus, except for the receiver’s actions being just slightly closer to the center
than under the case without bias-uncertainty, the equilibrium has hardly
changed. In particular, as ✏ tends to zero the influential equilibrium of the
game with bias-uncertainty converges to the original influential equilibrium
of the game without bias-uncertainty. To see this not only for the double-
uniform prior case, note that, generally, the condition ✓ > q(b) =  b, as ✏
tends to zero, tends to the condition ✓ > 0, which is the condition employed
in the model without bias uncertainty.
2.6.2 Proof of the Chakraborty and Harbaugh result
Proof. Theorem 2.1 (Chakraborty and Harbaugh)
Fix c 2 int(⇥) which exists as the interior is nonempty. Let hs,c be the hy-
perplane through c with orientation s 2 SN 1. This hyperplane splits ⇥ into
two nonempty sets R1(hs,c) and R2(hs,c). Suppose the receiver actions are
a1(hs,c) and a2(hs,c), respectively. As we assume full support of the prior,
the two actions are in the interior of the two halfspaces, a1(hs,c) 2 R1(hs,c)
and a2(hs,c) 2 R2(hs,c). Being interior points, for the two induced ac-
tions it holds R1(hs,c) 3 a1(hs,c) 6= a2(hs,c) 2 R2(hs,c), so that the equilib-
rium, if it exists, is influential. The expert sends message m1 if the true
state is in R1 and m2 if the true state is in R2. Consider the orientation
s of the hyperplane. For a fixed interior point c, the induced estimates
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a1(hs,c) and a2(hs,c) are continuous functions of s. For opposite orienta-
tions s, s 2 SN 1, we have R1(hs,c) = R2(h s,c) and R2(hs,c) = R1(h s,c)
implying a1(hs,c) = a2(h s,c) and a1(h s,c) = a2(hs,c). Consider the dif-
ference between the utility in the induced actions:  (·, c) : SN 1 ! R,
where  (s, c) = U(a1(hs,c))   U(a2(hs,c)). This is a continuous odd map
in s. According to the Borsuk-Ulam theorem every continuous odd map
SN 1 ! R has a zero. Thus, there exists for every interior c an orientation
s⇤ 2 SN 1 such that U(a1(hs⇤,c))   U(a2(hs⇤,c)) = 0. The expert does not
have an incentive to deviate to misreporting, we have found a cheap talk
equilibrium.
2.6.3 Robustness for additive separable preferences
We now turn to the analysis of additive separable preferences. Suppose
N = 2 and U(a) = U1(a1) + U2(a2). The additive separability allows to
treat the two dimensions separately and it suﬃces to add uncertainty in
one dimension to show that influential cheap talk equilibria are not robust.
We introduce uncertainty about the type of the sender as in the linear case:
U(a, x) = U1(a1) + U2(a2)(1 + x), where x 2 [ ✏, ✏] for ✏   0. If ✏ = 0
there is no uncertainty about the type. If ✏ > 0, the preferences of the
sender cease to be common knowledge as the receiver does not know the
realization x but only X ⇠  [ ✏, ✏]. Here X is a continuous random vari-
able distributed according to the distribution   with support [ ✏, ✏]. The
realization x is private knowledge of the sender. We introduce the following
technical condition. The utility function is said to satisfy Condition (A) if
the following holds true: If a 6= a0 , but U(a, x) = U(a0 , x), then U1(a1) 6=
U1(a
0
1) and U2(a2) 6= U2(a02). The following theorem is the analogue to the-
orem 2.2 for the additive separable case and states that for strictly positive
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✏ all influential cheap talk equilibria cease to exist.
Theorem 2.7. If condition (A) is satisfied and there is uncertainty about
the preferences in the additive separable case, i.e. if ✏ > 0, there does not
exist an influential cheap talk equilibrium for any F .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction and follows the logic of the proofs of
theorem 2.2 and theorem 2.4. Suppose there exists an influential cheap talk
equilibrium. Thus, there exist messages m1 6= m2 which induce diﬀerent
actions a1 = E(✓|m1) 6= E(✓|m2) = a2. Suppose there exists x˜ 2 [ ✏, ✏]
such that U(a1, x˜) = U1(a11) + U2(a12)(1 + x˜) = U1(a21) + U2(a22)(1 + x˜) =
U(a2, x˜). Condition (A) implies U1(a11) 6= U1(a21) and U2(a12) 6= U2(a22).
Thus, U2(a12, x) 6= U2(a22, x) for all x 2 [ ✏, ✏] and U(a1, x) 6= U(a2, x) for
all x 6= x˜. The sender is not indiﬀerent between the two induced actions,
she will send a state-independent message: For all ✓, ✓0 2 ⇥, ✓ 6= ✓0 , it
holds Pr(m1|x, ✓) = Pr(m1|x, ✓0) and Pr(m2|x, ✓) = Pr(m2|x, ✓0) for all
x 6= x˜, x 2 [ ✏, ✏]. As the realization of X is unknown to the receiver
and X a continuous random variable, Pr(X = x˜) = 0. Therefore the
receiver can only correctly infer how much the sender gains and loses in the
two dimensions with probability zero. As in the linear and general case,
this leads to a contradiction and the nonexistence of influential cheap talk
equilibria.
For the additive separable case, one can easily formulate an analogon to
propositions 2.3 and 2.6. Suppose for simplicity that |U2(a)|  1 and ⇥ =
[0, 1]. Then the following proposition is true.
Proposition 2.8. For all u and all F there exists an influential cheap talk
2✏-equilibrium.
The 2✏ appears as the length of the type interval is 2✏.
41
Section 2.6 Appendix
2.6.4 Diﬀerent receiver types
Suppose there is no Harsanyi-Uncertainty about the preferences of the
sender. That is, as in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010), there is only
one type of sender with state-independent utility function u : A ! R,
where A = ⇥ and ⇥ is a convex and compact subset of RN with N   2.
Instead, there are possibly infinitely many diﬀerent receiver types in terms
of the receiver’s subjective belief F over the state space ⇥. That is there is
a set F of distributions over the state space. Each receiver privately knows
his distribution F . The sender is not informed about the receiver’s prior,
but holds her own prior H over the set F . This prior H is commonly known
and can be a continuous distribution or can have atoms, or can even be a
finite distribution.
Theorem 2.9. Consider a sender-receiver game as defined in Section 2.2
with the information structure as given in this Section. Then this game has
an influential equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows the existence result of Chakraborty and Harbaugh.
Fix an arbitrary c 2 int(⇥) which exists as ⇥ is nonempty. Let hs,c be
the hyperplane through c with “orientation” s 2 SN 1. The orientation is
orthogonal to the hyperplane and has (Euclidean) length 1. Thus, SN 1 is
the unit sphere in RN . The hyperplane splits (essentially partitions) the
state space into two nonempty regions R1(hs,c) and R2(hs,c). The expert
sends messagem1 if ✓ 2 R1 andm2 if ✓ 2 R2. Receiver type F best responds
to the sender’s strategy by choosing optimal action aFi (hs,c) 2 Ri(hs,c) upon
receiving message mi (for i 2 {1, 2}).
The sender, with given fixed prior H, computes, for i 2 {1, 2}, her expected
utility ui(hs,c) = EH
⇥
aFi (hs,c)
⇤
. For a fixed interior point c, each ui(hs,c) is
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a continuous function in s 2 SN 1. For opposite orientations s, s 2 SN 1,
we have R1(hs,c) = R2(h s,c) and R2(hs,c) = R1(h s,c) implying u1(hs,c) =
u2(h s,c) and u1(h s,c) = u2(hs,c).
Consider the diﬀerence between the two utilities:  (·, c) : SN 1 ! R, where
 (s, c) = u1(hs,c))   u2(hs,c)). The property that  (s, c) =   ( s, c)
makes this a (continuous) odd map in s. The Borsuk-Ulam theorem then
implies that there is a s⇤ 2 SN 1 such that  (s⇤) = 0. Thus, there exists for
every interior c an orientation s⇤ 2 SN 1 such that u1(hs⇤,c)) u2(hs⇤,c)) = 0.
Thus, we have found an influential cheap talk equilibrium.
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3 The LIBOR Mechanism and
Related Games
Abstract
The London InterBank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) is the most important set
of interest rate benchmarks. Recently there have been reports about sys-
tematic manipulation of the LIBOR. We thus investigate incentives and
possibilities to rig the LIBOR or related statistics for quote submitting
panel banks. Both reputation concerns and financial exposure to the index
may lead to misrepresentation of borrowing costs. We show that even in the
static model incorrect quoting is the standard and honesty the exception. In
particular, we can explain theoretically why the LIBOR quotes were too low
during the financial crisis which started in 2007, when increasing panel bank
sizes is helpful and why individual quotes should be published with delay.
Moreover, we evaluate and compare the performance of diﬀerent statistics
like the median, the trimmed average and the average.
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3.1 Introduction and Motivation
“This dwarfs by orders of magnitude any financial scams in the history of
markets”
Comment on the LIBOR scandal by Andrew Lo, MIT Professor of Finance,
2012.
The London InterBank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) is the most important set
of interest rate benchmarks in the financial world. It is estimated that it
aﬀects more than $350 trillion worth of derivatives, flexible mortgage rates
and student loans. Almost everybody is directly aﬀected by changes of
the LIBOR. The BBC has called it ”the most important number in the
world“.1 The British Bankers’ Association writes ”The London Interbank
Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) is the primary benchmark for short term interest
rates globally.“2 In the last months reports about systematic manipulation of
the LIBOR have emerged. These reports call for a systematic investigation
of the current LIBOR mechanism in a theoretical model to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of the mechanism and the possibilities of banks
to manipulate the index.
To this end, we consider several strategic games which are closely related
to the actual LIBOR administering process. The LIBOR is currently cal-
culated as the trimmed average of submitted quotes of banks which belong
to the LIBOR panel. The top and bottom 25% of the quotes are deleted,
the remaining quotes are averaged, the result is the LIBOR. However, all
quotes of all banks are published.3 The quotes of the banks do not have
1http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7680552.stm
2http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/faqs
3With eﬀect from 1st July 2013, the publication of individual bank’s submissions to
LIBOR will be embargoed for 3 months. Prior to this date, all submissions were
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to be based on real transactions, instead banks answer the question: “At
what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then
accepting interbank oﬀers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11am?”
This opens the door to manipulation of the index. We will coin the name
”the LIBOR problem“ for the problem of building a mechanism and using a
statistic such that the resulting index based on the submitted quotes is the
same as if the index were calculated using the private values of the banks.
Diﬀerent statistics besides the trimmed average are the median and the av-
erage of all quotes. We will formulate games which are identical except for
the statistic that is used to aggregate the individual quotes. The statistic
enters the utility function of the strategically acting banks which are the
players in the game.
Our main findings are the following. Acting strategically, the default quote
of a bank is not the true quote, except when the bank cannot influence
the statistic. In the Average Game, banks thus always misrepresent their
private costs except when reputational concerns and financial incentives ex-
actly balance. In this game, an increase in the panel bank size decreases the
magnitude of misrepresentation if reputational concerns are not important
for the banks. We find somewhat diﬀerent results in the Median Game.
While it remains true that banks either quote honestly or such that they
influence the index, for uneven n there always exists a player who quotes
truthfully. This does not hold for even n. The notions of trimmed average,
median and average are only distinct if n   5. We present a proposi-
tion which delivers a comparison between the maximal misrepresentation in
equilibrium in the three games. Due to the diﬀerent marginal impact of the
players which influence the statistic, the misrepresentation can be largest in
the Median Game, second largest in the Trimmed Average Game and is low-
published immediately.
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est in the Average Game. Additionally, we prove the existence of a maximal
misrepresentation equilibrium for all considered games. This theorem holds
independently of the number of players. In the appendix we characterize
the equilibrium set in the three player Median Game. Three diﬀerent types
of equilibria appear, depending on the distribution of the private values and
the financial exposure of the banks. A truth-telling equilibrium may arise,
an indeterminate equilibrium set where a majority of banks controls the
median by quoting the same, and an equilibrium in which only one bank
misrepresents while the others quote truthfully.
For the formulation of the diﬀerent, LIBOR-related games we suggest a
specific utility function which captures the incentive structure of the banks.
Diﬀerent factors influence the final quotation. We argue that the utility
function has to capture the financial exposure of the bank to the LIBOR
or the respective statistic. Moreover, there may be reputational concerns
the banks face, in particular, during a financial crisis. As all quotes of all
banks are published, high quotes relative to the other quotes or relative
to the index may indicate a certain weakness of the financial institution
which may entail certain risks like an increased probability of a bank run.
Finally, we argue for an anchoring of the bank’s quote at the private value.
Misquoting is not legal and if detected, punished. Barclays had to pay
more than $400 million for the settlement of charges and UBS more than
$1 billion for having tried to manipulate the LIBOR. As the reputational
concerns only point in the direction of lower quoting and arguably only play
an important role in times of financial turmoil and the actual manipulation
goes way back before the financial crisis of 2007, we focus in large parts of
the paper on financial misrepresentation incentives and the anchoring of the
costs in the utility function.
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We opt for a linear quadratic structure of the utility function, close to the
utility function choices of Chen (2012) and Snider and Youle (2010), the
most important contributions in the very small theoretical literature on the
LIBOR mechanism. We justify this choice in detail in Section 3.3. We fur-
ther assume that all players know the private values of all players, while the
mechanism designer, the institution that administers the LIBOR, has no
information about these private values and only observes what the players
actually quote. We do not claim that this strong information asymmetry
accurately describes the real world. However, from our perspective it is
reasonable to assume that banks are better informed about the actual bor-
rowing costs of other banks than the regulating authority. This may be due
to the fact that panel banks are similarly structured and are actually oper-
ating on the interbank market and are not only observing it. Nevertheless,
this remains a simplification.
The literature which investigates the LIBOR, the quotation patterns, and
in particular the possibility of and indications for manipulation, is growing.
However, at the moment there are still relatively few contributions. There
exist several notable empirical investigations but only two papers which
formulate a theoretical model and directly address the LIBOR problem.
We start by summarizing the empirical literature.
The first paper which examined LIBOR quotes for suspicious patterns was
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012). They used a screen for collusion and found
dubious quote distributions which may indicate manipulation attempts.
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011) use a diﬀerent approach. Using a test based
on Benford’s law to find evidence for possible fraud, they find a quote dis-
tribution which is highly suspicious. The approach of Kuo et al. (2012)
relies on examining diﬀerent indicators for the borrowing costs of banks like
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the inferred term borrowing costs derived from FedWire, a data system for
interbank borrowing costs based on real transactions. They conclude that
the LIBOR quotes are 10-30 basis points lower than the comparison rates
in the times of huge financial turmoil after the collapses of Bear Sterns and
Lehman Brothers. In other times, the diﬀerent rates are statistically indis-
tinguishable. In a recent paper by Eisl et al. (2013) EURIBOR and LIBOR
fixings are investigated and their performance is compared to alternative
rate fixings like the median, the mean, and a randomized procedure. They
find that the manipulability of the median is much lower provided the panel
of banks is suﬃciently large. Therefore, they recommend switching from
the trimmed average to the median.
The theoretical literature on the LIBOR mechanism is still small, but due to
the ongoing LIBOR scandal a rapid growth of the literature is expected. The
first authors who investigated the LIBOR in a theoretical model were Snider
and Youle (2010). They sketch a model which predicts quote clustering of
the quotes of the banks around the pivotal 25% and 75% quantile. As the
LIBOR is calculated on a daily basis and quotes normally do not diﬀer a lot
from the previous day, banks have a good knowledge of the next quote of
their competitors.4 Thus, they are able to accurately predict the interval of
quotes which are taken for the actual LIBOR calculation and can optimize
the position of their own quote inside this interval that entails the quote
clustering at the borders. Snider and Youle then look at data and find
evidence supporting their theoretical predictions. In particular, they find
indications for fraud not only during the times of market turmoil, but also
before and after. Interestingly, the first version of their paper has been
written in 2009 and thus predates the revelations in the LIBOR scandal.
4The new rule of publishing the quotes with delay makes the prediction of future quotes
of other banks harder.
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A second important contribution is the paper by Chen (2012). She works
in a Bayesian framework where the realization of the private value is pri-
vate knowledge of the respective bank. The private values are independent
and identically distributed and known to all players and the mechanism de-
signer. She suggests a utility function similar to ours but only considers the
incentive for banks to lower their own quote. In this sense, she is primarily
concerned with reputational incentives of the banks. She investigates the
best responses of the players and suggests a mechanism to solve the LIBOR
problem which is in the spirit of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979). She
then looks at data and calibrates the parameters of her utility function.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start by giving
background on the LIBOR. We describe the origins of the index, how it
became the most important benchmark index in the financial industry, and
how it is calculated and administered. We then turn to the LIBOR scandal,
the attempted systematic manipulation of the index by the panel members.
The scandal really unfurled in June / July 2012, and the magnitude of the
scandal is still hard to estimate. However, reports on the manipulation go
back to the earliest days of the LIBOR. We go on to describe policy answers
to the LIBOR problem, in particular the suggestions of the Wheatley review
by Wheatley (2012a), and speculate on the future of the LIBOR as a bench-
mark index. We present our baseline model of a strategic game in Section
3.3 before we investigate the diﬀerent LIBOR-related games in Section 3.4.
The games only diﬀer in the way the quotes are aggregated. We then point
out how our findings add to the understanding of the LIBOR mechanism
and what normative implications our results may have on the fixing of the
LIBOR problem. In the appendix we present a detailed analysis of the three
player Median Game and several examples.
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3.2 Background on the LIBOR
In this section we give background on the London Interbank Oﬀered Rate.
Starting with a historical perspective, we continue with a description of
the current LIBOR mechanism before we present a detailed chronology of
the LIBOR scandal and policy approaches in response to the LIBOR scan-
dal. Besides the cited academic articles we draw primarily from newspaper
articles and give the references in the footnotes.
3.2.1 Inception and historical development of the
LIBOR
The London InterBank Oﬀered Rate was institutionalized in 1986. How-
ever, the origins of the rate go back to the late 1960s. In the early days of
the LIBOR, the fixing of the rate can best be described as a gentlemen’s
agreement between likeminded bankers.5 In that form it was set and gov-
erned by a small group of bankers in London between the late 1960s and the
early 1980s. The very first LIBOR loan was a $80 million loan by a group of
banks to Iran. The banker at Manufacturers Hanover, Minos Zombanakis,
who was responsible for the loan, had to come up with a rate fixing. Thus
he called several banks in London and asked them to send him their cost
of money. He used a trimmed average of the set of rates that were handed
in and called it the London InterBank Oﬀered Rate. For the next 15 years
the rate was set in a similar way: Banks were asked for their costs of money
and a trimmed set of the numbers handed in were arithmetically averaged
to fix the LIBOR.
5Landon Thomas Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, July 05, 2012,
New York Times
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Starting from 1984, the way the LIBOR was governed changed. New finan-
cial instruments like interest rate swaps emerged and banks started to trade
heavily in these new areas. Banks were worried that nonuniformity and the
adhoc structure of the LIBOR calculation would hinder the growth of the
new markets for banks. A demand for an institutionalization of the LIBOR
arose. Driven by this demand, the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) pre-
sented the BBA standard for interest rate swaps (BBAIRS), the predecessor
of the LIBOR, in 1985. The BBA LIBOR oﬃcially commenced on 1.1.1986
and immediately became standard market practice. There have been some
minor modifications in the way the LIBOR is governed and calculated since
1986. The composition of the panels has changed frequently and new tenors
and currencies have been added. Importantly, the LIBOR question has
been modified in 1988. Up to 1988, the question was: “At what rate do you
think interbank term deposits will be oﬀered by one prime bank to another
prime bank for a reasonable market size today at 11am?” The question was
changed to: “At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by
asking for and then accepting interbank oﬀers in a reasonable market size
just prior to 11am?” The new formulation was chosen to enable account-
ability for the rates, to cite the BBA. Interestingly, the LIBOR-question
diﬀers from the EURIBOR-question. The EURo InterBank Oﬀered Rate
is also a survey based set of interest rates. The EURIBOR-question is:
“Contributing panel banks must quote the required euro rates to the best of
their knowledge; these rates are defined as the rates at which euro interbank
term deposits are being oﬀered within the EMU zone by one prime bank to
another at 11am Brussels time.” An analysis of the importance of the two
diﬀerent questions can be found in Eisl et al. (2013). It is important to note
that the main idea of asking banks for their borrowing costs and using their
answers to calculate a number, the LIBOR, has not been changed since the
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1960s.
The significance of the LIBOR has massively increased in the last years
and decades. To get an idea of the centrality that the LIBOR plays in
the financial world it is best to look at some numbers. It is estimated
that contracts with notional value of more than $350 trillion are linked to
the LIBOR. More than 50% of all mortgage contracts in the United States
have flexible mortgage rates that depend on the LIBOR. Recent documents
show that Deutsche Bank has made more than 500 million Euro with bets
on the LIBOR only in 2008.6 The same documents give the information
that as of September 30, 2008, Deutsche Bank could “gain or lose as much
as about 68 million for each one-hundredth of a percentage point change
in the gap between diﬀerent rates related to LIBOR and the EURIBOR”.
In other words, the importance of LIBOR is enormous and can hardly be
underestimated. A possible manipulation of the LIBOR is of enormous
financial interest for the banks. Before we give a chronology of the LIBOR
scandal, in which the banks apparently indeed rigged or tried to rig the
LIBOR, we first summarize the administering process.
3.2.2 Administering of the LIBOR
In this section we describe how the LIBOR is currently administered. Fol-
lowing the revelations in the LIBOR scandal some changes to the admin-
istering process have been implemented recently. The LIBOR used to be
published daily in 15 diﬀerent maturities (overnight, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1
month, 2 months, ..., 12 months) and 10 diﬀerent currencies (Pound Ster-
ling, US Dollar, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Canadian Dollar, Australian
6http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324442304578231721272636626.html
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Dollar, Euro, Danish Kroner, Swedish Krona, New Zealand Dollar). The
last rates for the New Zealand dollar were published end of February 2013,
the last for Swedish Krona and Danish Kroner on March 28th, 2013, and
the last for Canadian and Australian Dollar at the end of May 2013. Apart
from the reduction from 10 to 5 currencies it is also planned to reduce the
number of maturities from 15 to 7.
For all currencies and maturities there exist panels which consist of 6-18
members. These members are chosen by the British Bankers’ Association
(BBA), the organization responsible for the administering process, accord-
ing to the three criteria scale of market activity, credit rating, and perceived
experience in the currency concerned. Panel bank members include the large
European, American and Asian banks like Deutsche Bank, UBS, Barclays,
Bank of America, Mitsubishi, etc. Some of the panel banks like Barclays
and HSBC are themselves members of the BBA, thus had to oversee them-
selves. Interestingly, Marcus Agius, who was chairman of Barclays till the
revelations of the LIBOR scandal of June 2012, was also chairman of the
BBA. He stepped down from this position when he stepped down from his
chairman position at Barclays.
The most important single LIBOR rate is the three months US Dollar,
which is fixed by a panel of currently 18 banks. The actual calculation of
the LIBOR is done by the data provider Thomson and Reuters. All panel
banks are given a special application which allows the banks to secretly
transfer the daily rates for the respective currencies and tenors to Thomson
and Reuters. The time window for this transfer is 11.00-11.10am GMT. In
this time window, banks submit their set of quotes which is their answer
to the question “At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so
by asking for and then accepting interbank oﬀers in a reasonable market
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size just prior to 11am?” After having received the data packages from the
banks, Thomson and Reuters performs a series of statistical tests on the
received data sets to ensure no mistakes have been made by the submitting
banks. The actual LIBOR rates are then calculated and together with all
original quotes of all banks (until June 30th, 2013) published by Thomson
and Reuters and other licenced data vendors at precisely 12am GMT. Since
July 1st, 2013, individual quotes are published with a delay of 3 month.
3.2.3 The LIBOR scandal
The LIBOR scandal started to unfurl in June / July 2012 when the first
major bank, Barclays, admitted that it had submitted quotes for the LI-
BOR calculation which did not accurately reflect their own perception of
the interest rate they would have to pay to borrow on the unsecured inter-
bank market. They agreed to pay a penalty of $450 million for a settlement.
However, reports on systematic manipulation of the LIBOR go back much
longer. The Wall Street Journal published a series of articles in April and
May 2008 which questioned the accurate quoting of banks. On April 16,
2008,7 the journal printed the article ”Bankers cast doubt on key rate amid
crisis“ by Carrick Mollenkamp where it was stated that ”One of the most
important barometers of the world’s financial health could be sending false
signals“. The article cited several bankers and the report by Gyntelberg and
Wooldridge (2008) which expressed the concern that banks may quote incor-
rectly. The sources quantified the misrepresentation to be 20-30 basis points
below the actual borrowing costs. The article already mentioned the two
main reasons for misrepresentation of true borrowing costs. First, ”Some
banks don’t want to report the high rates they’re paying for short-term
7http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120831164167818299.html
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loans because they don’t want to tip oﬀ the market that they’re desperate
for cash“. In other words, banks submit lower quotes to appear financially
stronger. Reputational concerns drive the misrepresentation. The report
by Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008) suggested that ”banks might have
an incentive to provide false rates to profit from derivatives transactions.“
Thus, the second reason for misrepresentation are financial incentives. In
a follow-up article published in the Wall Street Journal on May 29, 2008,
the reporters Mollenkamp and Whitehouse analyzed in detail the quoting
patterns of banks and arrived at the conclusion that some banks may have
submitted quotes during the financial crisis which were too low and thus
indicated a false financial situation of the banks.8 In particular, the study
compared the LIBOR submissions to credit default swaps, an indicator of
financial strength. This article received a lot of attention and triggered
research on the question whether the LIBOR is reliable and a credible in-
dicator of the actual borrowing costs of banks. Other financial publications
like the Financial Times followed in formulating concerns about the relia-
bility and accuracy of the LIBOR. 9
The British Bankers’ Association responded to the reports. Angela Knight,
who at that time was CEO of the BBA, said there is no need to replace or
reform LIBOR. She said ”I see no reason suddenly to up sticks and change
a process that has actually served the financial community world-wide ex-
tremely well for a very considerable number of years“. Some investigations
supported her statement. The already cited Gyntelberg and Wooldridge
(2008), a report of the Bank for International Settlements, highlighted in-
centives for misrepresentation due to financial exposure to the LIBOR. How-
8http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121200703762027135.html
9Mackenzie, M. and Tett, G. 2008. Libor remarks fail to put unease to rest. Financial
Times (June 2)
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ever, to quote from the report, “the available data do not support the hy-
pothesis that contributors manipulated their quotes from positions based on
fixings.” Moreover, in its global financial stability review of October 2008,
the IMF arrived at the conclusion that ”Although the integrity of the U.S.
dollar Libor-fixing process has been questioned by some market participants
and the financial press, it appears that U.S. dollar LIBOR remains an ac-
curate measure of a typical creditworthy bank’s marginal cost of unsecured
U.S. dollar term funding.“10 Nevertheless, the reports about inaccuracy and
problems with the LIBOR continued. Willem Buiter, then professor at the
London School of Economics, wrote in August 2008 in Buiter (2008) that
”The unsecured interbank market became illiquid to the point that Libor
now is the rate at which banks won’t engage in unsecured lending to each
other“. In November 2008, the governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn
King, described the LIBOR before parliament in the following way: “It is
in many ways the rate at which banks do not lend to each other, and it
is not clear that it either should or does have significant operational con-
tent.“11 Documents released in July 2012 prove that the New York Fed and
the Bank of England discussed reforms to the LIBOR setting system as
far back as June 2008.12 Mervyn King and Timothy Geithner, then head
of the New York Fed and later treasury secretary under President Obama,
exchanged a series of emails, in which Geithner gave several suggestions to
reform the LIBOR fixing process. These correspondences followed Barclays
formulating worries in August 2007 about quotes of other panel banks. In
October 2008 there has been an exchange between the deputy governor of
the Bank of England, Paul Tucker, and Bob Diamond, the CEO of Barclays.
10Global Financial Stability Report, World economic and financial surveys (International
Monetary Fund): 76. October 2008
11Examination of Mervyn King before Treasure Select Committee, November 25, 2008
12http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/13/tim-geithner-mervyn-king-libor
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Diamond’s account of these exchanges have been interpreted by Barclays
employees as suggestions to lower the LIBOR quotes. Tucker however re-
jects the idea that he meant Barclays to believe that it should quote lower.13
Barclays quotes were prior to October 2008 usually among the highest of
the panel banks. This changed after October 2008, when the executive
Jerry Del Missier ordered the head of the money market desk to lower the
quotes.14
The investigation of financial exposure as a driver of misquoting of banks
has been pushed forward by Snider and Youle (2010). The first version of
their paper is from autumn 2009. They find evidence for quote bunching
around the pivotal quotes, the highest and lowest quotes which are included
in the trimmed average. This is a clear indicator for strategic quoting of
banks. The comparison between the Eurodollar and the LIBOR is also
puzzling. Eurodollar are dollars which are held outside of US territory and
thus outside of US jurisdiction. Comparing the Eurodollar bid rate and the
LIBOR, which is an oﬀer rate, we find prior to the start of the financial
crisis in August 2007 a regular bid-ask spread. The bid rate was 6-12 basis
points below the LIBOR quotes. This pattern changed in August 2007 and
till summer 2011 the oﬀer rate was below the ask rate. One may call this
the Eurodollar-LIBOR paradox. The paradox is a clear indicator that the
LIBOR quotes were not accurate but too low.
In May 2011 the Wall Street Journal wrote that regulators are focusing on
Bank of America, Citibank and UBS in their investigation.15 The LIBOR
scandal however really broke lose when Barclays admitted misquoting in the
LIBOR fixing and agreed to a settlement in June 2012. Barclays not only
13http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/13/tim-geithner-mervyn-king-libor
14http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/16/libor-barclays-fsa-jerry-del-missier
15http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703818204576205991698548286.html
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agreed to a fine of approximately 450 million but also to the publication
of email correspondences. Some of these emails have become famous and
can be now found on the web.16 One email reads: “Hi Guys, We got a big
position in 3m libor for the next 3 days. Can we please keep the libor fixing
at 5.39 for the next few days. It would really help. We do not want it to
fix any higher than that. Tks a lot.” This mail was sent on September 13,
2006, from a senior trader in New York to a LIBOR submitter. Another
exchange is summarized in the Telegraph17 as follows: On 26 October 2006,
an external trader made a request for a lower three month US dollar LIBOR
submission. The external trader stated in an email to Trader G at Barclays
“ If it comes in unchanged I’m a dead man”. Trader G responded that he
would “have a chat”. Barclays’ submission on that day for the three month
US dollar LIBOR was half a basis point lower than the day before, rather
than being unchanged. The external trader thanked Trader G for Barclays’
LIBOR submission later that day: “Dude. I owe you big time! Come over
one day after work and I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger”. A Bollinger is
a champagne brand. It is important to note that there has been internal
and external communication of the money market desk at Barclays, which
is responsible for the LIBOR quote.
Besides Barclays, other banks that have admitted misquoting and settled
with the regulators are UBS (approximately 1.5 billion) and RBS (approx-
imately 600 million). Additionally to ongoing investigations by financial
authorities against the LIBOR setting banks, LIBOR banks are also sued
in civil court. Homeowners in the United States filed a class action against
LIBOR banks in October 2012. Flexible mortgage rates which are tied to
the LIBOR are mostly reset on the first day of a month.18 Statistical anal-
16 Excerpts: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9359392
17http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9359392
18http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/10/15/
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ysis has indicated that on this day quotes have gone up on a regular basis.
This is a clear indicator that banks tried via LIBOR manipulation to make
mortgage repayments artificially high. In April 2012 a number of munici-
palities in the United States filed a class action lawsuit against the LIBOR
banks as the municipalities earned less on their interest rate swaps due to
the too low quotes. The loss to the municipalities is quantified as being at
least $6 billion.19
These civil court lawsuits and the investigations of the financial authorities
are ongoing. More penalties against the banks and more precise estimations
of the magnitude of the scandal are expected in the next months and years.
The proof of fraud is not easy as the LIBOR quotes are supposed to be
best guesses of the borrowing costs. They are not necessarily based on
transactions and due to the illiquidity of the interbank market it is often
not clear what the true borrowing costs are. Moreover, there does not
exist a transaction database for actual interbank lending. The case for
such a database is made in Eisl et al. (2013) and Abrantes-Metz and Evans
(2012a). The strategy of the prosecutors will mainly be a combination of
finding whistleblowers, analyzing internal and external communication of
the LIBOR setting employees in the banks, and statistical investigations of
the quote patterns. In particular, the statistical investigations will consider
quote clustering at the pivotal quantiles, the relation of LIBOR to other
measures of borrowing rates, timing of movements of LIBOR quotes, and
similarity of LIBOR quotes. There are indications that the manipulation of
the LIBOR goes back to the very first days of its existence. Reports say that
fraud dates back till at least 199120; other sources speak of fraud already
19http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/rigged-libor-hits-states-localities-with-
6-billion-muni-credit.html
20Mark Gongloﬀ, LIBOR was happening in 1991, July 27, 2012, Huﬃngton Post
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in the late 80s.21 In an updated version of their paper, Snider and Youle
(2012) consider data up to June 2012. They are able to find indications
that LIBOR manipulation has continued after the financial crisis till 2011,
but their tests show no unregular patterns after August 2011.
3.2.4 Policy responses to the LIBOR scandal
The LIBOR scandal has led to an intense and ongoing debate on how to
ensure that the LIBOR cannot be manipulated in the future and that it rep-
resents the true borrowing costs on the unsecured interbank market. The
discussion paper by Wheatley (2012b) and the Wheatley review by Wheat-
ley (2012a) are the most important documents which summarize possible
avenues for reforming the LIBOR. They were written by the CEO of the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Martin Wheatley. The FCA is the
quasi-governmental regulating agency for financial firms in Britain. A sum-
mary of the Wheatley review is given by Garcia (2012), and criticism and
alternative reform suggestions are put forward by Abrantes-Metz and Evans
(2012b) and Abrantes-Metz and Evans (2012a). The following are the main
suggestions made in the review. 1. Reduce the number of currencies and
maturities. This facilitates the usage of actual transaction data. 2. Make
the quotes of individual banks temporarily anonymous, the suggested time-
frame is 3 months. This adresses possible reputation concerns and makes
collusion of the banks harder. 3. Increase the panel sizes. This decreases
the marginal influence of a single bank on the index. 4. Make a clear sepa-
ration of the trading desk of a panel bank and the bank’s LIBOR submitting
quotes to give the submitters no indication from which quote patterns the
bank would profit. 5. Change from the BBA to a diﬀerent agency which
21http://www.economist.com/node/21558281
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administers the LIBOR. Some banks are members of the BBA, thus had
to oversee themselves. The responsible agency should be independent. All
reform suggestion put forward by Wheatley will be implemented by the
Treasury and the implementation process has already started (e.g. point 1
is partially implemented, point 2 fully).22
While all these suggestions are sensible and will be supported by the results
of our theoretical model in the following sections, it is important to note
that the main idea of asking the banks what their perceived borrowing
costs are is not changed in the Wheatley review. The reasoning for sticking
qualitatively to the existing mechanism is, on the one hand, the lack of
alternative benchmarks and, on the other hand, the fact that the LIBOR
is currently included in the contracts and the legal way of phasing out
the LIBOR is complicated. Thus, according to Wheatley, it is important to
continue with the LIBOR for reasons of the stability of the financial markets.
These arguments are not wrong. However, and here we begin to speculate
about the future of the LIBOR, we expect that the market will move away
from using the LIBOR. Alternative benchmarks will be developed and used.
The LIBOR is an anachronism from a time when the LIBOR was only used
to find out the interbank oﬀered rate but was not used for other purposes
such as fixing derivatives. Interesting in this context is also research by
psychologists, like Gino et al. (2009). They show that once a culture of
fraud has been established, it is very diﬃcult to reestablish a culture of
trust.
22http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/regulation/treasury-to-implement-all-wheatleys-
libor-recommendations/
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3.3 The model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of players playing the game, i.e. panel banks.
Nature chooses the state ✓ 2 ⇥, where ⇥ = Rn+. All players are informed
about the state of the world, i.e. all players know the realization of the n-
dimensional random variable ✓ which represents the vector of private costs
of the banks. The strategy of player i is a function si : ⇥i ! R+, mapping
states of nature into the set R+ of quotes of player i. The actual quotes
of the players are denoted by x. To complete the definition of a strategic
game, we suggest the following utility function.
ui(xi, x i, ✓i) = ⌫iI(xi, x i)  (xi   ✓i)2 +  i(I(xi, x i)  xi)
The particular form of this utility function needs some explanation. I(x)
denotes a statistic, which depends on all quotes of all players. The games
which we investigate will be completely identical except for the fact that we
will consider diﬀerent kinds of statistics like the average or the median. ⌫i 2
R gives the financial exposure of bank i to the index and the utility is linear
in this component. Players face quadratic costs for deviation from their
true personal costs. The third component describes reputational concerns
of the players of their own quotes relative to the index and play a role as
all individual quotes are published in addition to the index. A high quote
relative to the index may indicate weakness of the bank. The banks weigh
their reputation concerns with  i 2 R.
The linear quadratic structure is a simplification of the true incentive struc-
ture that may entail misrepresentation of the banks. However, in the very
few other theoretical contributions that investigate the LIBOR problem,
namely Chen (2012) and Snider and Youle (2012), similar utility functions
are used. A reasoning behind the justification of the structure besides sim-
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plicity and tractability goes along the following lines: The more extreme the
misrepresentation, the more likely a detection of it and the penalty payment
is relative to the magnitude of the misrepresentation. This gives a quadratic
penalty term. For small deviations approximations with linear functions are
possible, and a huge number of derivatives based on the LIBOR have linear
or at least partially linear payoﬀs. We note moreover that the primary goal
of this paper is to arrive at qualitative, not quantitative, conclusions con-
cerning the vulnerability of the LIBOR and related mechanism. We aim at
providing ways how to think about the LIBOR problem that may add to
the understanding of how to redesign the mechanism in a sensible and more
robust way.
In addition to the n players, there is a mechanism designer concerned about
the index. This designer does not know the true state ✓ of the world, but
only gets to know the quotes x and is only allowed to use the vector of
quotes to determine the index. The objective of the designer is to ensure
I(✓) = I(x), in the ideal case. In general, the designer wants to design the
game and the statistic such that the statistic gives, loosely speaking, a good
sense of the private values of the players. This is in line with the description
of the LIBOR by the BBA: ”LIBOR reflects the rates at which contributor
banks can borrow money from each other each day, in the world’s ten ma-
jor currencies and for 15 borrowing periods ranging from overnight to 12
months.“23
23http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/faqs
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3.4 Equilibrium analysis of the games
We now investigate diﬀerent games. The games are completely identical
except for the statistic in the payoﬀ functions of the players. We begin with
the easiest case, the average, before we analyze more complicated statistics
like the median or averages which are trimmed in diﬀerent kind of ways. In
the case of the average all quotes directly influence the index. However, in
the other two games, the Median Game and the Trimmed Average Game,
misquoting may change the index even if the quote does not directly enter
the calculation. Misrepresentation may alter the order of the quotes. For a
simple example, see figure 3.3 in the appendix.
3.4.1 The benchmark: The Average Game
In this subsection we set I(x) = A(x) =
nP
i=1
xi/n, i.e. all quotes influence
directly the statistic which is the average of all quotes submitted. We do not
impose any restrictions on the  i. Thus, the utility function of an individual
bank i is
ui(xi, x i, ✓i) = ⌫iA(xi, x i)  (xi   ✓i)2 +  i(A(xi, x i)  xi).
We call this game the Average Game which will serve as a benchmark. As
all quotes of all banks always enter the calculation of the average, the banks
individually optimize without any strategic considerations. The individual
optimization is independent of the optimization of all competing players,
thus the Average Game is in a sense not really a strategic game. The first
order condition (FOC) is
FOC :
⌫i
n
  2xi + 2✓i +  i
n
   i = 0.
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This gives us our first proposition and two corollaries which immediately
follow.
Proposition 3.1. The bank’s optimal quote is xi = ✓i + ⌫i2n +
 i
2n    i2 . The
deviation in the quotation xi from the true costs ✓i is ⌫i2n +
 i
2n    i2 . In par-
ticular, the quotes decrease in  i and A(x) =
Pn
i=1
 
✓i +
⌫i
2n +
 i
2n    i2
 
/n.
Corollary 3.2. Incentive compatibility can be guaranteed via a Groves-
scheme with transfers ti =  ( ⌫i2n +  i2n    i2 ).
Corollary 3.3. If reputational concerns do not play a role ( i = 0), the
misrepresentation decreases in the number n of banks in the panel and xi =
✓i +
⌫i
2n ! ✓i for n!1.
These findings follow the intuition. The higher the individual concern about
the relation of ones own quote to the average, the more important becomes
the reputational concern component in the utility function of the banks.
This unilaterally leads to lower quotes, as noted in proposition 3.1. As we
can calculate the precise misrepresentation of the individual player in the
Average Game, we can guarantee truthful quotations of the players with a
Groves-scheme like in Groves (1973). Transfer payments are chosen such
that misrepresentation incentives are exactly counterbalanced and truthful
quoting becomes an equilibrium. The third finding, corollary 3.3, gives
information when the often discussed approach of an increase in the panel
sizes may help to mitigate the misrepresentation problem. The next two
results, proposition 3.4 and corollary 3.5, continue the investigation of this
approach.
The society which is represented by the mechanism designer is concerned
with the question whether banks quote their true costs and more impor-
tantly, if A(x) = A(✓). The following proposition and the corollary address
this problem.
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Proposition 3.4. An individual bank quotes honestly if and only if ⌫i =
 i(n 1). The average gives the actual interbank borrowing rate if and only
if
Pn
i=1 ⌫i =
Pn
i=1  i(n  1).
The following observation is an immediate consequence of the proposition.
Corollary 3.5. Increasing the number n of players solves the misrepresen-
tation problem in the limit if and only if  i = 0 for all i.
For completion, we now present the straightforward proof of proposition
3.4.
Proof.
A(x) =
Pn
i=1 ✓i +
1
2n
Pn
i=1 ⌫i +
Pn
i=1
 i
2n  
Pn
i=1
 i
2
n
=
Pn
i=1 ✓i
n
, 1
2n
nX
i=1
⌫i +
X
i=1
n
 i
2n
 
nX
i=1
 i
2
= 0
,
nX
i=1
⌫i =
✓Pn
i=1  i
2
 
Pn
i=1  i
2n
◆
2n =
nX
i=1
 i(n  1).
As panel banks also trade with non-panel banks and with other entities like
hedge funds, the condition
nP
i=1
⌫i =
nP
i=1
 i(n 1) is normally not satisfied even
in the case  i = 0 for all i. The default outcome of the average index is such
that A(✓) 6= A(x), thus the average index is an index which normally does
not accurately reflect the true borrowing costs on the interbank market.
However, as proposition 3.1 shows, increasing the number of banks can
attenuate the misrepresentation problem if   is the null vector. Then there
is no systemic misquoting in one direction. This is a diﬀerence to the case
 i > 0 for some i 2 N .
67
Section 3.4 Equilibrium analysis of the games
In the case of a nonnull vector  , the more banks there are in the panel, the
less likely it is that the average of all quotes is the average of all private costs.
The following intuition is behind this. The more banks there are in the
panel, the smaller is the marginal impact of a single bank, the more extreme
the financial exposure has to be in the positive direction to counterbalance
the reputational concerns.
Before we turn to the Median Game in the next subsection, let us briefly
evaluate our findings. We have shown a number of interesting results. For
example, we can give an explanation why deviations of the LIBOR from
market based indicators have been observed since the financial crisis has
unfurled. In times of financial crisis, the likelihood of bank runs is higher and
reputational concerns of banks become more important. This is reflected
in the utility function of the banks by a higher  i. In calm markets, which
may correspond to the  i = 0 for all i case, banks were primarily concerned
with their financial exposure to the LIBOR and not with reputation. Some
banks have positive exposure, some negative exposure, the overall eﬀect
may cancel out. If there is market turmoil like in a financial crisis, there
is an additional incentive for the banks to misrepresent which unanimously
points in one direction, that of lower quoting. Exactly this can be observed
since the crisis of 2007 / 2008 unfurled. The LIBOR left the traditional
close connection to market indicators like credit default swaps (CDS) and
has been much lower in the following months. To get these results, we made
simplifications. Most importantly, we calculated the index as an average and
not as a trimmed average. This leads to the fact that banks do not have
to reason about the quoting pattern of the other banks. We now turn to
a true game theoretic model and investigate the Median Game, where the
statistic in the utility function of the players is the median of all submitted
quotes.
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3.4.2 The Median Game
The current design of the LIBOR as an average of quotes between two
thresholds given by the 25% and 75% quantiles leads us to the formulation
and analysis of what we call the Median Game. Consider now the model
setup of Section 3.3 with the statistic I(x) = M(x), where M(x) gives the
median of the vector of quotes x. We have to distinguish between even and
uneven numbers of players and consider the order statistic (x(1), ..., x(n)), i.e.
x(1)  ...  x(n). Suppose n is uneven. Then M(x) = x(n+12 ). For even n,
the median is the average of the two middle quotes,M(x) = 12x
(n2 )+ 12x
(n+22 ).
From now on, we set  i = 0 for all 1  i  n. The utility function in the
Median Game has the following form
ui(xi, x i, ✓i) = ⌫iM(xi, x i)  (xi   ✓i)2.
We investigate the Median Game separately for even and uneven number of
players and start with the uneven case. An example for n = 3 is shown in
figure 3.1 in the appendix. The following two important observations will
simplify the further analysis enormously.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose the number of players in the Median Game is
uneven. In every Nash equilibrium it holds xi = ✓i or xi = M(x).
Proof. We prove this by showing that all other strategies are strictly domi-
nated. Suppose xi 6= ✓i and xi 6= M(x). In a suﬃciently small environment
of xi there exists x˜i such thatM(x˜i, x i) = M(x) and (✓i  x˜i)2 < (✓i xi)2.
Thus the strategy x˜i strictly dominates xi which implies that xi is not played
in any Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 3.7. Suppose the number of players in the Median Game is un-
even and n   3. In every Nash equilibrium at least one player quotes
truthfully.
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Proof. The only thing we have to show with reference to proposition 3.6
is that ✓i 6= xi = M(x) for all i cannot be a Nash equilibrium. But this
is immediate, as any player can profitably deviate to truth-telling. The
median does not change but the penalty decreases.
We now turn to the uneven case, for which an analogue to proposition 3.6
exists while the corollary 3.9 is not true as we show by means of an example.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose the number of players in the Median Game is
even. In every Nash equilibrium it holds xi = ✓i or xi 2 {x(n2 ), x(n+22 )}
Proof. The proof is almost a copy of the proof of proposition 3.6. We
show that all other strategies are strictly dominated. Suppose xi 6= ✓i and
xi /2 {x(n2 ), x(n+22 )}. In a suﬃciently small environment of xi there exists x˜i
such that M(x˜i, x i) = M(x) and (✓i  x˜i)2 < (✓i  xi)2. Thus the strategy
x˜i strictly dominates xi which implies that xi is not played in any Nash
equilibrium.
Comment 3.9. Suppose the number of players in the Median Game is
even. There exist equilibria in which no player answers truthfully.
Proof. The proof is given by means of an example. For n = 2 we are back
in the Average Game and players always misrepresent for financial exposure
diﬀerent from 0. Thus consider n = 4. The constellation for the example has
to be such that two players have negative financial exposure while two others
have a positive one. The negative financial exposure players have higher
private costs than the positive financial exposure types. Hence, there exist
parameter constellations in which the low private value types quote higher
than the high private value types such that all misrepresent and no single
player can unanimously deviate profitably. One parameter constellation
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that works is the following: ✓1 = ✓2 = 1.4, ⌫1 = ⌫2 = 1, x1 = x2 = 1.6,
and ✓3 = ✓4 = 1.6, ⌫3 = ⌫4 =  1, x3 = x4 = 1.4. For n > 4 add identical
numbers of identical players to the high and low type, respectively.
These findings facilitate the further characterization of Nash equilibria in the
Median Game. In the appendix we consider the case n = 3 and characterize
the equilibria for the heterogeneous private value, the heterogeneous finan-
cial exposure, and the general case. Here, we continue with the trimmed
average game.
3.4.3 The Trimmed Average Game
The LIBOR is presently calculated as a trimmed average and not as a
median or average. To discriminate between these three statistics, it is
necessary to consider n   5. For n = 1 and n = 2 all notions coincide.
For n = 3 the trimmed average can be defined either as the average of all
quotes or as the middle quote which is the median. Similarly for n = 4,
the average of the two middle quotes is the median. However, n = 5 is the
smallest number for which these three statistics are distinct. The statistic
in the Trimmed Average Game is defined as L(x) =
4P
i=2
x(i)/3 in the n = 5
player game, where x(i) denotes the order statistic. We call this statistic
L(x) as this is closest to the original LIBOR calculation rule. See figure 3.2
in the appendix for the actual rule for 6  n  18.
We start by presenting general findings for the Trimmed Average Game.
They are close to the findings for the Median Game, in particular to the
even case. Denote the smallest quote and the highest quote which are
averaged in the trimmed average by x(l) and x(u), respectively.
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Proposition 3.10. Suppose n   4 is the number of players in the Trimmed
Average Game. Then in every Nash equilibrium it holds xi = ✓i or x(l) 
xi  x(u).
Proof. With the obvious notation changes, the proof is an exact copy of the
proof of proposition 3.8.
Comment 3.11. Suppose n   4. Then there exist equilibria in which all
players misrepresent.
Proof. This is shown by means of an example. For n = 4, the trimmed
average and median coincide and the example of comment 3.9 gives the
result. For even n this example for the median also works for the trimmed
average if we add identical high and low value players. For uneven n   5
consider the example for n   1 and add one identical high or low value
player. This completes the proof of comment 3.11.
The next proposition formulates a suﬃcient criterion for misrepresentation
in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.12. If ✓i 2 (x(l), x(u)), and ⌫i 6= 0, then ✓i 6= xi.
Proof. Assume ⌫i < 0. Suppose bank i quotes xi = ✓i 2 (x(l), x(u)). This
quote gives utility ui(xi, x i, ✓i) = ⌫iL(✓i, x i). Consider the quote x˜i =
✓i   ✏ for ✏ > 0 suﬃciently small such that x˜i 2 (x(l), x(u)). This quote
gives utility ui(x˜i, x i, ✓i) = ⌫iL(x˜i, x i)   (x˜i   ✓i)2. Comparing the two
utilities, it holds ⌫iL(x˜i, x i) > ⌫iL(✓i, x i) and  (x˜i ✓i)2 < 0. As the first
inequality depends linearly on the quote and the second quadratically, for
suﬃciently small ✏ it holds ⌫iL(x˜i, x i) ⌫iL(✓i, x i)  (x˜i  ✓i)2 > 0. Thus,
we have found a strategy which strictly dominates xi = ✓i. The case ⌫i > 0
is proven analogously.
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For suﬃciently large exposure to the index a bank will quote x(l) or x(u),
depending on the sign of the exposure.
Proposition 3.13. For suﬃciently large exposure |⌫i| to the LIBOR a bank
will always quote x(l) if ⌫i < 0 and ✓i   x(l). Similarly, if ⌫i > 0 and
✓i  x(u), a bank will always quote x(u) provided suﬃciently large exposure
to the LIBOR.
Proof. Suppose ⌫i < 0 and ✓i   x(l). Quoting x(l) gives the utility
ui(x(l), x i, ✓i) = ⌫iL(x(l), x i)   (x(l)   ✓i)2. Thus, whether quoting x(l)
strictly dominates any other quote xˆi > x(l) depends on the relation of
the first and the second term in the utility function. For suﬃciently large
|⌫i| quoting x(l) strictly dominates any other quote. The case ⌫i > 0 and
✓i  x(u) is proven analogously.
We set n = 5 and prove that for all parameter constellations there exists
an equilibrium in which at least one player misrepresents in a maximal
way.24 It is important to note that we say a player i who has exposure
⌫i = 0 misquotes maximally although i always quotes truthfully having a
singleton as the interval of possible quotes.
Proposition 3.14. If n = 5, then for all ✓ and all ⌫ there exists an equilib-
rium x⇤ in which at least one player i misquotes maximally, i.e. x⇤i = ✓i+ ⌫i6 .
Proof. Suppose there is no maximal misrepresentation in equilibrium. Con-
sider without loss of generality the highest quote that is averaged in the
index. If there were exactly one or five players quoting this same quote,
players would have a profitable deviation. In case of five players, deviation
to truth-telling would be profitable, in case of one player deviation in the
24Maximal in the sense of proposition 3.15.
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direction of maximal misrepresentation would be profitable. Thus at the
highest averaged quote between two and four players quote the same.
Suppose first the highest averaged quote is the highest quote in total. This
implies that none of the two to four players quoting this quote has nega-
tive financial exposure, all have positive financial exposure. Consider the
minimum of the maximal misrepresentation of the players who quote the
highest. This becomes an equilibrium if all players who quote the same
highest quote deviate to quoting this minimum.
Suppose now that there is a single highest quote. The two to four play-
ers who quote the highest averaged quote then all have negative financial
exposure. If the quote of two to three players is the highest that is aver-
aged, they have a profitable deviation to a lower quote. If the four players
quote the highest averaged quote, this is the lowest quote in total. Consider
the maximum of the maximal misrepresentations of these players. This be-
comes an equilibrium if all players who quote the same lowest quote deviate
to quoting this maximum.
Proposition 3.14 also follows from the general theorem 3.16 in the next sub-
section in which the existence of a maximal misrepresentation equilibrium
in the general Median Game and Trimmed Average Game is shown.
3.4.4 Comparison of the games
The goal of this subsection is to compare the equilibrium sets of the three
games with a focus on the magnitude of possible equilibrium misrepresenta-
tion. The marginal impact of an individual quote of a player in the Median,
the Trimmed Average and the Average Game is diﬀerent. This fact allows
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us to prove a result which gives a bound on equilibrium misrepresentations
in the distinct games. Denote by m  n the number of quotes averaged in
the Trimmed Average Game.
Proposition 3.15. The maximal equilibrium misrepresentation of player
i is ⌫i2 in the Median Game,
⌫i
2m in the Trimmed Average Game, and
⌫i
2n in
the Average Game.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to note that the equilibrium misrepresentation in the
Median, Trimmed Average and Average Game is bounded by the potential
marginal influence of a single quote.
Two things are worth mentioning. First, in the Average Game the equilib-
rium is unique and players always quote ✓i+⌫i/2n. Second, for all parameter
constellations of private values ✓ and financial exposure ⌫ there exists not
only an equilibrium but in particular an equilibrium in which at least one
player misquotes maximally. This is clear for the Average Game and follows
for the Median and the Trimmed Average Game from theorem 3.16. The
reasoning in the proof depends neither on the number of players n in the
game nor the number m of quotes which are averaged.
Theorem 3.16. In the Median Game, the Trimmed Average Game and
the Average Game there exists for all ✓ and all ⌫ an equilibrium in which
at least one player misrepresents in a maximal way.
Proof. Consider the vector of maximal misrepresentations and order it from
high to low. If the maximal misquote xi enters the calculation of the statis-
tic, quote xi. If not, change the quote in the direction of ✓i. If the in-
tersection of the interval of possible misrepresentations with the interval
of counting quotes is empty, quote ✓i. Else misquote maximally under the
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constraint that the quote enters the calculation of the statistic. Suppose all
players follow this quote strategy. Then this defines a Nash equilibrium in
the Average Game, the Trimmed Average Game and the Median Game.
The median rule increases the marginal impact in comparison with the
other two statistics. Moreover, the median rule leads to a more volatile
index. By contrast, the average rule has the property of being sensitive to
extreme quotes, which may turn out to be a disadvantage in practice. In
this respect the trimmed average can be seen as a reasonable compromise
between the other, more extreme, statistics. This is in line with the ar-
guments of Wheatley (2012a). However, statistical analysis by Eisl et al.
(2013) points out that the median rule would have been less manipulable
than the trimmed average between 2006 and 2012. This diﬀerence to the
results of our model is probably due to two reasons. First, our informational
assumption that banks know perfectly well the private values of all banks is
not satisfied in reality. Second, the Nash equilibria in the Trimmed Average
Game and in the Median Game are diﬃcult to play but the Nash equilibria
in the Median Game are relatively more diﬃcult to play. The latter obser-
vation calls for a measure of how diﬃcult an equilibrium is to play. Such a
measure does not exist so far. An interesting next task could be to design
and perform experiments in the lab to examine which equilibria are actually
played in the three related games.
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3.5 The LIBOR Mechanism from the
normative point of view
The LIBOR scandal has made headlines throughout the world in the last
months. In this paper we try to contribute to the understanding of how
the banks actually manipulated the LIBOR and what modification possi-
bilities of the LIBOR mechanism exist to make the mechanism more robust
against manipulation. Thus, we have considered the LIBOR problem from
the descriptive point of view. We have modeled the LIBOR fixing process
as a strategic game with rational banks that individually maximize their
expected utility. We have analyzed several games which are closely related
to the actual LIBOR setting process. Concerning our model we emphasize
that it is a simplification of the actual LIBOR setting process. We quan-
tified the financial and reputational misreporting incentives and a penalty
function for misrepresentation in an adhoc way. Furthermore, our banks are
extremely well informed as we assume that the knowledge of ✓ is common
knowledge. In reality, the information distribution between the banks and
the regulators is more diﬀuse and the maximization problem of the individ-
ual banks is not common knowledge. This makes the LIBOR problem even
harder to solve.
The next step is now to take the normative perspective and ask: “What is
the right thing to do?” Our modeling approach and our results not only
illuminate how the banks were able to manipulate the LIBOR, they also
have normative implications. Our results make the case for several changes
of the current process. The LIBOR panels should be increased whenever
possible to lower the marginal impact of a single contributing bank. There
are however practical problems for increasing panel bank sizes as the num-
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ber of global player banks who have the necessary information to quote
is limited. The LIBOR quotes of the banks should be made temporarily
anonymous for two reasons. First, to prevent the quotes from being an in-
dicator of current financial strength of the banks. Second, the immediate
publication may serve the banks as a collusion device. Nevertheless, the
quotes should be eventually published with delay to enable identification
of financial misrepresentation. This change has been implemented in July
2013 and quotes are now published with three months delay. Furthermore,
the LIBOR quotes should be based on real transactions whenever possible.
To enable this, a database for actual interbank lending has to be estab-
lished first. Our results do not entail a change from the trimmed mean to
the median as the equilibrium misrepresentation in the Median Game can
be higher than in the Trimmed Average Game due to the higher marginal
influence on the fixing. A switch from a trimmed average to the average is
not robust to outliers and thus also problematic to introduce, although the
average induces a lower marginal influence of a single bank.
The majority of these modification ideas supported by our model have al-
ready been suggested in the Wheatley Review. However, these changes can
only attenuate the LIBOR problem but not qualitatively solve it. Maybe the
most important diﬃculty is that the optimization problem of the banks is
not known precisely because the utility function of the banks is not known.
If it were possible to find out the precise utility function by data analy-
sis, estimations, or reading the balance sheets of the banks, the theory of
mechanism design would be able to help solving the LIBOR problem by
counterbalancing misrepresentation incentives. In the Average Game the
Groves mechanism would solve it. However, the financial exposure to the
index, private costs and the penalty function for deviation from the pri-
vate costs are subject to change and unknown. The main problem remains:
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There are huge financial incentives to misrepresent.
We expect the market to move away from this interest rate benchmark. In
which directions the markets will evolve and what eventually may take the
place of the LIBOR is hard to tell.
However, due to the immense importance of the LIBOR rate for the financial
system in general and individuals all over the world in particular it remains
an important task of theoretical and practical economists to come up with
ideas to guarantee that the LIBOR actually represents what it is supposed
to represent or to come up with a sensible alternative.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 The three player Median Game
Heterogeneous costs
In this subsection, we assume n = 3 and that all players have exactly the
same financial exposure ⌫i = ⌫j = ⌫k = ⌫ to the median index. We set
⌫   0, the case ⌫  0 is solved similarly. However, the private values of
the players are possibly diﬀerent. We investigate the four arising cases:
1.✓i = ✓j = ✓k, 2.✓i = ✓j < ✓k, 3.✓i < ✓j = ✓k, and 4.✓i < ✓j < ✓k. We start
with the easiest one, that of identical values for all three players.
1.✓i = ✓j = ✓k = ✓ :
In the case of identical costs for all agents, exactly two diﬀerent kinds of
equilibria arise: the truth-telling equilibrium and an equilibrium in which
one player quotes honestly and the other two quote the same, but not the
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truth.
Proposition 3.17. If ✓i = ✓j = ✓k = ✓, then for any equilibrium it holds
that either M(x) = xl = ✓ for all l = i, j, k or 9l 2 {i, j, k} such that ✓ = xl
and M(x) = xm = xn 6= ✓ for m,n 6= l. In the second type of equilibrium
the dishonest players quote at most M(x) = xm = ⌫2 + ✓.
Proof. If all players quote honestly, there is no possibility to unilaterally
deviate profitably. Deviation in the other equilibrium is not profitable for
the honest player i as the median would not change and the penalty for lying
is already minimal. For the other two players j and k a deviation is not
profitable if their quote xj is between ✓ and the maximizer of ⌫xj (xj ✓)2,
thus if xj  ⌫2 + ✓. If xj > ⌫2 + ✓, then the deviation to xj = ⌫2 + ✓ will be
profitable. Thus both type of quotation patterns constitute Nash equilibria.
It remains to show that these are all Nash equilibria. Suppose xi < xj < xk.
Then either i or k can profitably deviate to quoting xj.
2.✓i < ✓j = ✓k :
The same two types of equilibria arise as in the identical costs case.
Proposition 3.18. If ✓i < ✓j = ✓k, then in any equilibrium it holds that
either xi = ✓i and M(x) = xj = xk = ✓j or else there exist players m,n 2
{i, j, k} such that M(x) = xm = xn > ✓k and xl = ✓l. In the second type
of equilibrium, player i quotes at most M(x) = xi = ⌫2 + ✓i while the other
two quote at most xj = ⌫2 + ✓j. It holds for the nontruthful quote xj > ✓j.
In particular, if ⌫2 + ✓i < ✓j, player i quotes always truthfully.
Proof. The truth equilibrium exists as there is no possibility to unilaterally
deviate profitably. In the other equilibrium the two players who quote the
same control the median. As the truthful quote is below the quote of the two
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equal quoting players, one of the two equal quoting players can only change
the median by deviating to a lower quote, which is in the specified intervals
not profitable. Higher quotation would only induce a higher penalty.
3.✓i = ✓j < ✓k :
In this situation, the truth equilibrium ceases to exist. Moreover, depending
on the true cost structure, new types of equilibria may appear.
Proposition 3.19. If ⌫2 + ✓i < ✓k, there exists only the equilibrium type in
which i or j quotes the truth, k quotes the truth and the other i or j sets
the median by quoting M(x) = xi = ✓i+ ⌫2 . If
⌫
2 + ✓i   ✓k, there exists only
the equilibrium type in which one player quotes the truth while the other
two players quote M(x) = xl 2 [✓k, ⌫2 + ✓i].
Proof. The truth equilibrium does not exist as i and j could both profitably
deviate by quoting higher. If ⌫2 + ✓i < ✓k, the nontruthful player sets the
median by its optimal quote xi = ✓i + ⌫2 . If
⌫
2 + ✓i   ✓k, the deviation of
the nontruthful player falls in the domain where the high cost player also
can deviate. By quoting the same and thereby controlling the median, no
individual player would like to deviate. The low quoter cannot aﬀect the
median, and the higher quoters quote in the area where a deviation to a
lower quote would not be advantageous.
4.✓i < ✓j < ✓k :
In the case where all players face diﬀerent individual costs, the equilibrium
structure is similar to the one of case 3.
Proposition 3.20. If ✓j + ⌫2  ✓k, then there only exists the equilibrium in
which ✓i = xi, ✓k = xk and M(x) = xj = ✓j + ⌫2 . If ✓j +
⌫
2 > ✓k, then there
exists the equilibrium in which ✓i = xi and M(x) = xj = xk 2 [✓k, ✓j + ⌫2 ].
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If additionally ✓i+ ⌫2   ✓k then there exists an equilibrium, in which players
i and j or k quote the same M(x) = xi 2 [✓k, ✓i + ⌫2 ] and the other player j
or k quotes the truth.
Proof. The truth equilibrium does not exist as the median cost player can
always deviate profitably. The range of possible deviations from the truth
depends on the underlying cost structure. With similar reasoning as in the
proof of proposition 3.19 one proves that the given quote patterns in fact
represent equilibria.
These four propositions completely characterize the set of pure Nash equi-
libria in the Median game in the three player cases, where players have
identical financial exposure but heterogeneous costs. Depending on the
cost constellation, three diﬀerent types of equilibria arise. The truth-telling
equilibrium, an equilibrium where two players control the median and the
third quotes truthfully, and an equilibrium in which the top and bottom cost
players quote truthfully while the middle cost player deviates in a maximal
sense. Interestingly, the second and the third equilibrium type are mutually
exclusive. Moreover, the equilibrium set in the second type of equilibrium
is indeterminate.
Indeterminacy of equilibrium sets is also a result we get in the next sub-
section, in which we consider heterogeneous exposure but identical private
values.
Heterogeneous exposure
In this subsection, we continue to assume n = 3 and ✓i = ✓j = ✓k = ✓   0.
However, we now allow heterogeneity concerning the financial exposure of
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the players. We investigate the four diﬀerent cases:
1. 0  ⌫i  ⌫j  ⌫k, 2. ⌫i  0  ⌫j  ⌫k, 3. ⌫i  ⌫j  0  ⌫k, and 4.
⌫i  ⌫j  ⌫k  0. Cases 2 and 3 are the interesting ones, the cases 1
and 4 with exclusively positive or negative financial exposure are similar to
the results of the preceding subsection. Basically one has to add indices
to the financial exposure. We summarize the findings for the four diﬀerent
cases of financial exposure to the median in the following proposition which
characterizes the equilibria. Case 1. corresponds to  case 4. and case 2. to
 case 3.
Proposition 3.21. 1.If ✓i = ✓j = ✓k = ✓ and 0  ⌫i  ⌫j  ⌫k, the only
equilibria are the truth-telling equilibrium and the equilibrium in which one
player quotes truthfully and two players lie. In the second type of equilib-
rium the dishonest players m and n quote M(x) = x 2 mins2{m,n}[✓, ⌫s2 +✓].
2. If ✓i = ✓j = ✓k = ✓ and ⌫i  0  ⌫j  ⌫k, the only equilibria are the
truth-telling equilibrium and the equilibrium in which i quotes the truth
xi = ✓ and j, k quote M(x) = xj = xk 2 [✓, ⌫j2 + ✓].
3. If ✓i = ✓j = ✓k = ✓ and ⌫i  ⌫j  0  ⌫k, the only equilibria are the
truth-telling equilibrium and the equilibrium in which k quotes the truth
xk = ✓ and j, k quote M(x) = xj = xk 2 [⌫j2 + ✓, ✓].
4. If ✓i = ✓j = ✓k = ✓ and ⌫i  ⌫j  ⌫k  0, the only equilibria are the
truth-telling equilibrium and the equilibrium in which one player quotes
truthfully and two players lie. In the second type of equilibrium the dishon-
est players m and n quote M(x) = x 2 maxs2{m,n}[⌫s2 + ✓, ✓].
Proof. As all players face the same costs and an individual cannot unilat-
erally change the index when all three players quote the same, truth is in
all four cases an equilibrium.
1. and 4.: The maximal misrepresentation of an individual agent l is ⌫l/2,
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if the exposure to the median is positive for all agents. This explains the
minimum in 1. The maximal misrepresentation of an individual agent l in
the negative exposure case is ⌫l/2. This leads to the maximum in 4.
2. and 3.: The direction of possible misrepresentation of two agents is the
same if and only if the financial exposure of both agents has the same
sign. Thus, only players who both have positive or negative exposure can
misrepresent in the same direction in equilibrium. The interval of possible
equilibrium misrepresentations is determined by the player with the smaller
absolute exposure which is player j.
Thus, we have, as proposition 3.17 suggested, only two types of equilibria:
The truth equilibrium and the indeterminate set of equilibria. We now turn
to the general characterization of the equilibria in the Median Game.
General case
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibria in the Median Game in the
general case. We thus allow for heterogeneous exposure and heterogeneous
costs. A case distinction is now made with respect to the quotes and not
with respect to the private values and financial exposure as in the preceding
subsections. Decisive in the proof will be to compare the regions of possible
misrepresentations of agents. Formally, the interval of possible misrepresen-
tations Ii of player i is the region in which player i quotes in equilibrium.
Equivalently, one may call it interval of possible quotes. It depends on the
exposure ⌫i and the costs ci. The following lemma characterizes it.
Lemma 3.22. The interval of possible misrepresentations Ii is given by
Ii = [✓i, ✓i +
⌫i
2 ]
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Proof. Suppose ⌫i   0. Then player i will always quote at least ✓i and not
more than ✓i + ⌫i2 as for higher quotes the quadratic detection costs always
dominate financial exposure benefits by misquoting. The ⌫i  0 case is
proved similarly.
The decisive trick for the complete characterization of the equilibria in the
Median Game is to investigate all cases of possible overlappings between
the intervals of possible misrepresentations.
Proposition 3.23. Suppose ✓1  ✓2  ✓3.
(i) If M(x) = x1 = x2 = x3, then x1 = ✓1 = ✓2 = ✓3.
(ii) Suppose xi < M(x) = xj < xk. Then int(Ii) 63 xj 62 int(Ik), xj = ✓j+ ⌫j2
and xi = ✓i, xk = ✓k.
(iii) Suppose M(x) = xi = xj 6= xk. Then xk = ✓k. If sign(⌫i) = sign(⌫j),
then xi 2 Ii \ Ij.
If ⌫i < 0 < ⌫j, then i and j both misrepresent in a maximal way.
Proof. (i) Suppose all quotes are the same. Then everybody quotes truth-
fully as otherwise there would be a profitable deviation to truth-telling for
the nontruthful player.
(ii) Suppose all quotes are diﬀerent in equilibrium. Then the top and bot-
tom quoter are truthful, otherwise they would deviate in the direction of
truth-telling. Moreover, the middle quoter misquotes maximally or else
an ✏ change in the quote in the direction of financial exposure would be
a profitable deviation. The middle quote cannot be in the interior of the
maximal misrepresentation intervals of the two honest quoters as otherwise
they would have a profitable deviation.
(iii) It holds xk = ✓k as k cannot influence the index. If ⌫i   0  ⌫j
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and xk  min {✓i, ✓j}, any element of the intersection Ii \ Ij can be an
equilibrium if both i and j quote it. If xk   min {✓i + ⌫i2 , ✓j + ⌫j2 } but
xk  ✓i + ⌫i2 or xk  ✓j + ⌫j2 , then the respective i or j would deviate
to xk, contradicting the assumption that xi = xj as for the other player
xk lies outside of the interval of possible misrepresentations. Moreover,
xi = ✓i +
⌫i
2 = ✓j +
⌫j
2 . If xk 2 Ii \ Ij, then xi = xj > xk. The case
⌫i  0   ⌫j is proven analogously.
If ⌫i < 0 < ⌫j, both i and j misquote maximally. Otherwise, each player had
either a profitable deviation in the direction of private costs, if that would
not change the median, or in the direction of maximal misrepresentation, if
that would change the median.
It is important to note that we do not get qualitatively new equilibria in
comparison to the preceding subsections. We do not explicitly show the
existence of the equilibria in proposition 3.23 but we investigate all possible
quote patterns of three players and which of these may qualify as equilibria.
We again have three possible types of equilibria, the truthful equilibrium,
the maximal misrepresentation of the middle quoter and truthful quotes
of the top and bottom quoter, and the possibly indeterminate equilibrium
type where two players quote the same and the third quotes truthfully.
Examples of parameter constellations of the ✓ and ⌫ vectors that lead to
the existence of the respective equilibrium types have been given in the
previous subsections of the appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Example of payoﬀ for player 1
3.6.2 Examples
On figure 3.1: The first axis is denoted x1 for the quote of player 1 and the
second axis gives the median. ✓1 is the private value of player 1 and x2, x3
the quotes of players 2, 3. The dotted line gives the payoﬀ of player 1 as a
function of player 1’s quote and the broken line the median as a function of
player 1’s quote. x⇤1 maximizes the payoﬀ of player 1.
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No. of Contributors Methodology No. of Contributor rates averaged
18 Contributors top 4 highest rates, tail 4 lowest rates 10
17 Contributors top 4 highest rates, tail 4 lowest rates 9
16 Contributors top 4 highest rates, tail 4 lowest rates 8
15 Contributors top 4 highest rates, tail 4 lowest rates 7
14 Contributors top 3 highest rates, tail 3 lowest rates 8
13 Contributors top 3 highest rates, tail 3 lowest rates 7
12 Contributors top 3 highest rates, tail 3 lowest rates 6
11 Contributors top 3 highest rates, tail 3 lowest rates 5
10 Contributors top 2 highest rates, tail 2 lowest rates 6
9 Contributors top 2 highest rates, tail 2 lowest rates 5
8 Contributors top 2 highest rates, tail 2 lowest rates 4
7 Contributors top highest rate, tail lowest rate 5
6 Contributors top highest rate, tail lowest rate 4
Figure 3.2: Trimming rule of LIBOR
Player 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Median Trimmed Average Average
Private value 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3
Quote 1 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.38 1.357
Figure 3.3: Example for influence of quotes
On figure 3.3: Seven players, the middle five quotes are averaged in the
trimmed average. The median changes as the misrepresentation of player 2
changes the order statistic.
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4 Model Uncertainty in
Insurance Markets
Abstract
We investigate the equilibrium set in competitive insurance markets un-
der model uncertainty. For this end, we consider diﬀerent modifications
and generalizations of the classical model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
The model uncertainty can enter on the individuals’ side or on the side of
the insurers. Instead of knowing the correct probability that an accident
occurs, model uncertainty entails that only an interval of probabilities is
known to either insurers or individuals. Depending on the risk aversion,
the probability set and the attitude towards model uncertainty, the equilib-
rium set changes. In particular, a breakdown of the insurance market may
occur. Introducing ambiguity about the fraction of high risk individuals
paired with ambiguity aversion of the insurers provides a solution to the
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium puzzle provided ambiguity is large enough.
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4.1 Introduction
The seminal contribution by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is probably one
of the most important and influential papers in the theory of economics.
It has led to the consensus that the modelling of information structures is
important as equilibrium outcomes may depend qualitatively on the dis-
tribution of information. Rothschild and Stiglitz investigate a competitive
insurance market and compare the equilibrium outcomes when informa-
tion is symmetric between insurers and individuals but insurance companies
cannot discriminate among agents having a high or a low accident probabil-
ity. They come to three principal conclusions. First, imperfect information
makes the competition on markets more complex than in standard mod-
els with perfect information. Second, equilibria may not exist and third,
competitive equilibria may not be Pareto optimal.
In our paper, we first consider the benchmark model from Rothschild and
Stiglitz with a homogeneous group of individuals and introduce model un-
certainty. The model uncertainty can either enter on the side of the indi-
viduals or on the side of the insurers. This modification induces qualitative
changes in the results. We show that, depending on the risk attitude, the
model uncertainty, and the model uncertainty attitude, the equilibrium set
may change. In particular, underinsurance and a breakdown of the insur-
ance market may happen. We then consider the heterogeneous population
case of Rothschild and Stiglitz but introduce model uncertainty about the
fraction of high and low risk individuals. If insurers act in an ambiguity
averse way as suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), then this yields a
new solution to the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium puzzle, provided model
uncertainty about the fraction is high enough.
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The inclusion of model uncertainty stems from ambiguity theory which
distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. This distinction goes back to
Knight (1921). In his view, risk is characterized by randomness that is pre-
cisely measurable, contrary to ambiguity or (Knightian) uncertainty. Ells-
berg (1961) diﬀerentiated in a more precise way between risk und uncer-
tainty. An event is risky if it has known probability and else it is uncertain.
Following Knight and Ellsberg decision theory started in the late 1980’s to
develop models which allow for this kind of distinction. The axiomatiza-
tions by Gilboa and Schmeidler, Bewley (2002) and Schmeidler (1989) were
the most influential. With the decision theory at hand, the next task is to
apply the theory in diﬀerent fields of economics like game theory, general
equilibrium theory, finance or macroeconomics. For a survey of these ap-
plications see Mukerji and Tallon (2004). While interesting findings have
been made and some empirical and experimental phenomena are now better
understood by using ambiguity theory, from our point of view the under-
standing of insurance markets under ambiguity is not suﬃciently good. In
the insurance market context we rather speak of model uncertainty than
ambiguity as agents do not precisely know which model is the correct one.
For more background on model uncertainty, see also Hansen and Sargent
(2008). Two recent contributions which apply Bewley’s model and which
are related to insurance markets are those of Rigotti and Shannon (2005)
and of Dana and Riedel (2013). We consider the introduction of model
uncertainty in the insurance market to be natural. Moreover, as we hope
our paper shows, it is a fruitful approach with clear results that may shed
some light on the mechanisms behind some of the problems on the financial
markets in the ongoing financial and economic crisis.
In our variant of the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz with a
homogeneous group of individuals, an individual has a fixed income but will
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suﬀer an accident with some probability. She can insure against the accident
by buying an insurance on a competitive insurance market. We introduce
model uncertainty on either the side of the individuals or the insurers. It
is of course a rather bald assumption to assume that model uncertainty
exclusively concerns one of the two groups in our model. Nevertheless,
this is just an expression of assuming that one of the two groups is better
informed than the other and, depending on the example one is considering,
it may be natural to assume that insurers or individuals are better informed
about the accident probabilities of the individuals. For car insurance, there
exists big and extensive data, hence insurers have a very good estimation of
the true probabilities. In other circumstances such as insurance of accidents
related to nuclear power plants, to give an extreme example, there is hardly
any data and insurers are worse informed than the individuals asking for
insurance. For a discussion of this point see also for example Jeleva and
Villeneuve (2004).
In section 4.3 we start with introducing model uncertainty on the insurer
side. This corresponds to a situation where insurers do not have a lot of
information and data to assess the riskiness. Individuals are better informed
and know their idiosyncratic probability of accident. Insurers only have an
idea about the true probability and reckon with an interval of accident
probabilities for the individuals. We assume the insurers to be maxmin
expected utility maximizers as suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
i.e. insurance companies are ambiguity averse. They design their contracts
with respect to the prior which would induce the highest costs and the lowest
payoﬀ for the insurers in case of accident. However, important to note is that
insurers do not have a priori a wrong belief about the accident probability
of the individuals. The reaction of ambiguity aversion towards the model
uncertainty leads to underinsurance of the individuals and to a drying up
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of the insurance market. It may even lead to a complete breakdown of the
insurance market provided suﬃciently low risk aversion of the individuals
or suﬃciently high costs of insurance contracts.
In section 4.4, the insurers know the average accident probability of the large
group of individuals and only care about this average. On the other hand,
individuals are not perfectly informed about their idiosyncratic chance of
accident, they only know an interval in which the true probability lies. This
may correspond to car insurance where insurers have good data to assess the
riskiness and calculate the premia of the insurance police. We consider the
case where agents are overconfident in own abilities, a phenomenon which
has been extensively investigated in economics and psychology, notably by
Svenson (1981) and Heath and Tversky (1991). Also Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1996) and Sharot (2011) are important references in this context. In
our model agents are assumed to show an extreme kind of overconfidence
and take the prior with the lowest accident probability to calculate the de-
mand for insurance. We dwell on the assumption of overconfidence in 4.4.1.
For the equilibrium set, the implications of overconfidence lead again to a
drying up of the insurance market with possible breakdown for suﬃciently
strong optimism and suﬃciently low risk aversion. However, in this case it
may become rational for the individuals to increase their risk. This happens
if their overconfidence overcompensates their risk aversion.
In section 4.4 we moreover examine the case where individuals are not over-
confident but use incomplete preferences as in Bewley (2002). As the in-
tuition suggests, this leads to indeterminacy of equilibria. Refining the
equilibrium concept with the inertia property induces a status quo bias for
the individuals. As soon as the uninsured state becomes an equilibrium,
the inertia refinement yields uniqueness of this equilibrium.
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In section 4.5 we investigate a variant of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model
with a heterogeneous group of individuals. In the original Rothschild and
Stiglitz paper insurers cannot discriminate between high and low risk types.
However, they know the fraction of high risk types in the population. We
introduce model uncertainty about this fraction. The insurers are assumed
to act in a way towards this model uncertainty as suggested by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). Thus, they make a worst case approach. We show that
for suﬃciently large model uncertainty there always exists an equilibrium.
Thus we present a solution for the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium puzzle.
RS is one of the mostly cited papers in economic theory. Many authors have
for example attempted to establish conditions that guarantee the existence
of equilibrium in the RS model like we do in section 4.5. A recent example
for this is Picard (2009). Conditions for underinsurance and breakdown of
the insurance market are also well known. If the insurers take prices that are
not fair, i.e. if the insurance market is not competitive, rational individuals
will only insure partially or not at all. An interesting paper in this context
is Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) who take Yaari (1987) as a starting point
to depart from RS. The paper most related to our work is Koufopoulos and
Kozhan (2012). They introduce ambiguity about the accident probability
on the side of the individuals when there is a heterogeneous population
with a known fraction of high and low risk individiduals. They present new
existence results under conditions on the probability intervals and examine
the eﬃciency of these equilibria. To the contrary, we investigate ambiguity
about the fraction of high risk individuals in the heterogeneous population
case.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we lay out
the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Then we introduce
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model uncertainty first on the side of the insurers and after that on the side
of the individuals. In section 4.5 we suggest a solution to the equilibrium
puzzle by assuming ambiguity about the distribution of the population and
ambiguity averse insurers. In section 4.6, we calculate a number of examples
for individuals that use CARA utility of degree 1. We discuss parametriza-
tions that lead to underinsurance, breakdown of the insurance market, risk
increase, indeterminacy of the equilibrium set and uniqueness due to the
inertia refinement. Then we conclude by relating to real world phenomena
and making an important connection to the ongoing financial crisis. The
legend of figures is presented in the appendix.
4.2 The Rothschild-Stiglitz Model
We first take the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) with a homoge-
neous population.1 Thus, we analyze the following simple example. There is
an individual whose income in the next period is a random variable. Either
she will get W or W   L. We interpret W to be the income if there is no
accident and W   L the income if there is an accident. Thus, L is the loss
for the individual due to the accident. The individual has the opportunity
to insure herself with an insurance contract. This contract costs a premium
of ↵1. In return, the insurance company pays the amount of ↵˜2 if there
really is an accident. With the contract, the individual alters her pattern of
income across the states “no accident” and “accident” such that the income
vector becomes (W ↵1,W L+↵2), with ↵2 = ↵˜2 ↵1. Without insurance
the income is (W,W   L) with the first entry for the state “no accident”.
The vector ↵ = (↵1,↵2) completely describes the insurance contract.
1As long as the group of individuals is homogeneous, we sometimes write the individual
and not always the individuals as all individuals are equal in all respects.
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4.2.1 Demand for Insurance Contracts
Let now W 1 denote the income if there is no accident and W 2 the income
if there is an accident. The group of individuals that may buy insurance
is completely identical in all respects. We assume the preferences of the
agents can be described by the function
V˜ (p,W 1,W 2) = (1  p)U(W 1) + pU(W 2), (4.1)
where U( ) represents the utility of income and p the likelihood of an acci-
dent. We can express the worth of a contract ↵ for the individuals in the
following way
V (p,↵) = V˜ (p,W   ↵1,W   L+ ↵2).
The individual chooses the contract that maximizes her expected utility
V (p,↵). She will only buy an insurance contract ↵ if it outperforms no
insurance, thus the condition V (p,↵)   V (p, 0) = V˜ (p,W,W  L) has to be
satisfied. We assume all individuals to be identical in all respects. In partic-
ular, they all know their common accident probability p and are risk averse,
U 00 < 0. We call this model the benchmark model. We will depart from the
benchmark model in sections 4.3 and 4.4 by introducing model uncertainty,
either on the insurer side or on the side of the individuals. In their paper,
Rothschild and Stiglitz then consider a heterogeneous group of agents, one
with high accident probability, one with low. While the individual knows
her idiosyncratic probability of accident, the insurers cannot discriminate
among the agents. In section 4.5 we will consider the heterogeneous group of
individuals between which the insurers cannot discriminate and additionally
assume ambiguity about the fraction of high risk individuals.
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4.2.2 Supply for Insurance Contracts
The worth of a contract ↵ for the insurers is
⇡(p,↵) =
⇥
(1  p)↵1   p↵2⇤ = ↵1   p(↵1 + ↵2). (4.2)
The insurance companies maximize their expected utility. We assume com-
petitiveness of the market. Thus, there is no barrier to entry and ⇡(p,↵) =
0.
4.2.3 Equilibria
We now define the notion of equilibrium that we use.
Definition 4.1. 2 Equilibrium in a competitive insurance market is a set of
contracts such that, when customers choose a contract by maximizing their
expected utility, the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) No contract in the equilibrium set makes negative expected profits,
(ii) There does not exist a contract outside the equilibrium set that makes
nonnegative expected profits.
With the definition of equilibrium and the description of the demand and
supply functions, we are now ready to analyze which equilibria can possibly
arise in our setup.
We analyze the benchmark case mainly graphically through figure 4.1.
The first and the second axis are denoted by W 1 and W 2 for the income in
the first state “no accident” and the second state “accident”. The individual
2Given this definition, an equilibrium is a contract or a set of contracts. As the equi-
librium contract fixes the equilibrium income, we sometimes refer also to the income
as equilibrium.
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Figure 4.1: Benchmark Case
starts in point E with coordinates E = (Wˆ 1, Wˆ 2), which is the uninsured
state. It lies to the southeast of the 45 degree line as she has higher income
if there is no accident. If the individual can buy a contract such that she
moves income on the 45 degree line, she has the same income in both states.
Indiﬀerence curves of the individual are level sets of the equation (4.1). A
contract ↵ = (↵1,↵2) moves the individual from E to (Wˆ 1   ↵1, Wˆ 2 + ↵2).
In equilibrium, insurance companies will make expected profit of 0 due to
the assumption of competitiveness. This means for a contract ↵:
⇡(p,↵) = (1  p)↵1   p↵2 = 0. (4.3)
This equation defines a line EF with slope 1 pp . We call the line fair-odds
line. We allow the insurers not only to oﬀer contracts with ↵2 2 [0, 1],
i.e. between E and F , but every contract in the upper right quadrant.
Then the insurers oﬀer every point on the line through E and F due to
their risk neutrality. Thus, the risk averse individual will in equilibrium
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choose the contract on this line that maximizes her expected utility. The
equilibrium contract is ↵⇤, which moves the individual to the intersection
of the fair-odds line and the 45 degree line, the point F . The contract is an
equilibrium as it satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) in definition 4.1: It breaks
even and any contract which would be preferred by the individual would
lead to expected losses for the insurers. ↵⇤ alters the income pattern of
the individual such that she gets the same income in both states. She is
fully insured in equilibrium. The slope of the indiﬀerence curve is given
by the marginal rate of substitution between the two states [U 0(W 1)(1  
p)]/[U 0(W 2)p]. For equal income W 1 = W 2, this becomes (1  p)/p, which
equals the slope of EF , independently of the actual U . The price for full
insurance ↵1⇤ is exactly the expectation of the loss L.
This benchmark case can be seen as a special case of the sections 4.3 and
4.4 when the interval of probability degenerates and becomes a singleton.
4.3 Model Uncertainty on the Side of the
Insurers
We begin by introducing model uncertainty on the side of the insurers. In-
stead of being informed about the true probabilities of the homogeneous
group of individuals, insurers only know an interval of probabilities P in
which the true probability p lies. In contrast, individuals know their id-
iosyncratic probability of accident.
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4.3.1 Demand and Supply for Insurance
Individuals calculate their demand as in the benchmark model. However,
on the supply side, important diﬀerences appear. We assume insurance
companies are risk-neutral as in the benchmark model, but in addition
assume ambiguity aversion as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).3 This is an
important feature as the companies do not know the accident probabilities
of the agents precisely. They only know that the true probability p is an
element of the interval P = [p, p]. Hence, the worth of a contract ↵ for the
insurers is
⇡(P ,↵) = min
p2P
⇥
(1  p)↵1   p↵2⇤ = min
p2P
⇥
↵1   p(↵1 + ↵2)⇤ = ↵1 p(↵1+↵2),
(4.4)
provided ↵1 + ↵2   0. For ↵1 + ↵2 < 0, the worst case changes and the
worth of a contract ↵ for the insurers is
⇡(P ,↵) = min
p2P
⇥
(1  p)↵1   p↵2⇤ = min
p2P
⇥
↵1   p(↵1 + ↵2)⇤ = ↵1 p(↵1+↵2).
(4.5)
The insurance companies maximize their expected utility. Due to their
ambiguity aversion, only the worst scenario with the highest accident prob-
ability p or the lowest accident probability p plays a role. This means that
in the considerations of the individual and the companies diﬀerent proba-
bilities p, p and p possibly drive the demand and supply respectively.
3In our framework it makes perfect sense to suppose these risk and ambiguity attitudes.
The risk goes away with a large number of agents and independence of the occurrence
of accidents. However, the ambiguity stays also with a large number of individuals.
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Figure 4.2: Partial Insurance
4.3.2 Equilibria
We now identify the equilibria in our model. We analyze this case again
mainly graphically through figure 4.2: partial insurance, and figure 4.3: no
insurance.
The point E with the coordinates (Wˆ1, Wˆ2) is the uninsured state of the
customer. Due to risk aversion, it lies southeast of the 45 degree line. The
point F 1 is the intersection of the 45 degree line and the fair odds line from
the benchmark case, i.e. the fair odds line of an insurer who calculates
with p. The contract ↵⇤ that moves consumption from E to F 1 is the
equilibrium in the benchmark case. For the ambiguity averse insurers, the
condition ↵1   p(↵1 + ↵2) = 0 has to be satisfied, north west of E. This
is due to the assumption of competitiveness of the insurance market which
guarantess free entry and perfect competition. If p = p, the only equilibrium
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Figure 4.3: No Insurance
is the full insurance equilibrium F 1, as in the benchmark case. The insurers
take the worst scenario for the accident probabilities to design the contract,
i.e. they calculate with the highest accident probability. This worst case
turns out to be the true case for p = p. If p < p, consider the line EG,
which has slope (1 p)/p. The slope of EF 1 is (1 p)/p. For p < p, we have
(1 p)/p < (1 p)/p. The insurers only oﬀer contracts which lie on the line
EG and to the north west of E. South east of E, the worst case scenario
for the insurers change and the fair odds line has a kink in the point E.
One of the following two cases becomes now possible, depending on the de-
gree of risk aversion. First, there is an indiﬀerence curve which is tangential
to EG and second, there is no such curve.
For the first case, call the tangential point H. The contract ↵⇤⇤ which
moves consumption from E to H is a candidate for an equilibrium. This
candidate is the only equilibrium candidate and in fact is an equilibrium as
it satisfies the two conditions of equilibrium. First, any contract preferred to
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↵⇤⇤ would bring the insurance companies expected losses as they calculate
the expectation with p. Second, the contract ↵⇤⇤ breaks even, i.e. it satisfies
(4.5).
In the second case, there is no tangential point of the indiﬀerence curve.
This case happens for suﬃciently low risk aversion and p < p. Obviously,
there can also be no tangential point to the right of the point E due to risk
aversion of the individual. In our model, in the point E there is a kink of
the fair-odds line. The worst case analysis leads to the kink in E, as the
diﬀerent prior with corresponding fair odds line with slope (1 p)/p becomes
decisive. A comparison of the slopes leads to (1  p)/p < (1  p)/p. Hence,
there is no tangential point of any indiﬀerence curve and the breakeven line
of the insurers. In this case, the individual holds the initial position and
does not buy an insurance contract. Full insurance would cost the individual
maxp2P EpL = EpL.
We summarize the analysis in the following theorem before we interpret
these findings economically.
Theorem 4.2. (a) In comparison to the benchmark model, the insurance
becomes more expensive, since the slope of the fair odds line becomes smaller.
(b) Any point on the line EG between E and G may become an equilibrium,
depending on the degree of risk aversion of the individual and on the prior
set of the insurers.
(c) (i) For suﬃciently low risk aversion, there does not exist a tangential
point H on EG, provided p < p.
(c) (ii) For suﬃciently large p > p, there does not exist a tangential point
H on EG, provided risk aversion of the agent.
(d) (i) for fixed p < p, the equilibrium moves to the east on the line EG
with decreasing risk aversion
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(d) (ii) for fixed risk aversion, the equilibrium moves to the east on the line
EG for increasing p.
(e) The full insurance price is maxp2P EpL.
4.3.3 Economic Interpretation
The fact that the insurers do not know precisely which accident probabil-
ity the individual has leads to more expensive insurance contracts. Thus,
the imprecise knowledge of the insurers about the true probability measure
paired with the attitude of ambiguity aversion exerts a negative externality
on the individuals. The companies design the contract with respect to the
highest accident probability they consider possible for the agent. If for the
highest probability p it holds p > p, then the individuals cannot buy the
contract which would enable them to alter their pattern of income to the
point F 1, because the insurers do not oﬀer this contract. The risk neutral
firms only oﬀer contracts that are on the line EG. Thus the individuals
choose the point on that line which maximizes their expected utility, i.e.
the point H where the indiﬀerence curve becomes a tangent. This may be
any point on EG, as pointed out in theorem 4.2 (b). For suﬃciently low risk
aversion, there may be no tangential point on EG as theorem 4.2 (c) states.
In the latter case, the individual does not alter her consumption pattern
through insuring and stays with her uninsured initial state. Decisive for
the location of the equilibrium is the trade oﬀ between risk aversion of the
individuals and costs of the insurance contract, which depend on p. Risk
increasing behavior is trivially not rational for individuals due to their risk
aversion. Finally we do comparative statics in (d). For fixed degree of risk
aversion, the higher the diﬀerence between p and p, the more expensive the
insurance contract becomes, the less insurance will the individual buy. This
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means that the equilibrium moves in the direction of E along the line EG.
Similarly, for fixed p > p, the lower the risk aversion of the individual, the
less it pays to insure, the less insurance the individual buys.
4.4 Model Uncertainty on the Side of the
Individuals
We now assume that the individuals face model uncertainty. In contrast to
the individuals, insurers do not face model uncertainty. They are assumed to
be informed about the average accident probability and to care only about
this average. We investigate diﬀerent plausible attitudes of the individuals
towards the model uncertainty. The attitude of ambiguity aversion leads
trivially to full insurance of individuals. However, we also examine the cases
of overconfidence and incompleteness as reactions to model uncertainty. In
case of overconfidence partial insurance, no insurance and even negative
insurance may become equilibria, depending on the degree of risk aversion
and the model uncertainty. If the agents have incomplete preferences, the
equilibrium set may become indeterminate.
4.4.1 Overconfidence
We focus in subsection 4.4.1 on overconfidence as reaction of the individuals
towards their imprecise knowledge of their idiosyncratic accident probabil-
ity. Concerning own abilities and skills, individuals show overconfidence in
many circumstances. Examples for this have for instance been investigated
in the contributions by Svenson (1981) and Heath and Tversky (1991). In
Svenson, car drivers are questioned about their driving skills and how safe
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they are driving. 70-80 percent of the subjects put themselves on the safer
half of the distribution. Similar findings have been made in many related
studies. Heath and Tversky investigate the competence hypothesis and
come to the conclusion, that people prefer betting on their own judgment.
We take these empirical works as motivation for the assumption of over-
confidence. In our case, overconfidence takes an extreme form. Individuals
use for their choice of insurance the lowest personal accident probability p.
We opt for this extreme overconfidence for two reasons. First, it facilitates
calculations and second, qualitatively decisive for our results will only be
that agents choose a probability of accident for their calculations which is
below the average probability. Our results are robust in this sense.
Demand and Supply for Insurance
The idiosyncratic accident probability p˜ of the individuals is an element of
P = [p, p]. The individuals are informed about P but not about p˜. Insurers
know the average accident probability p. Decisive for the analysis is that
all individuals have the same set P . They are allowed to be heterogeneous
with respect to their personal accident probability p˜ but they have to be
homogeneous concerning P as the set P determines their utility maximiza-
tion problem. Moreover, the individuals are assumed to be homogeneous in
their choice of how to react to the imprecise information. Individuals are
overconfident in own abilities and pick the most optimistic accident proba-
bility when they calculate their insurance demand, i.e. they calculate with
p. Thus, the demand of the individuals is determined by the maximization
of
V (p,↵) = (1  p)U(W   ↵1) + pU(W   ↵1   L+ ↵˜2).
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The insurance market is assumed to be competitive. There is free entry and
insurers make expected profits of 0. As the insurers take the probability p
for the design of the contracts, the worth of a contract for the insurers is
(1  p)↵1   p↵2 = ↵1   p(↵1 + ↵2) = 0.
The insurers oﬀer all contracts that lie on the line with the slope (1  p)/p
that goes through the uninsured state E. We call this line the fair-odds
line. The intersection between the fair-odds line and the 45 degree line is
the point F . We call this point F full insurance point and the corresponding
contract full insurance contract, as the individual has the same income in
this point in both states of the world. In this sense, she is completely
insured.
Equilibria
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis. If the prior set P is a singleton or
more generally such that p = p, we are back in the benchmark case without
model uncertainty. For our results we argue mainly graphically with figure
4.4: partial insurance, figure 4.5: risk increase and figure 4.6: no insurance.
E is the typical no insurance state which lies south east of the 45 degree line.
F is the full insurance state and lies on the 45 degree line. The line through
these two points is the fair odds line of the insurers. They will only oﬀer
contracts that lie on this line which has slope (1  p)/p. However, the indi-
viduals deem a set of probabilities to be possible as idiosyncratic accident
chance. This leads to a set of indiﬀerence curves through E. Due to the as-
sumption of overconfidence, the indiﬀerence curve of the individuals that is
decisive for their choice of insurance has slope (U 0(W 1)(1  p))/(U 0(W 2)p).
For equal income in both states W 1 = W 2 this becomes (1  p)/p which is
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Figure 4.4: Partial Insurance
Figure 4.5: Risk Increase
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Figure 4.6: No Insurance
larger than the slope of the fair-odds line (1 p)/p, if p < p. To equalize the
two slopes, income in the first state, the “no accident” state, has to rise and
income in the “accident” state has to fall. This is due to the curvature of U 0
for which we assume U 00 < 0. Hence the tangential point of the indiﬀerence
curve of the agents and the break-even line moves from F in the south-east
direction. Depending on the degree of risk aversion described by U 00 and
the extreme prior p, the tangential point may lie anywhere on the line EF .
For suﬃciently low risk aversion and suﬃciently high diﬀerence p  p, there
does not exist a tangential point in between E and F . Then there may
arise an equilibrium to the south east of the no insurance state E, a risk
increasing equilibrium, as depicted in figure 4.5. The intuition behind this is
as follows. As individuals are overconfident, the contracts the insurers oﬀer
are too expensive to insure. Instead, individuals want to insure in a way
that may be called “negative”. The insurers pay a fixed premium ↵1, and if
an accident occurs, the individuals pay the insurers ↵2. We summarize our
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findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. (a) For p > p, individuals do not buy full insurance.
(b) For suﬃciently low risk aversion and suﬃciently low p < p, the individ-
uals do not buy insurance at all or even increase their risk.
(c) Any point on the fair-odds line of the insurers may become an equilib-
rium, depending on the risk aversion of the individuals and on p.
(d) The lower the risk aversion and the lower p, the less insurance the in-
dividuals buy.
4.4.2 Incomplete Preferences
We now modify our model. The individuals were overconfident in section
4.4.1. Now we assume a diﬀerent attitude: They have incomplete prefer-
ences with inertia as suggested by Bewley (2002). In all other aspects we
take the same model as before. Individuals deem a set of probabilities to
be possible for themselves, P = [p, p]. They prefer one point of income
over another if and only if it yields higher expected utility under all priors.4
Additionally, they may have a status quo bias. Individuals only prefer a
point of income to remaining uninsured if this point makes them better oﬀ
in all scenarios. Else they stay uninsured. The behavioral assumption of
the status quo bias acts as an equilibrium refinement. The meaningfulness
of the status quo bias has been investigated in economics and psychology,
we refer to Rigotti and Shannon (2005) for a survey on this.
4Bewley preferences and inertia are explained in more detail in chapter 5.
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Demand and Supply for Insurance
The supply of the insurance does not change from the previous subsec-
tion. The individuals however have now a diﬀerent attitude towards the
set P = [p, p]. They have incomplete preferences. Thus, their behavior can
be described as follows. They pick a probability q 2 P and calculate their
demand with respect to this probability
V (q,↵) = (1  q)U(W   ↵1) + qU(W   ↵1   L+ ↵˜2).
Solving the associated maximization problem leads to an equilibrium income
on the line EF and to the acquisition of the corresponding contract. This
is an equilibrium as it lies on the line EF and is the best income point the
individual can reach with respect to the prior q.
Equilibria
We analyze this case again graphically through figure 4.7: interval of equi-
libria, and figure 4.8: interval of equilibria containing endowment.
As before, E is the uninsured initial state, F is the full insurance state, and
the insurers oﬀer exactly the contracts that alter the consumption pattern
of the individual such that it lies on the line through E and F . This line has
slope (1  p)/p, where p is the accident probability with which the insurers
calculate. The individual now has a whole set of indiﬀerence curves. The
slopes of the indiﬀerence curves are [U 0(W 1)(1   pˆ)/U 0(W 2)pˆ] for pˆ 2 P.
In an equilibrium, the indiﬀerence curve is tangential to the contract line
which is in this case the fair odds line. For p = pˆ the equilibrium is the full
insurance state F . However, for p  pˆ < p the equilibrium is on the line EF
but to the south east of F . On the other hand, if p < pˆ  p, the equilibrium
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Figure 4.7: Interval of Equilibria
is on the line EF but to the north west of F . Hence, there arises an interval
of possible equilibria around the full insurance equilibrium. The length of
this equilibrium is increasing in the length of the interval P . In particular,
the equilibrium set is indeterminate for positive length of the interval P .
Moreover, a bet on the accident by altering the income pattern to a point
to the north west of F can become an equilibrium. The indeterminacy and
the existence of a “betting” equilibrium B are illustrated in figure 4.7.
For suﬃciently large p   p and suﬃciently low risk aversion, no insurance
or risk increase can become an equilibrium, as for example in figure 4.8. If
no insurance becomes an equilibrium, the inertia refinement of equilibrium
makes this no insurance equilibrium unique. Else the refinement has no
bite. The inertia refinement is defined as follows.
Definition 4.4. An equilibrium satisfies the inertia refinement if it is an
equilibrium and individuals have higher expected utility of the equilibrium
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Figure 4.8: Interval of Equilibria containing Endowment
income in all scenarios P compared to staying uninsured.
As this definition does not cover the uninsured state, we say the uninsured
state always satisfies the inertia refinement, if it is an equilibrium.
We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. (a) Full insurance is always an equilibrium as we assume
p 2 P.
(b) The equilibrium set is an interval on the line EF and includes full in-
surance. This interval is nondegenerate for nondegenerate P. In particular,
this implies indeterminacy of the equilibrium set.
(c) Any point on the line EF may become an equilibrium. In particular,
risk increase and bets on the accident may become possible in equilibrium.
(d) If the initial state becomes an equilibrium for suﬃciently low risk aver-
sion and suﬃciently large (p p), the equilibrium refinement of inertia makes
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this equilibrium unique. Else the inertia property has no bite.
A remark on the equilibria on the line EF located north-west of F seems
to be in order. For these equilibria, a moral hazard problem may arise as
individuals profit from the occurrence of accidents. This might motivate in-
dividuals to increase their likelihood of accident. Anticipating this, insurers
may decide not to oﬀer contracts which correspond to points north-west of
F .
4.4.3 Economic Interpretation
In this section we examined the case when model uncertainty is on the
side of the individuals but not on the side of the insurers. First, we in-
vestigated overconfident individuals. The results in the analysis show that
overconfidence in own abilities rationalizes underinsurance or even risk in-
crease. This is a very clear and precise prediction. Due to the generality
of the model, these findings can explain underinsurance or deliberate risk
increase in many situations. We then turned to the incomplete preferences
case. The typical phenomenon of indeterminacy of the equilibrium set when
agents have incomplete preferences arises. This is a parallel to the findings
of Rigotti and Shannon (2005). The same is true for the uniqueness of the
endowment allocation if this is an equilibrium allocation and we refine the
equilibrium with the inertia property. In general, the indeterminacy of the
equilibrium set is critical. While many findings can be explained due to
the flexibility which a thick equilibrium set yields, one can on the other
hand say that indeterminacy is not very satisfying as the model does not
predict in a precise way where market forces are leading to. It only predicts
that market forces will lead into the equilibrium set which is not very infor-
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mative if the indeterminate equilibrium set is thick. In this context Dana
and Riedel (2013) pose the natural question of a refinement possibility of
the equilibrium notion in the context of incomplete preferences to reinstall
uniqueness, at least locally. They are not optimistic for the existence of such
a refinement possibility. Nevertheless, incomplete preferences is a natural
way to model individual behavior which has been given increasing attention
in the last years.
4.5 Ambiguity about the distribution of the
population
In this section we consider the original model of Rothschild and Stiglitz
where the population of individuals consists of two diﬀerent types, a high
risk and a low risk type.5 In the original model of Rothschild and Stiglitz,
the insurers cannot discriminate between the two types while the individuals
know of which type they are. However, the distribution of high and low
risk types inside the population is known to the insurers. The fraction
of high risk individuals is  . One of the main insights of Rothschild and
Stiglitz is that in this situation of a heterogeneous group of individuals
which the insurers cannot distinguish but where   is known an equilibrium
in general does not exist. For the comfort of the reader we repeat the
argument for possible nonexistence in the first part of this section. Then
we assume that the insurers do not precisely know the fraction   but only
an interval ⇤ = [ , ] such that for the true   it holds   2 ⇤. Moreover, we
5High risk and low ability as well as low risk and high ability are synonyms in this
section.
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assume ambiguity aversion of the insurers.6 The main result in this section
is that for suﬃciently large ambiguity, i.e. suﬃciently high  , there always
exists an equilibrium if insurers are ambiguity averse. Ambiguity about the
distribution of the population paired with the attitude of ambiguity aversion
can therefore reestablish the existence of an equilibrium.
4.5.1 Nonexistence of equilibrium in Rothschild-Stiglitz
In a first step we show that there is a unique equilibrium candidate in
Rothschild and Stiglitz. We then demonstrate that this candidate is not
always an equilibrium.
In our model there are two kinds of individuals which have either high risk
or low risk type. Their risk type is described by their accident probability
pH > pL. The fraction of high risk individuals   is known to the insurers.
The average accident probability is thus p =  pH + (1   )pL.
Following Rothschild and Stiglitz in their argumentation we begin by show-
ing that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium which is an equilibrium in
which both kinds of individuals buy the same contract. Suppose there is a
pooling equilibrium ↵. Then the equilibrium has to lie on the fair odds line
through E with slope 1 pp . Otherwise the firms would either lose money or
there would be a contract which would be profitable and that would be pre-
ferred by all individuals. Consider the indiﬀerence curves of the two types
of individuals which intersect in the equilibrium ↵. As they intersect there
6As above, the combination of ambiguity aversion and risk neutrality of the insurers
makes perfect sense as the risk goes away with an increasing number of individuals
provided independence of the occurrence of individual accidents while the ambiguity
does not go away with a larger number of individuals.
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exists another contract   next to ↵ which is preferred by the low risk indi-
viduals to the equilibrium contract but which is worse than ↵ for the high
risk individuals. As only the low risk individuals would buy this contract, it
makes a profit, thus breaking the equilibrium ↵. Hence there cannot exist
a pooling equilibrium.
Now consider the separating equilibrium case. The contract most liked by
the high risk type on the fair odds line of the high risk individual with slope
1 pH
pH is the full insurance contract. Accordingly, the contract most liked by
the low risk individual on the fair odds line of the low risk individual with
slope 1 p
L
pL is the full insurance contract as well. However, if the insurers
would oﬀer this full insurance contract, the high risk individuals would also
buy it which would induce negative expected profits for the insurers. Thus,
the insurers cannot oﬀer a contract to the low risk individuals which the
high risk individuals prefer to their full insurance contract. In this sense,
the presence of the high risk individuals induces a negative externality on
the low risk individuals. The contract which gives the high risk individuals
full insurance has to be part of any equilibrium. An equilibrium contract for
the low risk individuals most not be more attractive to high risk individuals
than this full insurance contract. The only remaining equilibrium candi-
date for low risk is the intersection of the indiﬀerence curve of the high risk
individuals through the full insurance contract for the high risk individuals
with the fair odds line of the low risk individuals. However, this equilibrium
candidate does not not always constitute an equilibrium together with the
contract that moves consumption to G. Consider a contract   below the
fair odds line of the low risk individual which is preferred to the equilibrium
candidate contract by both types. Now the fraction of the population be-
comes decisive. Suppose the fraction of high risk individuals is suﬃciently
low such that   lies below the fair odds line with slope 1 pp . Then the con-
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tract   makes a profit and is preferred by both types of individuals. Hence,
it breaks the equilibrium.
Figure 4.9: Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle
Figure 4.9 illustrates the preceding reasoning. For the equilibrium breaking
contract to exist, the population has to consist of suﬃciently many low risk
/ high ability individuals. Our idea to reestablish existence begins exactly
at this point. If in the calculation of the insurance contracts the insurers
take suﬃciently few high ability individuals to exist, the equilibrium exists.
We give the details in the next section.
4.5.2 Ambiguity about the distribution of the
population
We now assume that the fraction of high risk types is not known to the
insurers. Instead, insurers only know that for the true fraction   it holds
true that   2 ⇤ = [ , ]. Additionally, we assume that insurers are ambigu-
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ity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), i.e. they calculate
with the fraction  , when designing their insurance contracts. Thus, in-
surers systematically overestimate the fraction of low ability types among
the individuals whenever       > 0. What does this imprecise knowledge
about the true distribution of the population paired with the attitude of
ambiguity aversion imply? The argument given in the preceding section,
that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium in a population with high and
low risk types does not depend on the fraction of high and low risk types.
Hence the only equilibrium candidate remains the intersection of the fair
odds line of the low risk individuals and the indiﬀerence curve through the
full insurance allocation of the high risk individuals together with the full in-
surance for high risk types. However, without ambiguity about the fraction
of high risk individuals this equilibrium candidate is not an equilibrium for
a population consisting of suﬃciently many low risk individuals. In reverse,
this implies that if there are suﬃciently many high risk individuals there
exists an equilibrium. Even more holds true. If the insurers calculate with a
fraction of high risk individuals that is suﬃciently large, the unique equilib-
rium candidate is in fact an equilibrium. In our modification of Rothschild
and Stiglitz insurers know only an interval ⇤ in which the true fraction lies
and act in an ambiguity averse way. This means they use the fraction   in
their calculation. For suﬃciently large   the fair odds line with slope 1  
 
does not intersect the indiﬀerence curve of the low risk individual through
its full insurance contract. Thus, the low risk individual does not deviate
to any oﬀered contract which lies on this fair odds line with slope 1  
 
. This
implies that there does not exist a contract   which makes a profit and thus
would break the equilibrium. We have established the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose there is ambiguity about the fraction   of the high
risk individuals. Insurers only know   2 ⇤ = [ , ]. If insurers are am-
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biguity averse, then there always exists an equilibrium if   is suﬃciently
large.
Figure 4.10: Ambiguity about fraction of high risk types
Figure 4.10 demonstrates the theorem and the reasoning in the proof. The
unique equilibrium candidate for the low risk type is ↵, the intersection of
the indiﬀerence curve of the high risk agents through G and the fair odds
line for the low risk types. Between the fair odds lines for the high risk
and the low risk types there are the fair odds lines with slope 1 p˜p˜ where
p˜ is the probability that the insurers give the average individual. The line
with the fine dots represents the case where the insurers gives the average
individual a relatively low risk. The broken line gives the average individual
a higher risk. The average individual is determined by the fraction of high
and low risk types. The higher  , i.e. the higher the proportion of the high
risk types the smaller the slope of the corresponding fair odds line is. It
approaches the fair odds line for the high risk type for increasing  . As
the indiﬀerence curve of the low risk type always intersects the 45 degree
line above G, for suﬃciently large   in the calculation of the insurers, the
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contract   that might break the equilibrium lies above the fair odds line of
the average individual. Thus   loses money and is not oﬀered by the firm.
As   does not break the equilibrium, the equilibrium candidate consisting
of ↵ and the contract which enables the low ability types to insure fully is
in fact an equilibrium.
4.6 Examples
In this section we calculate a number of examples for the case of individuals
that use CARA utility of degree 1. We begin with the benchmark case. Let
E = (2, 1) be the uninsured state. Thus the income is 2 if there is no accident
and 1 if there happens to be an accident. The probability p of accident is 12
and insurers and individuals know and calculate with this p = 12 . This leads
to the slope of the fair odds line which is 1 pp = 1, and to the equation of
the line through F and E which is W 2 = 3 W 1. The full insurance state
F = (1.5, 1.5) yields expected utility of Eu(1.5) =   exp( 1.5) ⇡  0.2231.
Independently of the utility function and independently of the common
p insurers and individuals use for their calculations, risk averse investors
insure fully in the benchmark case. This can be seen from the marginal
rates of substitution: 1 pp =
U
0
(W 1)(1 p)
U 0 (W 2)p .
Now suppose there is model uncertainty on the insurer side: p 2 P =
[p, p] = [14 ,
3
4 ]. To diﬀerentiate between the probabilities used by insurers
and individuals, we denote them by pins and pind, respectively. Then, the
costs of insuring one unit north west of E is pins = 34 , due to the ambiguity
aversion of the insurers. We denote the number of units that get insured by
i 2 R. We calculate the marginal utility depending on i:
MU(i) =  (1 pind)pinsu0(2 ipins)+pind(1 pins)u0(2 1+i(1 pins)) = 0,
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which simplifies to
) 3
8
u
0
(2  3
4
i) =
1
8
u
0
(1 +
1
4
i).
For CARA utility of degree one, we can solve for i. The optimal i⇤ is
i⇤ =   ln 3 + 1 ⇡  0.0986. This means there is no tangential point of
the indiﬀerence curve and the fair odds line. For this, i⇤ would have to be
nonnegative. Thus, no insurance is bought by the individuals. We calculate
the probability of the insurance company, for which the tangential point
would be E, the initial state:
pinscrit =
pind exp(1)
pind exp(1) + 1  pind =
0.5 exp(1)
0.5 exp(1) + 1  0.5 ⇡ 0.7311.
This implies that if the insurers calculate their fair odds line with respect to
an accident probability which is lower than 0.7311, the individual will insure,
at least partially. The individual will buy full insurance for pins = 0.5. For
pins 2 (0.5, 0.7311) the individual will insure partially.
We now turn to the case where model uncertainty is on the side of the
individuals and the individuals are overconfident in own abilities. We again
take as interval for the probability of accident p 2 P = [p, p] = [14 , 34 ]. The
individuals calculate, due to their overconfidence, with p = 0.25. The slope
of the fair odds line the insurers oﬀer is 1 as the insurers calculate with
pins = 0.5. The equation of the line through E and F is W 2 = 3  W 1.
With the same notation as above, we calculate the tangential point of the
individuals indiﬀerence curves and the fair odds line. The optimal i⇤ is
1  ln
✓
0.5⇥ 0.75
0.5⇥ 0.25
◆
= 1  ln(3) ⇡  0.0986,
as above. That means, the individuals’ overconfidence outperforms their
risk aversion and it becomes rational for the individuals to increase their
risk. We calculate the critical probability for the individuals, for which they
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would exactly not change their risk position.
0.5 =
p⇥ exp(1)
p exp(1) + 1  p ) p
ind
crit =
1
2(exp(1)  0.5 exp(1) + 0.5) ⇡ 0.2694
If the individuals give themselves higher probability than pindcrit, they will
insure, if they give themselves lower probability, they would be willing to
insure “negatively”.
Finally, we calculate for the incomplete preferences case, again with p 2 P =
[p, p] = [14 ,
3
4 ]. The slope of the fair odds line of the insurers is 1, as they
calculate with p = 0.5. Of particular interest in this case is the insurance
behavior of the individual in the extreme cases. For p = 0.25, we already
know from the above analysis the corresponding optimal number of insured
units i⇤p=0.25 ⇡  0.0986. For p = 0.75, we get as result i⇤p=0.75 ⇡ 2.67398.
The critical value from which endowment is in the equilibrium set is as
above pindcrit ⇡ 0.2694. For p  pindcrit ⇡ 0.2694, the initial uninsured state is
in the equilibrium set. In this case, the inertia refinement would make the
initial state equilibrium unique.
Now we give an example how ambiguity about the distribution of the pop-
ulation can reestablish the existence of the equilibrium. Consider again the
uninsured initial state E = (2, 1). High risk individuals have accident prob-
ability ph = 0.6 and low risk individuals accident probability pl = 0.4. Fair
odds lines for these individuals have slope 1 p
h
ph =
2
3 for the high risk type
and 1 p
l
pl =
3
2 for the low risk type. Every equilibrium in the heterogeneous
population case is necessarily a separating equilibrium where high risk in-
dividuals buy full insurance. The full insurance allocation for the high risk
individuals lies on their fair odds line with slope 23 through E, thus their
full insurance allocation is (1.4, 1.4). Full insurance for the low risk would
be (1.6, 1.6), however this allocation cannot be oﬀered by the insurers as
high risk individuals would buy it. Consider therefore the intersection of
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the indiﬀerence curve of the high risk type with the fair odds line of the
low risk individuals. We calculate the location of this intersection point.
Expected utility in this point has to be the same for the high risk agent as
in the oﬀered full insurance. Thus
  exp( 1.4) =  0.4 exp( W 1)  0.6 exp( 4 + 3
2
W 1),
which leads toW 1 ⇡ 1.8855 andW 2 = 4 32W 1 ⇡ 1.17175. The unique equi-
librium candidate has the coordinates (1.8855, 1.17175). Consider now the
indiﬀerence curve of the low risk agent through this equilibrium candidate.
It intersects the 45 degree line approximately in the point (1.5372, 1.5372).
However, we are interested in finding a particular tangential line of the in-
diﬀerence curve of the low risk agent through the equilibrium candidate,
namely the tangential line which passes through the uninsured allocation.
This line defines the minimal fraction of high risk individuals for which the
equilibrium exists. We calculate the slope of this tangent.
U
0
(1.8855)(1  0.4)
U 0(W 2)0.4
=
1  p˜
p˜
) p˜ = 1
exp(1.17175  1.8855)32 + 1
⇡ 0.57647,
which defines the critical fraction  ˜ ⇡ 0.882332. If the insurers calculate
with this fraction or even higher fractions of high risk individuals there
always exists an equilibrium.
4.7 Conclusion
We introduced model uncertainty in the model of competitive insurance
markets by Rothschild and Stiglitz. We began by assuming that the in-
dividuals precisely know their own probability which is the same for all
individuals while the insurance companies do not know the precise prob-
ability. Instead they only know an interval and then make a worst case
124
Section 4.7 Conclusion
analysis for designing the insurance contracts they oﬀer. This makes the
insurance costlier. Hence, depending on the risk aversion of the agents and
the worst case scenario the insurers consider, any point on the breakeven
line of the risk neutral insurers may become an equilibrium. The less in-
surance is bought the less risk averse the agents are and the higher the
costs of the insurance are, which depend on the worst case scenario of the
insurers. In particular, the insurance market may break down completely
for suﬃciently expensive contracts or suﬃciently low risk aversion.
The individuals experience a utility loss due to the vague idea of the insurers
about the true probability. They would prefer well informed companies
that would know the true probability. Moreover, the lack of information
on the insurer side also poses a risk for the insurers. If somehow another
better informed company would appear on the market, it would be able
to oﬀer better conditions for the agents. Therefore it is in the interest of
both individuals and companies that insurers have perfect knowledge about
the probabilities of accident; for the individuals to increase their expected
utility, and for the companies to be able to oﬀer better contracts which
hinders opponents to outperform them.
We then introduced model uncertainty on the side of the individuals while
insurers were informed about the average probability of accident of the pop-
ulation of individuals. If individuals are ambiguity averse, they obviously
insure fully. However, overconfidence in own abilities may induce underin-
surance, a breakdown of the insurance markets, or even risk increase. If
agents have incomplete preferences as suggested by Bewley (2002), we get
indeterminacy of the equilibrium set. Bets on accidents, risk increase, no
insurance, and underinsurance may all become equilibria. Refining the equi-
librium with the inertia concept makes the equilibrium unique provided no
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insurance is an equilibrium.
Some of these findings like underinsurance are already explained in the lit-
erature in diﬀerent setups. However, our goal in this note is to describe the
role model uncertainty can play in the classical Rothschild and Stiglitz in-
surance model. In this sense, we hope to add conceptually to the literature.
Moreover, in section 4.5 we present a possibility to guarantee existence in
the original Rothschild-Stiglitz model with a heterogeneous population con-
sisting of high and low ability types. Insurers cannot discriminate between
the two types while individuals know their idiosyncratic accident proba-
bility. However Rothschild and Stiglitz assumed the fraction of high risk
individuals to be known. We modified the latter assumption and introduced
ambiguity about this fraction. If insurers act in a way that is ambiguity
averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) we can reestablish ex-
istence if the insurers calculate with a scenario that involves suﬃciently
many high risk individuals. Thus, we give in section 4.5 a solution to the
so called Rothschild Stiglitz equilibrium puzzle. A diﬀerent solution and a
short overview over the puzzle can be found in Picard (2009).
This research has in part been inspired by the worldwide economic crisis
that has been ongoing since 2007. One particularly important problem that
aggravates the turmoils and confuses the issue of finding a way out of the
crisis is the drying up of the insurance market. Especially the interbank
market has been experiencing this problem. Our simple model may shed
some light on the mechanisms that lead to these no trade states. Consider
the findings of section 4.3. If the uncertainty about the contract partner
becomes large, the costs of insuring increase which leads to lower levels
of insurance. The income pattern is no longer altered in a way that the
individual (the contract partner that can buy the insurance) is indiﬀerent
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between the states that may occur. Instead, one state may be much worse
than the other, i.e. the accident poses a real threat for the individual. This
may also indicate risks for the future of the economies in the current crisis.
Companies may be more vulnerable to negative shocks.
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4.8 Appendix
Legend of figures
W 1 : Income in “no accident” state
W 2 : Income in “accident” state
B : Betting equilibrium
E : Initial position
F : Full insurance
F 1 : Full insurance in Rothschild and Stiglitz
G : Full insurance for high risk type
H : Equilibrium
  : Equilibrium breaking contract
↵ : Equilibrium candidate
: Equilibrium set (in figure 4.7-4.8)
: Fair odds line (in figure 4.1-4.8)
: High share of high risk type (in figure 4.10)
: Low share of high risk type (in figure 4.10)
: Share of high risk type (in figure 4.9)
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5 Equilibria with Inertia in
Bewley Economies
Abstract
In a case study framework, we investigate the set of equilibria with inertia
in a Bewley economy. We identify the equilibria when agents are endowed
with two normal random variables where one is standard normal and there
is uncertainty about the expectation of the second. We examine the equi-
librium with inertia set which enables us to identify the conditions for a
breakdown of the insurance market. Furthermore, we prove indeterminacy
of the equilibrium set which survives the inertia refinement and highlight
the influence of the interplay of risk and uncertainty on the equilibrium with
inertia set.
5.1 Introduction
The classic work of Knight (1921) has led to a meaningful and important
distinction between risk and uncertainty in the economic literature. Knight
saw risk as randomness that can be measured precisely while this is not the
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case for uncertainty. In his view, the qualitative diﬀerence between risk and
uncertainty plays an important role in markets that economic theory should
take into account.
Ellsberg (1961) rendered the more precise, modern distinction between risk
and uncertainty. An event is called risky if it has known probability and
uncertain if it has unknown probability. His thought experiments have
highlighted important aspects of the diﬀerence as in many situations agents
tend to prefer gambles with known odds over gambles with unknown odds.
The main motivation of this paper is to understand the market implications
better if we allow for a distinction between risk and uncertainty. In partic-
ular, we want to investigate three questions. First: What happens to the
insurance market if there is risk and uncertainty? Already Knight argued
that uncertainty is not insurable. In how far is this true and to what extent
does the presence of risk in the market influence the insurance market for
uncertainty? Second: Is the set of equilibria indeterminate? In the presence
of uncertainty, markets might not be able to find precise prices and the fric-
tions created by uncertainty might lead to indeterminacy. In how far does
a status quo bias of the agents change the indeterminacy of the equilibrium
set? Third: What influence has the interplay of risk and uncertainty on the
equilibrium with inertia set?
To answer these questions, we consider a general equilibrium case study
without aggregate uncertainty where agents are endowed with a risky and
an uncertain component. This case study has been introduced into the liter-
ature by Dana and Riedel (2013). They examine the case study in discrete
time and focus on the insurance aspect. They show for which amount of
uncertainty in the economy full insurance is an equilibrium with inertia and
when the insurance market for uncertainty breaks down. They moreover
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prove indeterminacy of the equilibrium with inertia set. We investigate the
static version of their case study. The static version is easier to handle
and thus enables us to describe the equilibrium set suﬃciently well for our
purposes and to answer the three questions.
In our case study model we rely on Bewley’s decision theoretic model. The
axiomatization of Bewley’s model in Bewley (2002)1 leads to a set of prob-
ability distributions over the state space upon which decision making de-
pends. An allocation is preferred to another if and only if it is unanimously
preferred under all probability measures of the prior set. For a singleton
prior set, this reduces to standard expected utility. However, if there is no
unanimity for two allocations, the preference relation remains incomplete
and the two allocations cannot be compared.
In our case study there are two agents which have CARA-utility functions
and which are both endowed with two random variables. One random vari-
able models the risky part of the endowment and the other the uncertain
part. For this end, we model one random variable as standard normal and
the other as normal with standard variance but with expectation in an in-
terval around 0. Thereby, we define the set of priors our Bewley agents
use, namely exactly the set of priors such that the first random variable is
standard normal under all priors and the second is normal with standard
variance and expectation in the interval around 0. The length of the inter-
val gives us a measure for the amount of ambiguity in our economy. The
preferences of the agents are incomplete for positive length of the interval.
If the interval is a singleton and thus solely consists of 0, the set of priors
is a singleton and we are back in the expected utility framework.
In our case study we ask the question which equilibria arise. In particular,
1Bewley wrote the paper already in the late 1980’s, it was published 2002.
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we are interested in the question whether the insurance market breaks down
and if the set of equilibria is indeterminate. We thereby follow closely the
motivation of Rigotti and Shannon (2005). In their seminal work they show
that both a breakdown of the insurance market and indeterminacy of the
equilibrium set may happen in their model of a standard Arrow-Debreu
economy with agents that have incomplete Bewley preferences.
We confirm their findings by showing that both phenomena may arise in
our framework, depending on the amount of ambiguity in the economy.
Furthermore, we confirm their finding that if the endowment allocation
is an equilibrium with inertia allocation, then it is unique. However, in
important points we also depart from Rigotti and Shannon (2005). We
investigate explicitely the interplay of risk and uncertainty as agents are
endowed with an uncertain and a risky component. The presence of risk
gives the agents freedom to choose which amount of uncertainty they want
to consume as insuring the risk is already utility increasing. Furthermore,
our framework naturally provides us with a measure for the amount of
ambiguity in the economy. We take advantage of this measure and describe
how the equilibrium set changes for diﬀerent amounts of ambiguity, i.e. we
do comparative statics.
A natural question to ask is how robust our findings are with respect to
our choices of the prior sets, the endowments and the utility functions. Our
findings are robust with respect to the degree of risk aversion. Diﬀerent
endowments may change the equilibrium with inertia set, we investigate in
particular the focal case of only uncertainty as endowment and compare it
to the risk and uncertainty case. We also examine the case of diﬀerent prior
sets and can describe the equilibrium set in some cases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin with a pre-
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cise description of our model, including the explanation of Bewley’s decision
theoretic model. The analysis which equilibria arise in our economy is per-
formed in section 5.3. In this section, the main theorems 5.2 and 5.4 are
directly proven. All other proofs are presented in the appendix. The ro-
bustness of our findings with respect to the degree of constant absolute risk
aversion, diﬀerent endowments and diﬀerent prior sets is subject of section
5.4. We conclude by giving an interpretation which relates our findings to
the theory of financial market regulation.
5.2 The Model
We start with a probability space (⌦,F , P0). Let U and R be two random
variables on (⌦,F , P0) that are independent and standard normal under P0,
i.e. U ⇠ N(0, 1) and R ⇠ N(0, 1). We define a set of priors P by defining
the densities of the priors with respect to P0.
Q 2 P , q = exp
✓
↵U   1
2
↵2
◆
,
where q is the density of Q w.r.t. P0, and ↵ 2 [ ,] for some    0. Thus,
the prior set consists of all priors under which R is standard normal and U
is normal with expectation in the interval [ ,] and standard variance. R
and U are independent under all elements of the prior set. The parameter 
serves as an indicator of the amount of ambiguity / Knightian uncertainty in
our economy. The higher  is, the more uncertainty there is in the economy
about the expectation of the random variable U .2
2The defined prior set is not convex for positive . In the continuous time version
of this case study, where U and R become predictable processes which are standard
Brownian motions under P0, the prior set is convex. The mathematical background is
given by Delbaen (2006). It might then be possible to give a complete characterization
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One question that we want to answer in this paper is whether the set of
equilibria in the B-economy is indeterminate if we refine the equilibrium def-
inition by adding the inertia property. In the normal framework described
in the model above, we will show for our case study that indeterminacy
survives the equilibrium refinement of inertia.
We consider two agents with endowment !1 = U+R =  !2. Thus, there is
no aggregate uncertainty as aggregate endowment is normalized to 0. The
agents have incomplete Bewley preferences, i.e. they prefer to consume c
to d if c yields higher expected utility than d under all priors in P . Thus,
they use the decision criterion
c % d, EQu(c)   EQu(d) for all Q 2 P.
For the moment, we assume agents have CARA utilities u(c) =   exp( c)
of degree 1. We will consider general CARA utilities in section 5.4.
The full insurance allocation is the state independent allocation c1 =  c2 =
0. An allocation c is feasible if
P
ci =
P
!i.
An equilibrium is a pair (c⇤, p⇤) of a feasible allocation and a price such
that there exists for no agent a budget feasible consumption plan that
strictly dominates c⇤. Due to the incompleteness of the preferences in the
B-economy there may arise the situation that the equilibrium allocation and
the endowment allocation are incomparable. We consider this implausible
and refine the equilibrium concept by adding the inertia property. An equi-
librium (c⇤, p⇤) satisfies the inertia property if for all agents i with c⇤i 6= !i
it holds c⇤i   !i. The inertia property induces a status quo bias for the
endowment and an equilibrium that satisfies it is called equilibrium with
of the equilibrium set with the help of the theory of backward stochastic diﬀerential
equations.
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inertia. The inertia property was suggested by Bewley (2002) as an answer
to unmotivated betting. The inertia assumption is a behavioral statement
which is well supported by work in economics and psychology. To give an
example of an important reference in this context, see Samuelson and Zeck-
hauser (1988). Rigotti and Shannon (2005) give more details and sources.
In many economic situations it is diﬃcult to identify a reasonable status
quo. However, in the general equilibrium framework we are using, there is
a natural candidate, the initial endowment.
5.3 Equilibria in the B-economy
We investigate the set of equilibria with inertia in our case study. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the question whether the set is determinate
or indeterminate. We call a set determinate if it consists only of isolated
points and else indeterminate. As a starting point which facilitates the
further analysis, we note the following.
Theorem 5.1. Risk is always fully insured in the B-economy.
For the proof of theorem 5.1 we refer the reader to the appendix or to Dana
and Riedel (2013).
As a benchmark, we consider the set of equilibria in the B-economy without
imposing the refinement of inertia.
In this case, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.2. The B-economy has an equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with equilibrium
consumption c1⇤ =  c2⇤ = ↵U and equilibrium price p⇤ = exp( 12↵2) for
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↵ 2 [ ,]. In particular, the set of equilibria in the B-economy is indeter-
minate for  > 0.
The indeterminacy follows directly as the equilibrium allocations c1⇤ =  c2⇤
are non-isolated if  > 0. Before providing the proof, we sketch the equilib-
rium set in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Equilibrium consumption set


|| = 
−1
0
1
 1
The first axis denotes the amount of ambiguity  in the economy, the second
the equilibrium consumption ↵ of uncertainty. The equilibrium set grows
with  and is enclosed by the 45 degree lines. The intuition behind this
result is that the more ambiguity is present in the economy, the more diverse
scenarios are considered possible, the more allocations are undominated. We
now continue with the proof of theorem 5.2.
Proof. (Theorem 5.2) We equalize the marginal rates of substitution to
calculate equilibrium consumption c⇤.
exp( c1⇤)q1 = exp( c2⇤)q2
) exp( c1⇤) exp
✓
↵U   1
2
↵2
◆
= exp(c1⇤) exp
✓
 U   1
2
 2
◆
) c1⇤ = 1
2
(↵   )U   1
4
(↵2    2)
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Now we calculate the equilibrium price p⇤ for the first agent.
p1⇤ = exp( c1⇤)q1 = exp
✓
 1
2
(↵   )U + 1
4
(↵2    2)
◆
exp
✓
↵U   1
2
↵2
◆
) p1⇤ = exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
 
↵2 +  2
 ◆
= p⇤
Analogously we calculate the equilibrium price for the second agent.
p2⇤ = exp(+c1⇤)q2 = exp
✓
1
2
(↵   )U   1
4
(↵2    2)
◆
exp
✓
 U   1
2
 2
◆
) p2⇤ = exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
 
↵2 +  2
 ◆
= p⇤
Markets clear due to the normalization of consumption. For the budget
constraint the following equality has to hold for the first agent
EP0p⇤(!1   c1⇤) = 0.
This leads to
EP0
✓
exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
 
↵2 +  2
 ◆✓
R + U   1
2
(↵   )U + 1
4
(↵2 +  2)
◆◆
= 0
(5.1)
We now assume ↵ =   , so that we get
EP0
✓
exp( 1
2
↵2)(R + U   ↵U)
◆
= exp( 1
2
↵2)EP0(R + U   ↵U) = 0.
Walras’ law guarantees that the budget constraint is also satisfied for the
second agent. This completes the proof of theorem 5.2.
Comment 5.3. Theorem 5.2 does not give a full characterization of the
equilibrium set. The prior set P is not convex. In the convex hull of P
there may appear additional equilibria with possibly stochastic prices.
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We now refine the equilibrium concept and investigate the set of equilibria
with inertia in the B-economy. We investigate how the equilibrium set
found in theorem 5.2 changes due to the inertia property. Except in the
limit case of infinite ambiguity, the indeterminacy of the equilibrium set in
the B-economy survives the equilibrium refinement inertia.
Theorem 5.4. The equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with c⇤ = ↵U and p⇤ = exp( 12↵2)
satisfies the inertia property iﬀ ↵ 2 [max{ , p2  2+ 2},min{, +
p
2 + 2+ 2}]. In particular, the set of equilibria with inertia in the B-
economy is indeterminate for positive and finite ambiguity ( 2 (0,1)).
The indeterminacy is straightforward as equilibrium allocations are non-
isolated for  2 (0,1), for details consult the appendix.
Concerning full insurance and no trade of uncertainty theorem 5.4 implies
the following results.
Corollary 5.5. For the focal allocations full insurance and no trade of
uncertainty we have
(i) The full insurance allocation is not an equilibrium with inertia allocation
for  > 1.
(ii) There arises a no trade of uncertainty equilibrium with inertia for    1.
We can describe the equilibrium interval more precisely. In Corollary 5.6
we do comparative statics in , investigate which terms are decisive in the
interval definition and the thickness of the interval. The proofs can be found
in the appendix.
Corollary 5.6. (i) For the lower bound of the interval, the actual inertia
property becomes decisive for     13 +
p
7
3 .
(ii) For the upper bound of the interval, the actual inertia property becomes
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decisive for    13 +
p
7
3 .
(iii) The thickness of the interval is largest for  =  13 +
p
7
3 .
(iv) The thickness of the interval converges to 0 for limiting .
(v) The thickness of the interval increases monotonically for    13 +
p
7
3 .
(vi) The thickness of the interval decreases monotonically for    13 +
p
7
3 .
Before we give the proof of theorem 5.4, we illustrate theorem 5.4 graphically
via the following figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Equilibrium consumption set
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0
1
 1


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|| = 
In figure 5.2, the equilibrium allocations in a B-economy are indicated for
the first agent. The amount of ambiguity  is plotted against the share ↵
of uncertainty U which the agent consumes in equilibrium. The 45 degree
lines enclose the set of equilibrium allocations in B-economies without the
refinement of inertia. The two curves are due to the inertia condition, the
borders in theorem 5.4. They have for  = 0 the value
p
2 and  p2 re-
spectively and converge both monotonously against 1. The set of equilibria
with inertia is the shaded set. There is a smooth transition from one focal
allocation to the other, i.e. from full insurance to no insurance of uncer-
tainty. The equilibrium with inertia is only unique in the limit cases of a
risk economy ( = 0) and infinite ambiguity. This smooth transition has
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its origin in the tension between risk aversion and the inertia property. The
status quo bias due to the inertia property becomes the more powerful, the
higher the ambiguity. In particular, we have for ambiguity  > 1 that full
insurance is no longer possible in equilibrium. As soon as the inertia prop-
erty becomes the decisive bound for the equilibrium consumption set, we
have with further increasing  a decrease in the volume of possible trade for
insurance in the sense that the thickness of the equilibrium set decreases.
Finally, we note that a no trade of uncertainty equilibrium arises for    1,
as stated in corollary 5.5.
We turn to the proof of theorem 5.4.
Proof. (Theorem 5.4) We plug equilibrium consumption in the inertia prop-
erty. Here Q is a probability measure taken from the set of priors P and  
the expectation of U which corresponds to Q.
 EQ exp( c⇤)    EQ exp( !)
)  EQ exp ( ↵U)    EQ exp ( R  U)
) EP0 exp
✓
 ↵U +  U   1
2
 2
◆
 EP0 exp
✓
 U  R +  U   1
2
 2
◆
Both random variables U and R are standard normal under P0, so that
Laplace Transformation yields
) exp
✓
1
2
(    ↵)2   1
2
 2
◆
 exp
✓
1
2
+
1
2
(    1)2   1
2
 2
◆
,
which simplifies to
1
2
↵2    (↵  1)  1. (5.2)
The inequality 5.2 has to hold for all   2 [ ,]. Therefore it suﬃces to
check if 5.2 holds for the most extreme priors, which is either   =  or
  =  . We now distinguish the following two cases.
1
2
↵2   (↵  1)  1 if ↵ < 1, (5.3)
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and
1
2
↵2 + (↵  1)  1 if ↵   1. (5.4)
Solving these equations for ↵ leads to the intervals for ↵ in theorem 5.4.
Subject to our restriction ↵ =    there cannot be other equilibria as for
all other ↵ the inertia condition fails to hold. The left hand side of either
inequality 5.3 or inequality 5.4 would be larger than one. This concludes
the proof of theorem 5.4.
Comment 5.7. There is a stark diﬀerence between the equilibrium sets in
the B-economy and the Gilboa-Schmeidler (GS) economy. The GS-economy
has its name as agents use GS-preferences as axiomatized in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). We define the Gilboa-Schmeidler economy in exactly the
same framework as the B-economy, we only change the preference relation of
the agents. The GS-economy is the economy where agents use the following
criterion to compare allocations c and d
c % d, min
Q2P
EQu(c)   min
Q2P
EQu(d).
This preference relation is complete and we do not have indeterminacy as the
full insurance allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation, independently
of the amount of ambiguity . To prove the latter, we apply the argument
of Billot et al. (2000) as agents always have a common prior and there is no
aggregate uncertainty.
Comment 5.8. Equilibrium prices in both theorem 5.2 and theorem 5.4
are deterministic while equilibrium allocations are stochastic. This some-
what surprising result comes from the budget constraint that has to hold in
theorem 5.2.
Comment 5.9. With the set of equilibria with and without inertia that
we found, we are able to answer the questions when the set of equilibria is
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indeterminate and when full insurance is an equilibrium allocation. More-
over, the shape of the equilibrium sets enables a clear understanding of the
interplay of risk and uncertainty and how they influence the set of equilib-
ria with inertia. The latter aspect is also subject of section 5.4.1, where we
change the endowments of the agents.
5.4 Robustness
We investigate the robustness of our findings in the equilibrium analysis. We
consider agents with diﬀerent endowment than before, especially the case,
when agents are exclusively endowed with uncertainty and not with risk.
Furthermore, we allow the agents to have degree a of constant absolute risk
aversion. Finally, we change the prior sets of the agents in several diﬀerent
aspects.
5.4.1 Endowment
In the previous section, we considered agents that were endowed with a risky
component and an uncertain component, such that !1 = R+ U =  !2. In
general one can consider agents that have endowment !1 = aU + bR =
 !2, where a   0 and b   0. This generalizes the previous case. The
results for this case are stated in the following two theorems 5.10 and 5.11.
Moreover, we describe the focal case where agents are exclusively endowed
with uncertainty !1 = U =  !2. In this case, we get the result described
in corollary 5.12.
Theorem 5.10. Suppose the endowment of the agents is !1 = aR + bU =
 !2. Then the B-economy has an equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with equilibrium con-
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sumption c1⇤ =  c2⇤ = ↵U and equilibrium price p⇤ = exp( 12↵2) for
↵ 2 [ ,]. In particular, the set of equilibria in the B-economy is indeter-
minate for  > 0.
Theorem 5.11. Suppose the endowment of the agents is !1 = aR + bU =
 !2. The equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with c⇤ = ↵U and p⇤ = exp( 12↵2) satisfies
the inertia property iﬀ ↵ 2 [max{ , pa2 + b2   2b+ 2},min{, +
p
a2 + b2 + 2b+ 2}]. In particular, the set of equilibria with inertia in the
B-economy is indeterminate for positive and finite ambiguity ( 2 (0,1))
and a > 0.
Corollary 5.12. Suppose the agents’ endowment is !1 = U =  !2. Then
the equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with equilibrium consumption ! 6= c⇤ = ↵U and
equilibrium price p⇤ = exp( 12↵2) satisfies the inertia property iﬀ
↵ 2 [max{ , 2  1},min{, 1}]. (5.5)
We illustrate the equilibrium set of corollary 5.12 in the following figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Equilibrium consumption set
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Two points are remarkable concerning this special case. First, the inertia
assumption induces borders for ↵ that depend linearly on . Second, equa-
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tion 5.5 can only be satisfied for   1. This second fact is not surprising.
When the agents are endowed with risk, they always trade the risk away
and thus increase their expected utility. This gives the agents flexibility in
their consumption choice of uncertainty. Without risk in their endowment,
the agents do not have this flexibility. As soon as the endowment allocation
becomes an equilibrium with inertia allocation, this equilibrium becomes
unique. We note this in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.13. Suppose the agents’ endowment allocation is an equilib-
rium with inertia allocation. Then this equilibrium with inertia is unique.
Equation 5.5 can only be satisfied for   1. The endowment allocation
always satisfies the inertia property as this property is only defined for all
allocations but the endowment allocation. This implies that for    1 the
equilibrium with inertia is uniquely the endowment equilibrium. This fact
is a parallel to Rigotti and Shannon (2005) who have the same finding in
their paper.
5.4.2 Degree of constant absolute risk aversion
So far, we assumed agents to have CARA utility function of degree 1. Now
we consider agents having CARA utility of degree a. This leads to the
following generalization of theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.14. Suppose agents have CARA utility of degree a. A con-
sumption price pair (c⇤, p⇤) is an equilibrium in the B-economy if equilibrium
consumption is c⇤ = ↵aU and equilibrium price is p
⇤ = exp( 12↵2).
The theorem is proven as theorem 5.2. Refining the equilibrium set with
the inertia property leads to
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Theorem 5.15. Suppose agents have CARA utility of degree a and that
agents are endowed with !1 = R + U =  !2. The equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with
equilibrium consumption c⇤ = ↵aU and equilibrium price p
⇤ = exp( 12↵2)
satisfies the inertia property iﬀ
↵ 2 [max{ , p2   2a2 + 2a},min{, +p2 + 2a2 + 2a}],
which is again proved in the same way as the corresponding theorem 5.4.
Thus our findings are robust to changes of the degree of constant absolute
risk aversion. For details of the proofs see the appendix.
5.4.3 General degree of constant absolute risk aversion
and general endowment
We combine the generalizations of the two preceding subsections.
Theorem 5.16. Suppose agents have CARA utility of degree z and are
endowed with !1 =  !2 = aR+ bU . A consumption price pair (c⇤, p⇤) is an
equilibrium in the B-economy if equilibrium consumption is c⇤ = ↵zU and
equilibrium price is p⇤ = exp( 12↵2).
For the equilibrium with inertia set we get
Theorem 5.17. Suppose agents have CARA utility of degree z and are
endowed with !1 =  !2 = aR+bU . The equilibrium (c⇤, p⇤) with equilibrium
consumption c⇤ = ↵zU and equilibrium price p
⇤ = exp( 12↵2) satisfies the
inertia property iﬀ
↵ 2 [max{ , 
p
2 + (za)2 + (zb)2   2zb},min{, +
p
2 + (za)2 + (zb)2 + 2zb}]
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5.4.4 Prior sets
In the preceding sections, we assumed P1 = P2 = P . We now consider
cases, where P1 6= P2 becomes possible and where the interval is not sym-
metric around 0. We only examine the equilibrium set without the inertia
refinement. All proofs are straightforward and given in the appendix. In
a slight abuse of notation, we define the prior set by specifying the set in
which the expectation of U lies.
Theorem 5.18. Suppose P1 = [ 1,2] and P2 = [ ⌘1, ⌘2], for 1,2, ⌘1, ⌘2  
0. Consider the intersection P1 \ P2 = [ ⇣, ⇣] Then the economy has an
equilibrium with c⇤ = ↵U and price p⇤ = exp( 12↵2), where ↵ 2 [ ⇣, ⇣].
In particular, this theorem includes the following two special cases which
we formulate as corollaries.
Corollary 5.19. Suppose P1 = [ ,] and P2 = [ ⌘, ⌘], for , ⌘  
0. Then the economy has an equilibrium with c⇤ = ↵U and price p⇤ =
exp( 12↵2), where ↵ 2 P1 \ P2.
Corollary 5.20. Suppose P1 = P2 = [ , ⌘], for , ⌘   0. Then the
economy has an equilibrium with c⇤ = ↵U and price p⇤ = exp( 12↵2), where
|↵|  min{||, |⌘|}.
We now allow for prior sets which may have empty intersection.
Theorem 5.21. Suppose !1 =  !2 = R + U , that agents have CARA-
utility of degree 1 and that P1 = [1,2] and P2 = [⌘1, ⌘2] for 1,2, ⌘1, ⌘2 2
R. The allocation ↵U is an equilibrium allocation with equilibrium price
exp( 12↵2) if ↵ 2 P1 and  ↵ 2 P2. In particular, if 0 /2 P1 \ P2, then the
full insurance allocation is never an equilibrium allocation.
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One could now continue and formulate the equilibrium with inertia versions
of the above theorems. The only new thing in the proofs is that the inertia
condition has to be checked individually for both agents as the prior sets
of the two agents are diﬀerent. Moreover, one could combine the general
endowment cases and general degree of constant absolute risk aversion cases
with the cases where agents have diﬀerent priors. We do not expect qualita-
tively new insights from these even more general robustness investigations,
thus we stop the robustness analysis at this point.
5.5 Conclusion
We have investigated how agents interacting in a B-economy can share
and trade risk and uncertainty. We have examined the set of equilibria
in the B-economy. In particular, we have shown that the set of equilibria
with inertia in the B-economy is indeterminate except in the limit cases,
and a no trade of uncertainty equilibrium arises if the ambiguity  is high
enough. Furthermore, full insurance is not possible in the B-economy for
suﬃciently large ambiguity if we use the equilibrium notion of equilibrium
with inertia. This may in part explain the recent liquidity crisis of the
financial markets. Our results are robust to changes of the degree of constant
absolute risk aversion. Furthermore, we have investigated the robustness of
the assumptions on the prior sets and the endowments of the agents. An
important next step is to formulate and analyze the continuous time version
of the case study. In continuous time the prior set is convex and a full
characterization of the equilibrium sets appears to be possible.
Our results depend on the specific construction of the prior set. The con-
struction provides us with the neat “separation” of risk and Knightian un-
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certainty, the measure  for the amount of ambiguity in the economy and
allows the comparison of the equilibrium sets in diﬀerent economies. Inves-
tigations with more than two agents or with two diﬀerent kinds of agents
therefore need a diﬀerent setup.
Following the lines of Dana and Riedel (2013), we finally suggest an interpre-
tation of our results in terms of financial market regulation. Two prevalent
ways of regulation are risk measures and stress testing. Exhibiting a stress
test means comparing the performance of a new allocation and a status quo
allocation under diﬀerent scenarios. The new allocation is only preferred
to the status quo if it is preferable under all scenarios. With the scenarios
described by the priors and the endowment serving as the status quo, the
usage of B-preferences plus inertia can be interpreted as performing a stress
test. For example, the resilience of European banks against diﬀerent critical
economic scenarios was stress tested recently.
A diﬀerent approach to regulation was taken by Artzner et al. (1999). Their
starting point was that a tool to measure risk in financial markets should sat-
isfy certain desirable properties like subadditivity and monotonicity. They
introduced coherent risk measures in Artzner et al. (1999). GS-preferences
can be interpreted as coherent risk measures due to the representation result
for coherent risk measures in Artzner et al. (1999).
Our results show an objectionable consequence of stress testing: The market
for insurance dries up provided there is a suﬃcient amount of ambiguity in
the economy and becomes smaller with further increasing ambiguity. Worst
case regulation via coherent risk measures never leads to these economically
bad no insurance equilibria. In this respect, coherent risk measures may
thus be the better way to regulate.
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While the latter interpretation is a valid and interesting interpretation of
our results, a convincing general theory to evaluate and compare the im-
plications of diﬀerent forms of financial market regulation has yet to be
formulated. In the light of the recent turmoil on financial markets, this
remains an important and urgent task of economic theory.
5.6 Appendix
Proof. (Theorem 5.1)
The two agents have the same prior for the distribution of the risk R. If
a feasible allocation contained risk for one agent it would contain also risk
for the other. By exchanging this risk and thus trading it away completely
both agents are better oﬀ and have higher expected utility due to their risk
aversion. Thus equilibrium allocations do not contain risk components.
Proof. (Theorem 5.4, indeterminacy part)
Suppose  2 (0,1). It suﬃces to show for indeterminacy that
 +p2 + 2+ 2   ( p2  2+ 2) > 0
as the interval in theorem 5.4 has positive length in this case. For finite 
it holds
 +p2 + 2+ 2 =  +
p
(+ 1)2 + 1 >  + + 1 = 1,
and
 p2  2+ 2 =  
p
(  1)2 + 1 <   (  1) = 1,
which shows nondegeneracy of the interval and thus indeterminacy of the
equilibrium with inertia set.
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Proof. (Corollary 5.5)
(i) Suppose  > 1. Then
max{ , p2  2+ 2} =  p2  2+ 2 =  
p
(  1)2 + 1 > 0.
Thus the full insurance allocation which corresponds to the case ↵ = 0 is
not an element of the interval [max{ ,   p2  2+ 2},min{,  +
p
2 + 2+ 2}]. This implies that the full insurance allocation does not
survive the equilibrium refinement of inertia if  > 1.
(ii) Suppose    1. Then
min{, +p2 + 2+ 2}   1
as    1 by assumption and  +p2 + 2+ 2 =  +p(+ 1)2 + 1   1.
On the other hand,
max{ , p2  2+ 2}  1
for all , as  p2  2+ 2 =  p(  1)2 + 1  1 for all . This implies
that the no trade of uncertainty allocation which corresponds to ↵ = 1 is
always an element of the interval [max{ , p2  2+ 2},min{, +
p
2 + 2+ 2}] if    1.
Proof. (Corollary 5.6)
(i)
  =  p2  2+ 2
)  =  1
3
+
p
7
3
.
The expression  p2  2+ 2 is strictly monotonically increasing as the
derivative is
1   1p
( 1)2+1 > 0 for finite . This shows (i).
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(ii) We show (ii) similarly to (i).
 =  +p2 + 2+ 2
)  = +1
3
+
p
7
3
.
The expression   + p2 + 2+ 2 is strictly monotonically decreasing as
the derivative is  1 + +1p
(+1)2+1
< 0 for finite . This proves (ii).
(iii) As the slope of the function    p2   2+ 2 is larger than one for
 < 1 and smaller than one for  > 1, the only candidates where the
equilibrium set may be thickest are  13 +
p
7
3 and
1
3 +
p
7
3 . The thickness of
the interval at these points is  23 + 2
p
7
3 ⇡ 1.097 andq
(13 +
p
7
3   1)2 + 1 ⇡ 1.023, respectively. Thus the interval is thickest at
the point  =  13 +
p
7
3 .
(iv) The upper bound of the interval converges monotonously from above
against 1,  +p(+ 1)2 + 1! 1 for !1.
The lower bound of the interval converges monotonously from below against
1,   p(  1)2 + 1 ! 1 for  ! 1. Thus the thickness of the interval
converges against 0 for !1.
(v) For    13 +
p
7
3 it holds [max{ ,  
p
2  2+ 2},min{,  +
p
2 + 2+ 2}] = [ ,], which implies (v).
(vi) For    13 +
p
7
3 it holds [max{ ,  
p
2  2+ 2},min{,  +
p
2 + 2+ 2}] = [ p2  2+ 2, +p2 + 2+ 2]. As  p2  2+ 2
is strictly monotonically increasing in  and   +p2 + 2+ 2 is strictly
monotonically decreasing in , (vi) is implied.
Proof. (Theorem 5.10) The proof follows the lines of the proof of theorem
5.2. We begin by equalizing the marginal rates of substitution to calculate
151
Section 5.6 Appendix
equilibrium consumption c1⇤ and then calculate the equilibrium price. As
the calculations do not depend on the endowment we get the same results
as in theorem 5.2, i.e. c1⇤ = 12(↵   )U   14(↵2    2) and
p1⇤ = p⇤ = exp
 
1
2 (↵+  )U   14 (↵2 +  2)
 
.
Markets clear due to the normalization of consumption. For the budget
constraint the following equality has to hold for the first agent.
EP0p⇤(!   c1⇤) = 0.
This leads in the general endowment case to
EP0
✓
exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
 
↵2 +  2
 ◆✓
aR + bU   1
2
(↵   )U + 1
4
(↵2 +  2)
◆◆
= 0.
Suppose now ↵ =   . The equation simplifies to
EP0
✓
exp( 1
2
↵2)(aR + bU   ↵U)
◆
= exp( 1
2
↵2)EP0(aR + bU   ↵U) = 0,
as U and R are standard normal distributions under P0.
Walras’ law guarantees that the budget constraint is also satisfied for the
second agent. This completes the proof.
Proof. (Theorem 5.11) The proof follows the lines of the proof of theorem
5.4. We take equilibrium consumption and check when the inertia property
is satisfied. Q is a probability measure from the prior set P and   the
expectation of U which corresponds to Q.
 EQ exp( c⇤)    EQ exp( !)
)  EQ exp ( ↵U)    EQ exp ( aR  bU)
) EP0 exp
✓
 ↵U +  U   1
2
 2
◆
 EP0 exp
✓
 aR  bU +  U   1
2
 2
◆
) EP0 exp
✓
(    ↵)U   1
2
 2
◆
 EP0 exp
✓
(    b)U   aR  1
2
 2
◆
.
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Both random variables U and R are standard normal under P0, so that
Laplace Transformation yields
) exp
✓
1
2
(    ↵)2   1
2
 2
◆
 exp
✓
1
2
a2 +
1
2
(    b)2   1
2
 2
◆
,
which simplifies to
(    ↵)2  a2 + (    b)2.
This expression can be written as
↵2   b2   2 (↵  b)  a2.
This inequality has to hold for all   2 [ ,]. Thus we have to check
the most extreme priors   =   and   = . We distinguish between the
following cases.
↵2   b2   2(↵  b)  a2 if ↵  b, (5.6)
and
↵2   b2 + 2(↵  b)  a2 if ↵ > b. (5.7)
We solve these two expressions for ↵, starting with 5.6
) ↵2   2↵+ 2b  a2   b2   0
) ↵    p2   2b+ a2 + b2.
For 5.7 we get in a similar way
) ↵2 + 2(↵  b)  b2   a2  0
) ↵   +p2 + 2b+ a2 + b2.
Thus we have established the borders of the theorem and the condition for
↵ is
↵ 2 [max{ , p2   2b+ a2 + b2},min{, +p2 + 2b+ a2 + b2}].
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Proof. (Corollary 5.12) The proof follows by setting b = 0.
Proof. (Corollary 5.13) The argument is given in the text before the state-
ment of the corollary.
Proof. (Theorem 5.14) The proof follows again the lines of the proof of
theorem 5.2. Suppose the degree of constant absolute risk aversion is a.
The calculation of equilibrium consumption yields
  exp( ac1⇤)q1 =   exp( ac2⇤)q2
As c1⇤ =  c2⇤, this solves to
c1⇤ =
1
2(↵   )U   14(↵2    2)
a
.
For the equilibrium price we then get
  exp( ac1⇤)q1 =   exp(ac1⇤)q2
) exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
(↵2 +  2)
◆
= p1⇤ = p2⇤ = p⇤.
The equilibrium price is independent of the degree of constant absolut risk
aversion a. The equilibrium consumption has to be normalized with the
CARA degree. We now assume ↵ =    and show that the budget con-
straint EP0p⇤(!   c1⇤) = 0 holds. Plugging in the values for equilibrium
consumption and equilibrium price leads to
E
✓
exp
✓
 1
2
↵2
◆✓
R + U   ↵U
a
◆◆
= exp
✓
 1
2
↵2
◆
EP0
✓
R + U   ↵U
a
◆
= 0,
as R and U are standard normal under P0. This completes the proof.
Proof. (Theorem 5.15) We check when the inertia property holds. As before,
let Q denote a prior from the prior set P with corresponding expectation  .
 EQ
✓
exp
✓
 a↵U
a
◆◆
   EQ (exp( a(R + U)))
) EP0
✓
exp ( ↵U) exp( U   1
2
 2)
◆
 EP0
✓
exp( a(R + U)) exp( U   1
2
 2)
◆
.
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Laplace transformation yields
) exp
 
(    ↵)2
2
  1
2
 2
!
 exp
✓
a2
2
+
(    a)2
2
  1
2
 2
◆
.
Taking the logarithm and simplifying leads to
) ↵
2
2
+   (a  ↵)  a2.
This inequality has to hold for all   in the prior set, thus we only have to
consider the most extreme priors  and  . We distinguish between the
following two cases.
↵2
2
   (a  ↵)  a2 if ↵   a, (5.8)
and
↵2
2
+  (a  ↵)  a2 if ↵ < a. (5.9)
We solve these two expressions for ↵, starting with 5.8.
) ↵2 + 2↵  2a2   2a2  0
) ↵   +p2 + 2a2 + 2a
For the second expression 5.7 we get
) ↵2   2↵+ (  1)2a2  0
) ↵    p2   2a+ 2a2,
which concludes the proof.
Proof. (Theorem 5.16) We follow once again the lines of theorem 5.2. Equal-
izing the marginal rates of substitution yields the equilibrium consumption.
exp( zc1⇤)q1 = exp( zc2⇤)q2
) exp( zc1⇤) exp
✓
↵U   1
2
↵2
◆
= exp(zc1⇤) exp
✓
 U   1
2
 2
◆
) c1⇤ =
1
2(↵   )U   14(↵2    2)
z
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The equilibrium price is
p1⇤ = exp( zc1⇤)q1 = exp
✓
 1
2
(↵   )U + 1
4
(↵2    2)
◆
exp
✓
↵U   1
2
↵2
◆
= exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
(↵2 +  2)
◆
For the second agent
p2⇤ = exp( zc2⇤)q2 = exp
✓
1
2
(↵   )U   1
4
(↵2    2)
◆
exp
✓
 U   1
2
 2
◆
= exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
(↵2 +  2)
◆
.
We now check the budget constraint.
EP0(p⇤(!1   c1⇤))
= EP0 exp
✓
1
2
(↵+  )U   1
4
(↵2 +  2)
◆✓
aR + bU  
1
2(↵   )U   14(↵2    2)
z
◆
For ↵ =    this simplifies to
EP0 exp( 1
2
↵2)
✓
aR + bU   ↵U
z
◆
= exp( 1
2
↵2)EP0
✓
aR + bU   ↵U
z
◆
= 0
which completes the proof.
Proof. (Theorem 5.17) We follow the lines of theorem 5.4 and check the
inertia property.
 EQ exp( zc⇤)    EQ exp( z(aR + bU))
) EQ exp( (↵U)  EQ exp( z(aR + bU))
) EP0(exp( (↵U)) exp( U   1
2
 2))  EP0(exp( z(aR + bU)) exp( U   1
2
 2))
Laplace transformation yields
) exp((    ↵)
2
2
   
2
2
)  exp((za)
2
2
+
(    bz)2
2
  1
2
 2)
) ↵
2
2
  (za)
2
2
  (zb)
2
2
+  (zb  ↵)  0
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We consider the extreme priors defined by   =  and   =   and make the
following case distinction:
) ↵
2
2
  (za)
2
2
  (zb)
2
2
+ (zb  ↵)  0 if (zb  ↵)   0, (5.10)
and
) ↵
2
2
  (za)
2
2
  (zb)
2
2
  (zb  ↵)  0 if (zb  ↵) < 0, (5.11)
We solve these expressions for ↵, beginning with 5.10.
) ↵2   2↵  (za)2   (zb)2 + 2zb  0
) ↵ = ±
p
2 + (za)2 + (zb)2   2zb.
The second inequality 5.11 becomes
) ↵2 + 2↵  (za)2   (zb)2   2zb  0
) ↵ =  ±
p
2 + (za)2 + (zb)2 + 2zb.
Proof. (Theorem 5.18) Consider the intersection of the prior set
P\ = P1 \ P2. It holds 0 2 P\. For the prior set P\ the proof of theorem
5.18 is identical to the proof of theorem 5.2.
Proof. (Corollary 5.19) Follows from theorem 5.18 by setting 1 = 2 = 
and ⌘1 = ⌘2 = ⌘.
Proof. (Corollary 5.20) Follows from theorem 5.18 by setting 1 = ⌘1 = 
and 2 = ⌘2 = ⌘.
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Proof. (Theorem 5.21) We now consider the case where the prior sets of
both agents have an empty intersection. Suppose ↵ 2 P1 and  ↵ 2 P2.
Then the fact that ↵U is an equilibrium allocation and exp( 12↵2) is an
equilibrium price is proven as in theorem 5.2. The full insurance allocation
corresponds to ↵ = 0. Thus, if this ↵ is not an element of one of the prior
sets, than the full insurance allocation is not an equilibrium allocation.
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Summary
This dissertation studies the robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria to uncertainty
about the preferences, the LIBOR mechanism from a game theoretic point of view, and
applications of ambiguity theory with a particular focus on insurance questions.
The main chapters of this thesis are based on four articles and self-contained. Chapter 2
is joint work with Christoph Kuzmics. We investigate the set of equilibria in the model
of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) when the receiver faces uncertainty about the
preferences of the sender and prove that there is a qualitative diﬀerence to the situation
in the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Uncertainty about the preferences in the
framework of Chakraborty and Harbaugh leads to the nonexistence of all influential
equilibria, while in the framework of Crawford and Sobel uncertainty about the bias may
still allow for influential communication in equilibrium.
The London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) has been manipulated for many years. We
study in chapter 3 the underlying mechanism from the game theoretic perspective and
examine how and why diﬀerent statistics lead to diﬀerent quote patterns in equilibrium.
In particular, we are, on the descriptive side, able to understand the observed quote
patterns in the real world, and, on the normative side, able to give advice what kind of
changes to the current mechanism may attenuate the problem of the manipulability of
the LIBOR.
In chapters 4 and 5 we introduce model uncertainty into the classic insurance market
model by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and examine the static version of the case study
introduced by Dana and Riedel (2013). Most importantly, we present a new solution
to the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium puzzle, and describe precisely the set of equilibria
which survives the equilibrium refinement inertia, a refinement introduced by Bewley
(2002).
Keywords
Cheap Talk, Influential, Uncertainty, Bias, Preferences, Robust, LIBOR, Game Theory,
Mechanism, Manipulation, Model Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Existence, Inertia, Bewley,
Incomplete, Risk Aversion, Ambiguity Aversion
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Résumé en Français
La présente thèse étudie la robustesse de l’équilibre en communication gratuite qui influe
sur l’incertitude concernant les préférences ainsi que le mécanisme du LIBOR du point
de vue de la théorie des jeux et les applications de la théorie de l’ambiguïté, l’accent
étant particulièrement mis sur les questions d’assurance.
Le principaux chapitres de cette thèse se fondent sur quatre articles et sont indépendants
les uns des autres. Le chapitre 2 a été rédigé conjoinement avec Christoph Kuzmics. Nous
avons étudié l’ensemble des équilibres du modèle de Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010)
lorsque le récepteur fait face à une incertitude concernant les préférences de l’envoyer et
prouvé qu’il y a une diﬀérence qualitative par rapport à la situation du modèle de Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982). L’incertitude sur les préférences dans le cadre de Chakraborty and
Harbaugh amène à nier l’existence de tout équilibre influencé, alors qu’avec Crawford and
Sobel, l’incertitude sur le biais n’empêche pas la communication influente à l’équilibre.
Des manipulation du London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) sont pratiquées depuis
des années. Au chapitre 3, nous avons étudié le mécanisme sous-jacent du point de vue de
la théorie des jeux et examiné comment et pourquoi des statistiques diﬀérentes amènent
à diﬀérent modèles de cotations à l’équilibre. En particulier, du point de vue déscriptif,
nous avons pu suivre les diﬀérents modèles de cotation à l’équilibre dans le monde réel
et, du point de vue normatif, proposer les types de modifications du mécanisme actuel
qui pourraient contribuer à atténuer la manipulabilité du LIBOR.
Aux chapitres 4 et 5, nous avons introduit l’incertitude modélisée dans le modèle classique
du marché de l’assurance de Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) et examiné la version statique
de l’étude de cas introduite par Dana and Riedel (2013). Et, surtout, nous présentons
une nouvelle solution à l’énigme de l’équilibre de Rothschild and Stiglitz et décrivons
avec précision l’ensemble des équilibres qui subsistent à l’inertie du raﬃnement dans la
recherche de l’équilibre, raﬃnement introduit par Bewley (2002).
Mots clés
Communication gratuite, Influent, Incertitude, Biais, Préférences, Robuste, LIBOR,
Théorie des jeux, Mécanisme, Manipulation, Incertitude de modèle, Ambiguïté, Exis-
tence, Inertie, Bewley, Aversion du risque, Aversion de l’ambiguïté.
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